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Frank Newton Trager
1905-1984

Frank Trager, whose life ended August 26, 1984, in Carmel, California, left the world a better place. A prolific scholar and a political activist deeply committed to liberty and justice for all, Frank Trager never swayed from his principles. The search for social justice and outspoken opposition to communism coexisted comfortably in the heart and mind of this happy warrior.

A varsity wrestler in college, labor organizer and colleague of Norman Thomas in the Socialist Party during the Depression, enlisted man in the U.S. Army Air Forces during the Second World War, fervent advocate of staunching communist power in Asia in the postwar years, Frank Trager never ducked a fight when his principles were at stake. Those who threatened his principles encountered a tireless opponent. Those who fought with him found him a champion. Those with whom he disagreed never faulted his fairness.

At the time of his death Frank Trager had been a Member of the Board of Directors of the Foreign Policy Research Institute and a Member of the Editorial Board of ORBIS for a decade and a half. On the occasion of one of his fortunately temporary retirements, the Spring 1977 issue of ORBIS was dedicated to him and included a tribute to his life work. Both lifelong friends and the younger generation to whose education he gave himself feel privileged to have shared a part of their lives with Frank Trager.

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forum

THE GULF WAR, YEAR FIVE

The Iran-Iraq war is now into its fifth year, with little prospect that the conflict will end soon. The war has already cost over a quarter of a million lives and untold billions of dollars in military and civilian destruction, and foregone economic opportunities. The current "ORBIS Forum" provides an update on a number of important issue areas related to the war. The contributors are: **DENNIS ROSS,** *Executive Director of the Berkeley-Stanford Program on Soviet International Behavior, and formerly Deputy Director of the Office of Net Assessment in the Pentagon;* **JOHN DUKE ANTHONY,** *President of the National Council on United States-Arab Relations;* **BIJAN MOSSAVAR-RAHMANI,** *Research Coordinator at the Harvard University Energy and Environmental Policy Center; and* **MARSHALL W. WILEY,** *former United States Ambassador to the Sultanate of Oman.*

SOVIET VIEWS TOWARD THE GULF WAR

by DENNIS ROSS

For anyone who has followed the Soviet public posture on the Iran-Iraq war, it may seem odd to speak of changing Soviet views toward the conflict and its protagonists. After all, the Soviet declaratory position on the war has been consistent. From the outset of the Gulf war, the Soviets have repeatedly called it "senseless," "fratricidal" — a war only serving the interests of imperialism. Soviet commentators and officials, like Karen Brutents (Deputy Chief of the International Department), have consistently stressed that the war serves neither Iraqi nor Iranian interests, splits the Arab world, provides the United States a pretext to offer "protection" to the Gulf Arabs and thus build its military presence in the region, and diverts attention away from "United States-Zionist" plans in the area.[1]

[1] See, for example, Brutent's comments on the Iran-Iraq war, Moscow Television Service, FBIS, February 27, 1984, p. CC-18-19.

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In fact, and despite their declared neutrality, the Soviets have changed their posture toward the combatants during the course of the conflict and may now be changing their attitude toward the war itself. Their various twists and turns, and the reasons for them, reveal much about Soviet attitudes, priorities, and operating styles in the Gulf.

The Soviet Tilt Toward Iran, 1980-1982

The outbreak of the war in September 1980 was inconvenient for the Soviets. Iraq, the emerging regional power with whom the Soviets had a Treaty of Friendship, invaded Iran. The region's preeminent power, Iran had suddenly become virulently anti-American, and was undergoing revolutionary change that created opportunities for the Soviets. Tension between the two might complicate the Soviet ability to woo both, but a war was bound to force the Soviet leadership to choose. And it did.

While calling for an end to the war and declaring neutrality, Soviet neutrality had a decided Iranian tilt. Notwithstanding their Treaty of Friendship, treaties the Soviets have worked to invest with credibility and international standing, the Soviets cut off *direct* or new arms supplies to the Iraqis (though they did fulfill prior contracts for small arms and munitions). At the same time, the Soviets offered Iran major weapon systems and other forms of assistance.[2] Though the Iranians apparently rejected offers of direct Soviet arms transfers, Soviet arms and munitions were supplied by Eastern European states and by Libya and Syria, presumably with Soviet consent and at times with Soviet assistance.[3] In addition, the Soviets signed a Treaty of Friendship with Syria in late 1980, motivated in part by the need to counter a growing United States presence in the region. Closer Soviet-Syrian ties were bound to be seen by the Iraqis as further evidence of a Soviet tilt toward Iran, given Syrian hostility to Iraq and its material support for Iran.

In tilting toward Iran, the Soviets saw it as the real strategic prize in the area. After all, Iran, not Iraq, borders the USSR and physically separates the Soviet Union from the Gulf; its population equals that of Iraq and all the Gulf states combined. At the time of the revolution and the beginning of the war it had a very impressive array of advanced American military equipment; and its anti-Americanism and revolutionary situation created an apparent strategic opportunity. Whatever costs might be incurred in the Soviet-Iraqi relationship, and to the image and value

[2] Shrahram Chubin, "Gains for Soviet Policy in the Middle East," *International Security,* Spring 1982, p. 140.

[3] Mark Heller, *The Iran-Iraq War: Implications for Third Parties,* Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, Paper No. 23, January 1984, p. 33.

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of Soviet Treaties of Friendship generally, were apparently offset by these factors, justifying a tilt toward Iran.

Adopting Real Neutrality, 1982-March 1984

The Soviet tilt was accompanied (before and after the outbreak of war) by efforts to woo the Iranians in a variety of ways: the Soviets offered the Iranians military, technical and economic assistance; offered to help to deal with internal security threats;[4] blocked sanctions against the Iranians in the U.N. during the hostage crisis; increased trade with and served as a transit route for goods into Iran at the time of the United States economic embargo; warned the United States against intervening in Iran; and even tried to identify ideologically by claiming as Brezhnev did at the 26th Party Congress that the "liberation struggle can develop under the banner of Islam."

Despite these efforts, the Soviets got nowhere with the Iranians who unilaterally renounced the 1921 Treaty of Friendship, cancelled construction of the second Iran Natural Gas Trunkline, increasingly condemned Soviet regional policies, and took what the Soviets regarded as a number of other hostile actions. Pavel Demchenko writing in *Pravda* in March 1982 observed that in an "atmosphere of febrile anti-Soviet propaganda"[5] Iranian authorities had set back Soviet-Iranian relations and understanding. He noted that some around Khomeini had an "extreme right-wing orientation" and were trying to put the "brakes on the development of Soviet-Iranian relations, even though such action could harm the Iranian economy and Iran's ability to fight imperialist pressure."[6]

The Demchenko article reflects the basic themes that began to emerge in Soviet commentary about Iran in the spring of 1982: themes emphasizing the positive achievements of the Iranian revolution, while also emphasizing that these achievements were in jeopardy. This precarious state was caused — it was said — by the inability of some Iranians to recognize that the Soviets were their only true friends. Soviet commentators criticized only Iran's behavior toward the Soviets and *not* Iran's role in the war; but the commentary reflected growing frustration and foreshadowed the end of the Soviet tilt toward Iran and the adoption of real neutrality.

Following an upturn in Iranian fortunes in the war and Iranian offensives into Iraq in July 1982, the Soviets again began to supply arms

[4] Chubin, *Gains for Soviet Policy,* p. 141.

[5] Pavel Demchenko, "USSR-Iran: In the Interest of Good Neighborliness," *Pravda,* March 9, 1982, p. 1.

[6] Ibid.

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to the Iraqis. While Iran continued to receive war materiel from North Korea, Poland, Libya, and Syria, the Iraqis found their previous arms supply relationship with the Russians re-established and concluded new arms agreements.

The Soviet change in 1982 probably stemmed from several events and perceptions: first, the Soviets had been spurned by the Iranians and were frustrated by the hostility. Second, the war's turn in Iran's favor added to Khomeini's appeal and his image of invincibility. Further successes in the war, including a possible invasion of Iraq and the downfall of the Saddam Hussein regime, could only add to the Khomeini charisma and create another surge of Islamic fundamentalism in the area. Apart from the effect on the Afghan resistance, the specter of a string of radical Shia states along the Soviet periphery taking their cue from Iran must have disturbed the Soviet leadership. Such a consideration probably revived the traditional Soviet fear of an external focus attracting Soviet citizens (in this case the citizens in Soviet Central Asia). Finally, the fall of the Iraqi regime would be an embarrassment for the Soviets. Not supplying arms to a signatory of a Treaty of Friendship was one thing, but permitting that signatory to be invaded and toppled would be quite another. Thus, Soviet credibility may have required a switch.

The Soviets adjusted their posture, but did not at this point tilt toward Iraq. They acted to convey to the Iranians that continuing hostility would lead to a more serious resumption of Soviet material support for Iraq; but they undoubtedly still recognized the importance of Iran, their potential there, and the need to avoid doing anything that might either jeopardize their prospects or push Iran toward the West.

Tilting Toward the Iraqis, March 1984-Today

In the spring of this year, the Soviet tilt toward Iraq was unmistakable. Y.A. Ryabov, Chairman of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations (and generally assumed to be in charge of arms export)[7] led a delegation to Baghdad in the middle of March. Major economic and technical agreements were signed at this time, including provision for Soviet construction of a nuclear reactor in Iraq.[8] These meetings and agreements were followed by a visit to Moscow in late April by Iraqi Deputy Premier Taha Yasin Ramadan and Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz; their principal host was Deputy Premier Ivan Arkhipov, but they also met with Premier Tikhonov and then Chief of Staff

[7] See Dusko Doder, "Soviet-Iraqi Ties Said to Improve Amid Reports of Credits for Arms," *Washington Post,* April 28, 1984, p. A25.

[8] Ibid. and *Pravda,* March 20, 1984, p. 4.

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Ogarkov. A final communiqué stated that Ramadan and Arkhipov had signed a long-term agreement on expanded economic and technical cooperation.[9] Tariq Aziz subsequently disclosed that the Soviets had extended $2 billion in long-term loans at easy credit terms for various economic projects in Iraq.[10] In addition, it was widely reported that the Soviets agreed to provide Iraq with long-sought qualitatively new weapon systems, including improved surface to surface missiles and air to ground munitions.[11]

Further proof of the tilt was provided by the Iraqis, who suddenly changed their tune. While they had previously blamed both superpowers for the continuation of the war, the Iraqis had in fact been drawing closer to the United States for economic reasons. They had also had reason to value United States efforts to stop third-country arms transfers to Iran. Then the Iraqis suddenly blamed the United States for the continuation of the war. Western countries, Deputy Prime Minister Ramadan stated, were maintaining Iran's financial and military capabilities to frighten Arab countries and force them to look for Western support. Ramadan noted that the Soviets, on the other hand, had come around from their "inexact viewpoint" and were now living up to the spirit of the 1972 friendship treaty.[12]

Even more striking was an interview given by Saddam Hussein who rarely grants interviews to Western reporters, and even more rarely criticizes either superpower directly, preferring to use either Ramadan or Tariq Aziz for this purpose. Nevertheless, in a mid-May interview he blamed the United States for the continuation of the war, and spoke of "good" relations with the Soviets and the mutual Soviet-Iraqi desire to develop these relations further.[13] Such utterances suggest that either Hussein or the Soviets (or both) wanted the Soviet-Iraqi rapprochement to be clearly seen.

The Soviets might have wanted a clear-cut demonstration that Iraq was willing to distance itself from the United States — a step requiring a direct statement by Saddam Hussein to a Western audience. From the Iraqi standpoint, such an unusual statement by Hussein would signal the Iranians that both superpowers were now on the Iraqi side. Because America's relations with the Gulf states guaranteed an anti-Iranian posture,

[9] *Pravda,* April 28, 1984, p. 4.

[10] David Ottaway, "Soviets Seek Better Persian Gulf Ties," *Washington Post,* July 21, 1984, p. 1, 21.

[11] Drew Middleton, "On Final Assault: Dissension in Iran?" *New York Times,* June 12, 1984, p. 12.

[12] Edward Mortimer, "Iraq Blames the West for Prolonging Conflict in the Gulf," *The Times* (London), May 1, 1984, p. 8.

[13] Lally Weymouth, "Despite Improving Ties, Iraqi Leader Assails United States," *Washington Post,* May 13, 1984, p. 31, 36.

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an obvious Soviet tilt toward Iraq would tell the Iranians that they were isolated from both superpowers, and that Iraq might indeed be capable of sustaining its war effort.

Whatever the reason for Saddam Hussein going public, there was a clear shift in the Soviet position that was also revealed in at least some Soviet commentary. For the first time, the Iraqis were characterized as favoring peace and the Iranians were blamed for the continuation of the "senseless" war. V. Pustov, in *Krasnaya Zvezda,* stated:

> As is known, the Iraqi government has reacted positively to the peace initiatives from the UN, other international organizations, and individual countries. The Iranian ruling circles occupy the opposite position, rejecting out of hand any proposals on a political settlement of the conflict. The refusal to hold peace negotiations has been backed by a series of offensive operations on the front . . .
>
> The Iranian ruling circles are using a number of measures in an attempt to boost the morale of the soldiers who are being sent to their deaths. They are whipping up religious fanaticism and military frenzy at the battlefront and on the home front and crudely slandering the country's democratic forces and terrorizing them.[14]

While this commentary and relevant Soviet and Iraqi actions indicated the tilt, public Soviet commentary outside of *Krasnaya Zvezda* remained largely neutral or at the most engaged in only veiled or implied criticism of the Iranians. This suggests that the issue of tilting toward Iraq may not have been an easy one for the Soviet leadership.

Signs of a Debate

The most interesting sign that some in the Soviet leadership opposed the tilt and openly argued against it is provided by a number of references to the suppressed Iraqi communist party. The week before the Ryabov trip to Baghdad, during which the first major new agreements were signed, an article appeared in *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* that detailed the history of the Iraqi Communist party, its repression, the execution of its members, and its need to operate illegally given its persecution by the current Iraqi regime.[15] That such an article should appear at a time when a major rapprochement with the Iraqi regime was in the offing is strange indeed and suggests a split in the leadership.

Continuing debate may be read in the recognition of Aziz Muhammad, first secretary of the outlawed Iraqi Communist Party, on his sixtieth birthday; on June 30 he was awarded the Order of Lenin and only July 1 *Pravda* conveyed the Central Committee's greetings to him.

[14] V. Pustov, "Who Benefits from Bloodshed," *Krasnaya Zvezda,* April 21, 1984, p. 6.

[15] G. N. Nechkin, "Half a Century of Struggles and Trials," *Voprosy Istorii KPSS,* (No. 3) March 1984, p. 139.

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While this may have been intended as a signal to Saddam Hussein to relax at least symbolically the repression of the Iraqi Communist party, these greetings coincided with widely quoted interviews with Soviet officials in the Arab media on Soviet reasons for supporting the Iraqis.[16]

Clearly, some in the Soviet leadership worried about the consequences of the tilt. They may have worried that a tilt would jeopardize future ties with Iran, the real strategic prize in the area. Additionally, they may have feared that a tilt toward Iraq would embolden the Iraqis and make them more likely to escalate the war. Such activity would increase the turmoil along the Soviet periphery and possibly trigger United States military intervention, increasing the specter of a confrontation.

These concerns would not be taken lightly. Yet, if raised, they did not predominate because the Soviets clearly tilted. Why? Several reasons probably explain why the debate was settled in favor of the tilt. First, Iranian policy had become far more hostile to the Soviet Union (the expulsion of Soviet diplomats, the outlawing of the Tudeh party, show trials carrying confessions of espionage on behalf of the Soviets and detailing Soviet efforts to penetrate the Army and the Pasdaran, and signs of increasing Iranian support for the Afghan rebels), and the Soviet leadership probably wanted to show the Iranians that they would pay a price for this. (If this was indeed the Soviet aim, their tilt may well have had the desired effect — witness a sudden Iranian interest in meeting with the Soviets after the tilt amid reports of new Soviet arms deals with the Iraqis.)

Then, there seems to have been a general Soviet perception that this was their moment of opportunity in the area as a whole. Lebanon was seen as a serious United States defeat.[17] Soviet commentators harped on this theme.[18] They emphasized that the Gulf states were reluctant to draw close to the United States even as things heated up in the Gulf because Lebanon demonstrated Washington's unreliability. Meanwhile, United States experience in Lebanon and its own elections made it leery of military intervention. Konstantin Geyvandov interpreted United States policy, "learning from bitter experience, it [the United States administration] is now striving toward greater caution. Especially as even those Arab leaders who consider themselves friends of Washington have shown

[16] See Dr. Igor Pleve's comments reported in Kuna, FBIS *Middle East Daily Report,* June 22, 1984, p. C-3. See also Oleg Troyanovsky's comments also reported in Kuna, FBIS *Soviet Daily Report,* July 5, 1984, p. H2.

[17] Having stated since the early 1970s that one of the measures of the changed correlation of forces between the United States and the USSR was that the United States could no longer intervene in Lebanon the way it had in 1958 without due regard for the Soviets, the Soviets generally tended to exaggerate the significance of the United States military presence in the multinational force (MNF). Having exaggerated the significance of United States intervention, the Soviets then exaggerated the significance of the United States setback in Lebanon.

[18] See comments by Alexander Bovin and Pavel Demchenko, Moscow Domestic Service, FBIS, May 29, 1984, p. CC 5, 6.

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during the latest aggravation of the Iran-Iraq conflict that after Lebanon, they prefer to keep their distance from the Americans."[19] (The observation that the United States was striving toward caution in the area is noteworthy because it occurred at a time when the Soviet leadership/media, was portraying the United States administration as quick to use military force and responsible for the serious deterioration in United States-Soviet relations.)

Soviet perception of United States reluctance to intervene militarily gained greater force with Washington's public posturing about not intervening in the Gulf, except in concert with its allies. The net effect of this was to lend credence to United States passivity, thus reducing the prospect of a serious escalation in the Gulf and lowering the potential risk of a Soviet tilt to Iraq.

The depth of the United States-Iranian antagonism also lowered the potential cost and further countered the arguments of those worried about the consequences of a tilt. The antagonism showed no signs of relenting on either side, and, if nothing else, suggested that a Soviet tilt toward Iraq would not push Iran into the United States sphere.

Finally, the desire to be seen pursuing a politically active policy capable of exploiting opportunities may have also helped settle the debate. The Soviets needed to show the West that their leadership was not paralyzed by succession and was capable of seizing initiatives. Tilting toward Iraq, and demonstrating the value of Soviet help against Iran, would not only signal Soviet decisiveness but would also play upon the apparent interest of some of the conservative states in the area in hedging their bets. Certainly, the Soviets pursued a very active diplomacy in the area — numerous Soviet emissaries visited the region, Arab ministers visited Moscow, a new arms deal was concluded with Kuwait, another deal was in the wind with Jordan, and diplomatic ties with Egypt were restored.

For all of these reasons, those who favored the tilt won out in the internal debate. What can we expect in the future from the Soviets on the war? Further swings? Greater or lesser activism? An interest in seeing the war continue?

The answers to questions of future Soviet policy hinge on events in Iran and the leverage the Soviets can exert to affect the course of the war or its settlement. While seeing Iran as the strategic prize in the long run, Soviets have apparently concluded that they have few direct, positive options vis-à-vis Iran until Khomeini passes from the scene. The turmoil of the post-Khomeini period is almost certain to create new opportunities, and at least some factions in the leadership are then likely to

[19] Konstantin Geyvandov, "Political Observer's Opinion: But Is It Not Time to Call a Halt," *Izvestiya*, June 8, 1984, p. 5.

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be less determinedly hostile to the Soviets. If the war drags on, the Soviets might reassess their position upon Khomeini's death and perhaps tilt back toward Iran.

Meanwhile, the Soviets will probably maintain their support for the Iraqis and try to build their leverage vis-à-vis the Iranians. Their tilt toward the Iraqis did seem to worry the Iranians, and brought signs of interest in restoring dialogue and improving relations. In early June, Sayed-Mohammad Sadr, Director General of the Iranian Foreign Ministry, visited Moscow and met with Gromyko; according to reports of the meeting Sadr urged the Soviets to reduce Soviet military aid to Baghdad and expressed Iran's interest in improving ties.[20] In late June, a Soviet energy delegation headed by Deputy Power and Electricity Minister Aleksey Makukhin visited Teheran and concluded agreements on Soviet construction assistance for Iranian power plants.[21] Shortly thereafter, Teheran radio reported delivery of a message from Foreign Minister Gromyko to Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati. These are small steps, but indicative of a slight improvement in Soviet-Iranian ties, of Soviet interest in encouraging Iranian economic dependence, of an Iranian stake in more positive relations, and indicative also of the pattern of growing Soviet activism in the region.

The continuation of the war has provided new opportunities for increased Soviet activism. The current state of the war has put the Soviets in a position where they may for the first time be developing leverage with both parties — at a time when it appears that the United States has leverage with neither. It may be, therefore, that Soviet attitudes about the desirability of ending the war have changed.

Thus, the costs of continued fighting may be less clear when the benefits are becoming apparent. Not surprisingly, the costs of ending the war may also be more apparent to the Soviets. Were the war to end now, both countries would need to attend to their problems of economic reconstruction — meaning a need to look to the West. (Soviet economic deals with both may be designed to position the Soviet Union to limit this possibility, but more time and more expansive deals will be required.) Moreover, if the war ends now or soon, both countries will have an interest in exporting as much oil as possible and within six months they will be able to add around 3 mbd to the world market — adding to the glut, putting further downward pressure on oil prices, and harming Soviet oil revenues in the process. Finally, an end to the war now or soon may reduce Soviet opportunities in Iran. The strain of the war is beginning

[20] Richard Owen, "Russia Resumes Cautious Dialogue with Iran," *The Times* (London), June 7, 1984, p. 6.

[21] See details of agreements in *Moscow in Persian,* FBIS, July 3, 1984, p. H1.

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to show with increasing signs of ethnic fragmentation, disaffection from the Mullah leadership in the cities, severe economic problems, splits between the Pasdaran and the military, and discontent over the high level of casualties. The growing stresses of the war may threaten the Mullah hold, creating greater potential for Soviet penetration over time; as a result the Soviet leadership may see benefits in the continuation of the war.

Irrespective of the Soviet view, the local parties could decide to end the war. While unlikely so long as Khomeini lives, the Soviets cannot discount this possibility. Thus though they may prefer to see the war continue, current Soviet positioning with both parties may also be designed to make the Soviets *a* or *the* broker in its settlement. Such a role would boost Soviet stature in the area and establish an important precedent: it would remind local states that the Soviets could not be excluded from any peace-making efforts, that the Soviet Union (and not just the United States) was an arbiter of local disputes, and that the USSR played an important role in local security arrangements. Apart from achieving these intangible, but important and long-sought gains, were the Soviets to become a broker of the war, they would surely try to make these gains more concrete by using their position to press their "Zone of Peace — Dismantling of Foreign Bases in the Indian Ocean" proposals in any settlement, as some Soviet commentators have suggested.[22]

While that is what the Soviets would like to see happen — and what they may be aiming toward — the reality is far from it. They may see the current period as an opportunity to build their regional position with broad objectives in mind, but Soviet leverage vis-à-vis the combatants remains tenuous and can be undone. Moreover, the reluctance of the Gulf states to embrace the United States would likely be reversed if these states saw direct and imminent threats to their security. These states still look to the United States for protection in the crunch — confident that Washington will oblige at that time. (A leading Saudi prince told one United States journalist that the Saudis did not need to invite the United States in — at the time Washington sought such an invitation — because the United States would come in when necessary.) The reality is that they are right. So long as Washington defines its stakes in the Gulf as vital, the United States is likely to respond to a major escalation of the war — be it a cutoff of oil shipments or an expansion of the war to neighboring states.

To the extent that the United States becomes more active in the Gulf, it is likely to exacerbate the fears of those Soviet leaders who

[22] Note in particular V. Pustov, "Military-Political Review," *Krasnaya Zvezda,* June 3, 1984, p. 3.

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saw dangers in a tilt toward Iraq. Thus, while the current Soviet level of activism should be expected to continue, it is likely to be tempered if things begin to heat up dramatically in the Gulf war. The world has certainly not seen the last twist and turn in the war, nor the last twist and turn of Soviet policy toward it.

THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL

by JOHN DUKE ANTHONY

The recent attacks on oil tankers and other vessels by Iraq and Iran, following the earlier terrorist bombing of United States and other installations in Kuwait, are stark reminders of the dangers to United States interests in the Gulf. Before clamor mounts for the intervention of United States troops, elementary wisdom suggests a look at a small silver lining among the storm clouds in this otherwise war-torn region. At a time when United States military and economic resources abroad are stretched thin, it is heartening to see the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states making realistic and responsible plans for their own defense. Reacting to heightened threats to freedom of navigation in the world's most strategic waterway, the GCC's Ministerial Council recently convened in Riyadh. With Iran and Iraq warring only twenty minutes by air from Arabia's borders, the foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Oman weighed possible steps to enhance prospects for regional security cooperation. In the interim, the ministers hoped that two particular measures taken by Saudi Arabia might continue to serve as deterrents. These were the utilization of (1) the Kingdom's American-supplied AWACS to monitor the Gulf's airspace, and (2) United States-supplied F-15 fighter planes to resist violations of Saudi Arabian territory.

The ministers focused on a tough agenda: (1) finding a non-military, preferably diplomatic, means to end the bloody Iran-Iraq war, which has already cost well over 250,000 lives and over $35 billion in GCC aid to Iraq; (2) maintaining freedom of navigation in the Gulf; and (3) strengthening security within the GCC.

Following an extended period of Iraqi threats to continue bombing vessels entering Iranian oil-export terminals and Iranian counterthreats to close the Gulf to all shipping, more than sixty ships lined up outside the Straits of Hormuz, hoping to be less of a target while waiting

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to load half of Europe's and two-thirds of Japan's oil imports. The United States and other oil-importing nations can derive some comfort from GCC efforts to enhance self-reliance.

Topping the GCC agenda since its establishment on May 25, 1981, has been the need to deter a military attack by Iranian forces and any widening of the Gulf war which could lead to external intervention. As they gaze across the Gulf at over a quarter of a million men under arms in both Iran and Iraq, an overriding question for GCC military planners remains: how might the sparsely populated desert states forge a credible deterrence, let alone manage their defense?

As a first step, the GCC has conducted a series of joint military maneuvers over the past eight months, involving fewer than 15,000 combat-readied troops — minuscule by United States standards. It is for a different reason, however, that the exercises, to date, have been significant: they are the first joint maneuvers ever held between Arab states. Rather than seeking a show of force, their purpose has been to test the coordination of the six states' Western equipment and command systems, especially in air defense, radar, and communications.

Although the maneuvers are unprecedented, many United States analysts have failed to notice their importance to United States national security interests. Viewed for what they are — demonstrations to the world that aggression against any one of the six states will be an aggression against all — the exercises are a symbolic illustration of the GCC states' determination to have military oneness. To local eyes, they signify that the GCC is on the right track in diminishing both needs and pretexts for outside intervention.

Coming at a time of United States concern over developments in Central America, the United States and other Western countries have every reason to welcome and encourage the GCC endeavors. At stake is the security of six states that, together, generate nearly half of all OPEC oil production and contain 40 percent of the world's proven oil reserves. No less important to the American taxpayer is the fact that these states have invested more extensively in United States Treasury bills than any other regional group, thereby helping to hold down interest rates and finance the United States national debt.

Despite the high profile of United States interests in the region, and the preference by a majority within the GCC for United States goods and technology, member states purchase increasing quantities of equipment of French and British origin. The recent decision by Saudi Arabia to purchase a $2 billion French-built air defense system is a painful example. In the eyes of many GCC military planners, the United States

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is considered an unreliable arsenal due to the "no arms for most Arabs" campaign waged in the Congress.

The huge flow of United States military, monetary, diplomatic, and strategic support for Israel constitutes a major disincentive to any public embrace of the United States in most of the GCC states. A contemporary irony flows from this: the prospects for providing truly meaningful and sustained United States assistance for local defense efforts are curtailed in a region where Western strategic, economic, and security interests are more obvious and vital than almost any place in the world.

All this would be far less important were it not that the military and security concerns of the GCC states are real, as recent events have demonstrated. No less important is another option open to Washington and Europe in the event that regional self-defense efforts prove ineffective: intervention in the region by Western, primarily United States, forces. Yet in the event that local defenses fail to deter Iranian aggression and the possibility of intervention by United States forces becomes more popular, it is important to recognize the limit of these forces.

The principal military organization responsible for protecting United States security interests in the Gulf is the United States Central Command (CENTCOM), headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base in Florida. CENTCOM has the necessary forces to back up its heady mandate in theory only. In the event that a crisis in the Gulf required prolonged United States intervention, soldiers would have to be borrowed from locations scattered around the world, with the attendant risk of bringing United States force levels in Europe and elsewhere to unacceptably low levels.

The costs, moreover, would not be limited to United States manpower. Top United States military and civilian officials admit that creating a capacity for effective intervention in the Gulf would require tens of billions of dollars for improved sea and airlift capabilities and new light-armored divisions. Whether expenditures of this magnitude would be possible, let alone necessary, has hardly been the subject of serious congressional debate. This lack of preparedness is puzzling, especially as the states in question are among the world's very few able and willing to pay their own defense bills.

Strengthening the GCC states would cost the United States taxpayer nothing, and the strategic, economic, political, and diplomatic gains — not to mention the hundreds of corporate contracts and many thousands of jobs that would otherwise go to Europeans — would be considerable. Most important, such assistance reduces the risk of United States military intervention to defend its own or other Western interests in the region.

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The inclination of many in the Reagan administration to downplay local initiatives in crisis areas and to favor the use of armed intervention when United States interests appear threatened does not bode well for Western stakes in the Gulf. In this light, the GCC's efforts to reduce the causes — whether needs or pretexts — of superpower intervention deserve far more support and encouragement. Neither the process nor the outcome — enhanced potential for self-defense — poses the slightest threat to Israel, Iraq, Iran, or anyone else. This is clearly in keeping with Western interests.

THE WAR AND THE WORLD OIL MARKET

by BIJAN MOSSAVAR-RAHMANI

Iran and Iraq have wreaked considerable havoc on each other's oil industries in four years of bloody fighting. Early in the war, Iran attacked and destroyed Iraq's Persian Gulf export terminals at Mina al-Bakr and Khor al-Amaya, reducing Iraq's oil export capability by two-thirds. Iraq, in turn, leveled Iran's (and the world's) largest oil refinery at Abadan. Both sides have intermittently struck out at other petrochemicals and refining facilities, pipelines, oil fields, and most recently, at tankers operating in Gulf waters. Damages to date to the two countries' oil infrastructure exceed $50 billion and some 4 million barrels per day (mbd) of potential oil supply have been lost to the world market. More than ever before, the Iran-Iraq War now threatens to engulf other oil-producing nations in the region.

The world oil market has remained uncharacteristically calm throughout the fighting. Over the last four years, the average price of a barrel of oil in international trade has fallen $7 or 20 percent (more sharply if adjusted for inflation). Precautionary inventories built up in the wake of the Iranian Revolution have been largely sold off. OPEC has fallen into considerable disarray. Western investment in alternative sources of energy has for all practical purposes stopped, and the muscle car — though more fuel-efficient — is making a comeback. The term "crisis" has been dropped from the oil lexicon.

In fact, the world oil market has shrugged off the devastation in the Gulf with equanimity, creating questions for the near term, and the medium term.

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Looking Back

The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War happened to coincide with the start of an unprecedented decline in global demand for imported oil caused by some combination of economic recession, stepped-up conservation, a switch to alternative sources of energy, and warm weather — the first three triggered by spiraling oil prices in the previous year. In 1981, oil consumption in the non-communist world totalled 47.3 mbd, down 4.4 percent from 1980 levels; consumption dropped another 3.6 percent in 1982 and still another 1.3 percent in 1983 (see table I).

Oil supplies, meanwhile, were more than adequate to meet these reduced needs. Record-high inventories held by Western oil companies cushioned the market against the disruption of supplies from Iran and Iraq; inventories have been dropping in each of the past three years from some 5,430 million barrels at year's end 1980 to 4,600 million barrels at year's end 1983. Other OPEC countries, too, moved quickly to make up some of the losses from the two warring nations, motivated by both political and economic considerations. Saudi Arabia, alone, increased output by several hundred thousand barrels a day. Elsewhere, other non-OPEC oil exporters — Mexico, Great Britain, Egypt, and Norway among them — continued steadily to carve out a larger share of the world market. Between 1980 and 1983, non-OPEC oil production climbed 2.8 mbd.

Thus, while oil exports from Iran and Iraq slowed to a trickle within weeks of the outbreak of hostilities (remaining at less than half of historic levels since), the war did not lead to a world oil price explosion similar to those that followed the 1973-74 Arab oil embargo and the 1978-79 revolution in Iran.

In the fall of 1984, the world oil market continues to face a glut of unusually high proportions (availability of oil exceeds demand by at least 5 mbd), and reports of periodic escalations in the Iran-Iraq War elicit yawns in oil circles.

Looking Ahead Twelve Months

Iran and Iraq could yet shake the world oil market out of its doldrums, particularly if the war spills over into Kuwait or Saudi Arabia. While such a risk remains real, most analysts discount it.

Current analysis sees Western economies remaining insulated from this war, and the prolonged fighting ultimately proving beneficial. Continuing large-scale destruction of infrastructure and depletion of war materiel translates into lucrative reconstruction and resupply contracts for

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TABLE I
NON-COMMUNIST WORLD OIL BALANCES 1980-1984
(millions of barrels per day)

	1980	1981	1982	1983*	1984**
DEMAND					
Consumption	49.5	47.3	45.6	45.0	45.9
of which:					
United States	17.5	16.5	15.6	15.5	16.0
Western Europe	13.5	12.5	12.0	11.8	11.9
Japan	5.0	4.7	4.5	4.4	4.6
Other Developed Countries	3.0	2.9	2.7	2.6	2.7
OPEC	2.7	2.9	3.0	3.1	3.1
Non-OPEC LDC	7.7	7.6	7.5	7.4	7.4
Unaccounted for	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Stock Change	0.8	−0.2	−1.3	−0.8	0.0
Total Demand	50.3	47.1	44.3	44.3	45.9
SUPPLY					
Production	49.1	45.7	42.8	42.7	44.2
of which:					
United States	10.8	10.7	10.8	10.8	10.8
Canada	1.8	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.8
North Sea	2.2	2.4	2.7	3.1	3.5
Other Developed Countries	0.8	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.2
OPEC	27.8	23.6	19.7	18.7	19.2
Non-OPEC LDC	5.7	6.4	7.0	7.3	7.7
Net Imports from Soviet Bloc	1.2	1.3	1.5	1.6	1.7
Total Supply	50.3	47.1	44.3	44.3	45.9

* Preliminary
** Projected

SOURCE: United States Department of Energy (July 1984).
NOTE: Some totals may not sum due to rounding.

Western companies. A decisive victory by either Iran or Iraq — neither regime is popular abroad — would threaten conservative states in the region. But the belief that this war can be contained indefinitely rests on three key fallacies.

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Iraq's summertime attacks on shipping to and from Iranian ports failed to coax Teheran into peace negotiations. While exports of oil from Iran's Gulf terminal at Kharg Island fell off sharply initially, price discounts of up to several dollars per barrel led to recovery in sales volume, and the direction of the war remained fundamentally unchanged. Iraq's leadership has long held that destruction of Kharg Island — Iran's principal oil export terminal — would provide the economic and psychological blow necessary to turn the tide of this war.

Iraq's failure to date to destroy Kharg Island has lent credence to the perception that Iraq does not have the military wherewithal to strike accurately and decisively at Iranian targets, thereby prompting a major escalation of the crisis. Early mishaps reinforced this fallacy. Dozens of tankers and freighters later, however, the perception of Iraq's capabilities is changing.

Iraq has for some time had the capability to strike at major Iranian targets not only in the Gulf, but deep inside Iran as well. Kharg Island remains a large and vulnerable target, its beefed-up antiaircraft defense perimeter notwithstanding. Kharg Island has not yet been attacked in large part because Iran threatened early in the war that destruction of its oil export capability would lead to retaliation against other exporters in the Gulf. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates took that threat seriously and have channeled billions of dollars to Iraq in a strengthening effort calculated to stave off just such a desperate gambit. But the massive financial assistance has not shifted the underlying balance of power away from Iran, particularly on the ground.

Iraq, now financially broke, psychologically broken, and threatened by as many as 300,000 Iranian regulars and another 100,000 revolutionary militia massed on its border, has few other options but to play its final card against Iran, if provoked. The Iranian troops have been ready to move since early April; spring floods and concern over casualties (intelligence sources have estimated that the count could be as high as 60,000 to 100,000) have deferred but not permanently discouraged the long-expected offensive. Too much momentum may have been built up to back off now.

Western contingency planning in the past year centered on a possible Iranian attempt to block the Straits of Hormuz. However, Iran was never likely to attempt this feat, as it recognized that such a closure could not be sustained in the face of superior Western naval firepower. And, even if the Straits of Hormuz could be closed, such action would prove self-defeating since the Straits are the conduit not only of oil but of war materiel and food. Nonetheless, the focus of attention remained the Straits of Hormuz, accepting the fallacy that if Iraq managed to strike

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at Kharg Island, there was little Iran could do to disrupt seriously the flow of oil from the Gulf.

Iran, like Iraq, retains sufficient military capability to inflict substantial damage to oil export facilities throughout the Persian Gulf. The ability of Iran to secure spare parts and military equipment has often surprised Western experts; and efforts by the United States to prevent such allies as Israel, South Korea, and Taiwan from resupplying Iran have been only intermittently successful. The Iranian air force, while truncated and cannibalized, still retains the range, speed, and firepower to cause considerable havoc in the region. Of an original arsenal consisting of 77 F-14s, 90 F-4s, and 135 F-5Es, at least fifty are serviceable and still fly. The loading terminals in Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates are less than fifteen minutes away from Iranian air bases at Bandar Abbas and Bushehr. Even with early warning by the Saudi Arabian-based AWACS, there would be insufficient time to intercept Iranian aircraft.

Saudi Arabia's large oil export terminal at Ras Tanura is somewhat more problematic. For while Ras Tanura, too, is little more than fifteen minutes away from the Iranian air base at Shiraz, the combination of Saudi Arabian interceptors and antiaircraft defenses would raise the cost to Iran. But Ras Tanura's defenses, several hundred hand-held Stingers notwithstanding, are not foolproof; some Iranian aircraft would be lost but others would in all likelihood get through to cause substantial fire and smoke, if not major destruction. Iranian-inspired or directed sabotage of major oil production and distribution facilities inside Saudi Arabia — pumping stations, Petroline, the Jubail refinery complex — would clearly lead to internationalization of the war with even less certain outcome. One thing is clear, however: the region's geopolitical character could be permanently altered.

The perceived insulation of Western economies from the vicissitudes of the Gulf war stems from the fallacy that given the current glut in the world oil market, a cutoff in Gulf supplies would not be disruptive. The premise here is the willingness and capability of other OPEC and non-OPEC oil exporters to rush to increase production to make up any supply shortfall; and the willingness and capability of Western governments — particularly the United States — to implement measures to draw down strategic stockpiles. In fact, there is no reason to believe that either would take place quickly enough to absorb the shock of a major disruption.

A pause by other countries before increasing exports would almost ensure escalation of prices. Most other exporters — from the Soviet Union to Great Britain, from Nigeria to Mexico — would welcome the additional revenues, and are unlikely to help to keep the lid on prices.

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In any event, little additional oil is available from these countries; the bulk of the world's spare oil export capacity is located in the Gulf, not outside.

As for strategic stockpiles, the utility of such reserves as a buffer against supply emergencies has yet to be tested. To have much impact, strategic stockpiles should be utilized in emergencies — or at least the buyers should believe that they will be utilized. Yet governments are always slow to tap such reserves.

The member countries of the International Energy Agency have agreed to share oil stockpiles once any shortfall reaches 7 percent. Critics of the complex scheme claim that it cannot be put into effect quickly enough in a real disruption, as there is no agreement on the price of the *shared* available supplies. Moreover, they argue, while the disruption may never reach the trigger point, it may still be large enough to cause panic buying and a price shock.

Meanwhile, commercial stocks are at precariously low levels, both in absolute volumes and relative to forward days of consumption at a time when recovery in global demand — and hence recovery in imports — has been substantially more vigorous than expected.

Data covering the first quarter of 1984 show a year-on-year increase of about 5 percent in oil consumpion in the industrial countries; resulting from 6.5 percent and 8.9 percent increases in oil consumption in the North American and the Pacific regions respectively. Western European consumption, while up only 0.8 percent, was significant because it indicated that the four-year slide in oil consumption may have finally ended.

OPEC oil production has reflected the changing market realities. In the first quarter of this year, OPEC production figures show an enormous year-on-year increase of 16.8 percent, higher still if natural gas liquids are also counted.

OPEC has recently faced considerable difficulty maintaining price discipline by enforcing its March 1983 production quotas, and spot oil prices remain weak. But the world oil glut, no longer all that it used to be, now provides far less insurance against a major supply disruption and an ensuing oil price shock.

The timing and the extent of any such disruption will depend on Iran's ground offensive. Iranian leaders have provided few clues, saying that the attack could come "next month or next year." Such an Iranian offensive will unleash Iraq's superior forces in the air.

The Medium-Term Outlook

If and when the fighting stops, Iran and Iraq will have to decide how rapidly oil export capacity will be restored. Those decisions could

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pose significant problems for others in OPEC if substantial additional oil becomes available before world oil demand recovers to prewar levels.

Within about a year of cessation of active hostilities, Iraq could double current export capacity by completing development on several new oil fields started before 1980, and by rebuilding damaged terminals on the Gulf. Prospects for speedy restoration of exports are as good in Iran; at least another 1 mbd can be added expeditiously to the latter's oil export capacity.

Together, Iran and Iraq could quickly supply an additional 2 mbd to the world market; both are likely to try in an effort to raise foreign exchange earnings to finance postwar reconstruction. With more time and investment, these two countries could produce another 1 mbd each.

The two former oil giants will recover much of their strength — as measured by production levels and by impact on OPEC pricing policies — largely at the expense of Saudi Arabia. For Saudi Arabia, a reduction in output and influence, in moderation, would be a small price to pay for some semblance of normality.

AMERICAN SECURITY CONCERNS IN THE GULF

by MARSHALL W. WILEY

The decline of the traditional British military role in South Asia and the Gulf following World War II has coincided with a sharp increase in the economic importance of that area to the West. In particular, access to the oil suppliers of the Gulf has become imperative for the economies of Europe and Japan, and, indirectly, for the United States. Long-term developments have created an acute and persistent problem for security planners in the United States and the other countries of the free world. Despite their continuing attempts to deal with the problem, the strategic vulnerability of this vital element persists.

As is often the case in democratic societies, efforts to cope with the potentially serious security problems of the Gulf have fluctuated more with the level of public interest than with the realities of the strategic situation. Long lines at United States gas stations in the early 1970s and the taking of United States diplomatic personnel in Teheran as hostages both had a direct and profound impact on United States public opinion. In response to the public concern generated by these traumatic events,

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Washington was energized into a series of actions; some improved our strategic situation, but many were more cosmetic than realistic.

It is generally agreed that the overriding objective of United States Gulf policy is to secure continued access to Gulf oil supplies at reasonable prices. How to achieve this objective has been the subject of prolonged debate within the foreign policy establishment, and 1984 finds that establishment as far as ever from a consensus that could provide the basis for a sustained national effort. This lack of progress is a result of deeply embedded misperceptions in the United States body politic that have impeded Washington's efforts to deal effectively in this critical area of the world.

Essential Flaws in Washington's Perception of the Gulf

A fundamental tenet of the Reagan administration's Middle East policy when the new regime came into office was that the people of the Gulf countries perceived the Soviet threat as their principal security problem and would therefore cooperate with the United States in building a "strategic consensus" to counter this threat. Convinced that the Carter administration was weak and irresolute and determined to "stand tall" and restore credibility to the United States role in the world, the Reagan team was unwilling to accept the political reality that the Arab countries were much less concerned about the Soviet Union, which had never invaded or occupied Arab land, than they were about Israel, which all Arabs perceived as an invader and oppressor of their Arab brethren in Palestine. In fact, most regimes in the Gulf area believed strongly that their interests could best be served by avoiding entanglement in the United States-USSR conflict, and they had no desire to become a theater for East-West rivalry.

Following the more limited Carter administration initiatives, the Reagan team pushed hard for a more active United States military involvement with moderate Arab countries, including the stationing of United States ground forces in the Gulf area. While the professional diplomats who best knew the area doubted the wisdom of the policy, political appointees in the White House, the Pentagon, and the upper levels of the State Department vigorously pursued its implementation.

For a variety of reasons, their efforts had limited success. Moderate Arabs viewed the United States as strongly biased with regard to their number one security concern, Israel; and they were therefore unwilling to cooperate wholeheartedly in dealing with Washington's number one security concern, the USSR. Moderate Arab regimes also had concerns over the effect on their domestic political standing of overt

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military cooperation with Israel's prime supporter. This is a potent consideration in a part of the world where many more regimes have been toppled by internal subversion than by external aggression. Finally, the Gulf states feared that more overt cooperation with the United States would result in an enhanced Soviet military presence in their part of the world with increased risk of big power conflict.

After struggling with little success for over three years with these obstinate political facts, the Reagan administration policymakers, while not conceding the weakness of their basic assumption, have played down "strategic consensus."

Intense and bitter policy debate within the administration focused on the premise that after the failure to achieve "strategic consensus" with the moderate Arabs, United States security interests in the Middle East could be advanced by a "strategic alliance" with Israel. State Department professionals most experienced in the Middle East were joined by important figures in the Pentagon in opposing more overt and active military cooperation with Israel as harmful to our broader security interests in the area. Again, professional area specialists were overruled by political appointees who, in this case, were supported by some senior State Department professionals with wide experience in foreign affairs but little direct experience in the Middle East. The Israeli lobby was delighted with the outcome. Moderate Arabs were appalled. By increasing overt military cooperation with Israel, which represents perhaps 2 percent of the land and people in this strategically important area, most area experts believe the United States incurred a serious setback in its political and military relations with the other 98 percent. In addition, there is concern on the part of many observers that United States and Israeli security interests differ in important respects, perhaps creating problems in security cooperation. It may be difficult to reconcile Israel's prime security concern with the Arabs with Washington's prime security concern with the Soviet Union.

Reagan policy stressed that the USSR must be deterred from military "adventurism" in the Middle East by a United States military presence in that area of the world. In reality there is no possibility that the United States could station or project enough conventional military power in the area of the Gulf to stop a determined Russian assault on its oil wealth. The Soviet Union is deterred not by the United States conventional military capabilities *in the Middle East,* but by the *worldwide balance of power.* The Middle East is one of the worst possible places to attempt to exercise deterrence. At the end of excessively long lines of supply, the region is inhospitable (both politically and climatically) to

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United States military forces, and in case of general conflict they would quickly become hostage to superior Soviet ground forces.

Administration policymakers granted that Soviet ground forces would be superior to United States ground forces in the Gulf area in case of armed conflict, but required a ground military presence there to serve as a "trip wire" deterrent as in the case of United States forces in West Berlin. The NATO analogy is misleading because Europe represented a very different set of political and military realities. The "trip wire" theory assumes that the Soviet Union will not take advantage of its local military superiority, risking an escalation of the conflict to its disadvantage. When this strategy evolved, the United States enjoyed a recognized superiority in nuclear weaponry, and United States strategists thought it unlikely that the Soviet Union would risk a local conflict over Berlin that might escalate into a nuclear exchange.

The situation in the Gulf now is quite different from Europe in the 1940s and 1950s. Developing technology has placed significant constraints on the use of nuclear weaponry. The Russians may not be convinced that the United States would risk the horrors of nuclear war to protect its military units stationed in the Middle East, but, so far, they have demonstrated caution and avoided confrontation. Nevertheless, it is by no means certain that this policy will continue, as younger, and perhaps more aggressive, leadership assumes power in the Kremlin. In that case, United States forces in the Gulf area might better be described as hostages than "trip wires," and might become more of a liability than an asset in the worldwide military balance.

Effective Means to Achieve United States Security Goals in the Gulf

When discussing difficult strategic problems such as the defense of the Gulf, it is easier to point out flaws in the strategic policies of others than to develop positive policy recommendations. However, there are realistic and cost-effective steps open to Washington's policymakers in building a credible presence and achieving United States national security goals in the Gulf.

Deterrence against Soviet aggression in the Gulf area is a function of the worldwide balance of power. Therefore, most critically, the Gulf must be viewed in the context of United States worldwide security planning vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and its allies. Thus, deterrence is not a function of the relative forces that the United States or the Soviets could project into the immediate region of the Gulf. To be effective, a deterrent threat must be credible. The USSR was not deterred from invading Afghanistan because its leadership did not believe that the United States

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would retaliate militarily in response to their invasion — a correct assessment. In the case of the oil fields of the Gulf, the stakes for the West would be higher, and the United States should make it credible that Soviet military action threatening our access to those resources would be met by military retaliation somewhere in the world — not necessarily in the Gulf area. Washington's contingency planners should identify possible responses giving the United States the best relative advantage vis-à-vis the Soviets. The Gulf area seems an unlikely choice, given the logistical disadvantages in conducting operations so far from United States forces' home bases.

Once identified, these potential responses should be underpinned by a force structure adequate to implement them — were it ever necessary. The existence of such a capability would provide the most cost-effective deterrent to Soviet aggression in the Gulf.

To be sustainable through time, a policy must be based on the political and psychological realities of the area. Thus, the United States needs to develop a long-term sustainable policy and avoid the wide policy fluctuations that have marked our past dealings with this area. Hasty actions based on inadequate understanding of the realities will inevitably lead to abrupt policy reversals and will also lead to serious concerns about Washington's reliability among its friends in the area. Greater regard for the opinions of career professionals and other area experts inside and outside of government could have prevented some of the more egregious mistakes committed in past United States relations with the countries of the Gulf.

Misguided policies adopted in disregard of the advice of career professionals have not been limited to the Reagan administration. The Carter administration disregarded the advice of its professional diplomats in Teheran when it permitted the Shah to return to the United States, triggering the hostage crisis. Then, to the utter dismay of United States professionals and host country officials alike, the Carter administration issued a travel advisory for the countries of the lower Gulf and ordered the evacuation of all Embassy dependents and non-essential employees. All United States ambassadors in the area protested vehemently, to no avail. In fact, Americans in those countries had been in no way jeopardized by events in Teheran and were probably safer in the lower Gulf than walking the streets of New York or Washington. Hasty and ill-advised action only made the United States appear uninformed and raised serious questions about its ability to implement sensitive policies in the area.

A more informed and sustainable policy needs to be developed in full consultation with the professionals — even when policymakers suspect that the judgments of these experts may conflict with their own

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ideological preconceptions. To ignore this important source of information is to risk policy failure, embarrassment, and loss of credibility.

Additionally, the United States should devise a more realistic and effective strategy of alliance-building with friendly nations in the area of the Gulf. The first requisite for such a strategy is a better understanding of their security concerns, which do not necessarily coincide, in all respects, with our own. In particular, a more effective strategy would require (a) greater recognition of the legitimacy of their security concerns with respect to Israel; (b) greater emphasis on the threat of internal subversion; and (c) greater recognition of the political liabilities created for friendly regimes by an overt and visible United States military presence on their soil.

A major military power in its regional context, Israel has demonstrated the willingness to use this power to its advantage. While it would not be in the United States interest to provide moderate Arabs the military means to launch a successful aggression against Israel, the United States could respond more sympathetically to their requests for defensive arms, such as antiaircraft weapons, which could be used by the Arabs to defend themselves were Israel to launch aggression. Until the United States gives more recognition to the legitimacy of such concerns, a closer alliance is unlikely.

Security relationships with the countries of the Gulf should place greater emphasis on internal threats to these regimes. Washington's policies have focused on the threat of overt external aggression and United States laws, by prohibiting aid to police forces, have impeded efforts to strengthen the defenses of friendly regimes against internal subversion. The USSR has never been reluctant to use covert action and unconventional warfare techniques, directly and by proxy, to achieve its foreign policy goals. With the exception of areas adjacent to its borders, the USSR has relied almost exclusively on such techniques in dealing with the Third World. Concentration on the risk of overt aggression rather than internal subversion in United States security relations with the countries of the Gulf emphasizes the wrong threat.

The Reagan policy has pressed hard for a more visible United States military presence in the Gulf — even to landing exercises for Marine units on the shores of Oman. Such exercises run a serious risk of weakening those very regimes that are most friendly and cooperative to the West. The presence of foreign military forces on the "sacred" soil of the Middle East has always created severe political liabilities for the host regimes. Since World War II, those regimes most receptive to overt military cooperation with the West — the Sennousi in Libya, the Nuri Said regime in Iraq, the Shah's regime in Iran — were weakened by their military links

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to the West, a significant, if not the principal, factor in their overthrow. In their places, the United States now finds three regimes of marked hostility to it and the West in general. If the United States does not learn from these experiences, it will be destined to repeat them.

Instead of exerting continuous pressure on friendly regimes to permit a greater and more visible United States military presence on their territory, Washington should be working to strengthen its ties with them by employing a variety of the standard tools of foreign policy in the economic, commercial and cultural, as well as military, areas.

In addition to programs designed to strengthen their internal security, the United States should assist them in developing indigenous military and paramilitary forces. Any United States military presence should be limited to the minimum required for the task.

The United States defense posture vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, should view the Middle East as part of its worldwide strategy and not in isolation from other potential theaters of conflict. The potential military missions of United States forces in the area need sharper definition. Emphasis should be placed on highly mobile intervention forces that could deal with intraregional conflicts or internal disorders. Unfortunately, past interservice rivalries continue to influence planning decisions on future force structures. For instance, the Army has demanded a "piece of the action" in the Gulf area despite the fact that the potential military missions are much better suited to the Navy, Air Force, and Marines. The commitment of heavily equipped Army units to the Gulf area would take too much time and would not be a suitable military response to any threat other than a large-scale Soviet ground offensive. For the reasons described above, such a response to a Soviet offensive would probably be more of a liability than an asset to our overall military position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

In summary, Washington's strategic alliances with its friends in the Gulf should concentrate on United States air and sea power in cooperation with United States-supplied and trained indigenous ground forces. To avoid political liabilities to friendly regimes, the United States should maintain as low a profile as possible for its training missions and for its air and sea logistic support facilities in the area.

United States security interests would be threatened if either Iran or Iraq emerged as the unchallenged major regional power in the Gulf area. Therefore, the United States should maintain a balance of power between Iraq and Iran and attempt to reduce the level of hostilities between these two powers. Potentially destabilizing is Iran's determination to avenge the earlier invasion of its territory by Iraq. Were Iran to overwhelm Iraq's defenses and overturn the Baathi regime, the fundamentalist

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revolutionary enthusiasm that has fueled the Iranian revolution would receive a tremendous boost both inside and outside of Iran. The small states of the lower Gulf would then become the obvious targets of this revolutionary enthusiasm and would feel obliged to adjust their policies to avoid conflicts with the Iranian regime. In the short run, this could cause them to search for ways of demonstrating their independence from Western influence; in the longer run, it could result in internal subversion spearheaded by supporters of the Iranian regime. Either result would be a serious setback for Western security interests.

On the other hand, were the Iraqi regime to win a clear-cut victory, the states of the lower Gulf would fear a resurgence of Baathi pan-Arab aspirations and a reappearance of covert political organizations that might be instruments of subversion against the monarchies of the lower Gulf.

Faced with some difficult decisions, the lower Gulf regimes could strengthen their security links with the United States in the hope of bolstering their defenses against a resurgent Iraq, or they could accommodate themselves more to Iraqi policies, hoping to deflect hostility. Unfortunately, their experience with the United States is such that they would probably choose the latter course. Lower Gulf regimes find Washington remarkably insensitive to a cluster of internal and external security problems related to Israel. In addition, the United States has given them little reason to believe that it can implement sensitive security policies with subtlety and discretion. In the past, when they tried to cooperate more closely with the United States, they were repeatedly embarrassed by press leaks and by anti-Arab public pronouncements. Concerned by the inflexibility of the United States military and bureaucratic establishments in pursuit of a specific policy goal, these regimes are appalled at the size of the personnel complements that the Pentagon believes to be the required minimums for specific tasks. Overall, they find the United States government, although powerful, insensitive to their particular political and security needs and inept in executing its foreign policies. These considerations would probably lead the lower Gulf regimes to distance themselves from the United States and become more accommodating to the perceived policy objectives of Baghdad. As long as there is a reasonable balance of power between Iraq and Iran, the regimes of the lower Gulf will not be forced to make such unpleasant choices and might remain on relatively friendly terms with the United States and the West.

Continued hostilities between Iraq and Iran risk that the fighting will spread, endanger other regimes of the Gulf, and disrupt the flow of oil. Since Iran's desire to avenge the previous Iraqi invasion is now the principal obstacle to a reduction in hostilities, the West should attempt

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to influence the Iranian regime to moderate its thirst for revenge. On the political level, the United States should encourage all mediation efforts by parties viewed as neutrals by both Iraq and Iran. On the economic level, the United States should make all reasonable efforts to impede the flow of war materiel to the Iranian armed forces. Additional economic sanctions against Iran would be difficult to enforce and could engender a strengthening of economic relations between Iran and the Soviet Union. The United States would probably be better advised to strengthen non-military, commercial links between Iran and the West in the hope that a reduction in commercial isolation would accelerate the maturation of the Iranian regime and encourage the development of a more pragmatic foreign policy.

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DEFENDING ARABIA: EVOLUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY

by J. E. Peterson

Concerns over the security and military defense of the Persian/Arabian Gulf and, in particular, the Arabian Peninsula have steadily intensified over the course of the twentieth century. At the same time, the actors assuming (or proclaiming) responsibility for the security of the Peninsula have also changed. Furthermore, as perceived threats to the security of this area have changed, so have the means—and thus the strategies—to defend the Peninsula. Consequently, any viable strategy concerning the security of the Peninsula and the Gulf must not only take into account external threats to Gulf security, but must also deal with the social, economic, and political conditions in the Gulf itself, past and present.[1]

The three actors or groups concerned with Peninsula security in this century have been Britain, the United States, and the six states now comprising the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Oman. Britain exercised primary responsibility for the security of this region because of its predominant position in the Gulf through World War II, and it continued to be directly concerned with the area until final withdrawal in 1971. While American military and security interests originated around the time of World War II, it was not until after 1971 that the United States became increasingly and directly concerned with the defense of the region and Western interests there. The expression of security concerns by the Arab littoral states was also late in emerging, principally due to the nature of British legal responsibility for defense and external affairs in most of these states, as well as predominant British influence over international relations in the Gulf generally.

[1] There is a growing body of literature on the topic of Gulf security, out of which only a few pertinent sources can be mentioned here: Hossein Amirsadeghi, ed., *The Security of the Persian Gulf* (London: Croom Helm, 1981); Hermann F. Eilts, "Security Conditions in the Persian Gulf," *International Security*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (1980), pp. 79-113; Abdel Majid Farid, ed., *Oil and Security in the Arabian Gulf* (London: Croom Helm, 1981); J.E. Peterson, ed., *The Politics of Middle Eastern Oil* (Washington: Middle East Institute, 1983); A. Z. Rubinstein, ed., *The Great Game: Rivalry in the Persian Gulf and South Asia* (New York: Praeger, 1983); Z. Michael Szaz, ed., *The Impact of the Iranian Events upon Persian Gulf and United States Security* (Washington: American Foreign Policy Institute, 1979); and the four-part series on *Security in the Persian Gulf* by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (London: Gower, 1982).

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The year 1971 also marked a watershed in the way many of the littoral states viewed the security of the Gulf. The centuries-old British shield had been removed, and by default new responsibilities for self-defense and regional policing fell to newly emerging nation-states. While the roots of the contemporary state of Saudi Arabia are several centuries old, the establishment of the kingdom in its present territory dates back only half a century, and concern with affairs beyond the Peninsula has been present only in the last several decades. Oman, while always legally independent, spent the twentieth century within a British sphere of influence until emerging from its isolation with an intrafamily coup d'état in 1970. The smaller emirates of the Gulf became independent as recently as 1971, with the exception of Kuwait (1961). Their increasing concern over external affairs and their growing profile in international relations can be traced to a number of factors, including the impact of nationalism, tighter integration into Arab politics, politicization and nationalization of oil resources, identification with the Third World on political and North-South issues, emerging suspicions of superpower rivalry in the Gulf and Middle East, and a recent climate of fears of burgeoning threats among these states and societies, which view themselves as fragile and vulnerable.

Despite their many obvious differences, the two external powers and the Arab Gulf littoral states that are concerned with Gulf security have exhibited similar strategic interests in the Arabian Peninsula. Essentially, these have been (1) preservation of global and particularly Western access to Gulf oil, and (2) denial of penetration or intrusion by hostile or rival forces. While the strategic interests have been similar, the means or methods of protecting those interests—the tactical objectives—differ considerably. This is due not only to differing national interests and perceptions, but also to dramatically changing circumstances and situations over the last three-quarters of a century, both in the Gulf itself and on a much broader level. Comparison of the perceptions and experience of each of these three actors or groups is not only a useful historical exercise, but can provide some insight into the constraints, limitations, and necessary direction of contemporary U.S. policy in that region.

The British Role

The British connection with the Gulf originated with trading links established in the early seventeenth century. Over the next three hundred years, British interests multiplied and intensified to the point that British supremacy in the Gulf was clearly recognizable by the 1920s. This evolutionary process included the following factors or events:

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- the establishment of political relationships with the area's rulers at the beginning of the nineteenth century in order to forestall Napoleon's Eastern ambitions;
- the gradual imposition of maritime peace in the Gulf during the first half of the nineteenth century;
- the development of imperial transport and communications routes through the Gulf in the mid-nineteenth century;
- the establishment of treaty relationships with the rulers of the Arab littoral in the 1890s, placing them under British protection; and
- the territorial acquisition of formerly Ottoman Mesopotamia (present-day Iraq) through conquest in World War I.[2]

Consequently, by the early part of this century—and especially by the end of World War I—the Gulf had for all intents and purposes become a British "lake." The external challenges to British supremacy had been beaten back: French and Russian attempts to undermine the exclusive British relationship with various littoral rulers, the Ottoman presence on the periphery of the Gulf, and the German challenge through its special position of influence within the Ottoman empire. At the same time, Britain turned toward closer involvement in local politics to protect what were increasingly seen as important interests in the Gulf.

During the 1920s and 1930s, it became apparent that several British strategic interests—certainly strategic if not "vital"—were to be found along the shores of the Gulf. The first of these arose out of the development of imperial air routes, with the Gulf providing one of the earliest links in the London-India route, despite the false start caused by political problems in establishing a route through Persia (Iran) and the subsequent necessity of rerouting along the Arab littoral. The coming of the air age gave the Gulf—and in particular the Arabian Peninsula—a renewed importance as a link in transcontinental transportation and communication networks. At the same time, the newly emergent key role played by the Royal Air Force in the region, particularly in Iraq and Aden, provided another spur to the establishment of air facilities along the Gulf and Arabian Sea periphery of the Peninsula, in order to link RAF com-

[2] Sources on the history of British activities in the Gulf include: J. G. Lorimer, comp., *Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, 'Oman, and Central Arabia* (Calcutta: Superintendent, Government Printing, 1908-15; reprinted Farnborough, Hants.: Gregg International Publishers, 1970); Briton Cooper Busch, *Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1894-1914* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967); J. B. Kelly, *Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1795-1880* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968); idem, *The Legal and Historical Basis of the British Position in the Persian Gulf* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1958; St. Antony's Papers, No. 4, Middle Eastern Affairs, No. 1); Peter Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq, 1914-1932* (London: Ithaca Press, for St. Antony's College, Oxford, 1976); and Malcolm Yapp, "British Policy in the Persian Gulf," in Alvin J. Cottrell, gen. ed., *The Persian Gulf States: A General Survey* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980).

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MAP 1

AIRFIELDS IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA,
to the end of World War II



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mands.[3] For these reasons, it is not surprising that the Gulf should be referred to as the "Suez Canal of the air."[4]

The second factor reviving the strategic importance of the Gulf to Britain, and, in the end, the more permanent and important factor, was the growing dependence on Gulf oil. The first oil finds in the region occurred in Persia in 1904. Oil was discovered in Iraq shortly after World War I and soon after in Kuwait. Subsequently, fields were brought into production down the Gulf, including Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman. The presence of this oil was seen early as a strategic resource for the British empire, since the Royal Navy depended heavily on Gulf oil for fuel. British commercial interests held the great majority of concessions in the region, and Gulf oil was instrumental in the steady expansion of oil consumption throughout the empire.[5]

A third reason for the Gulf's emerging importance to London at this time was actually a continuing manifestation of the Gulf's geopolitical significance. For centuries, Britain had sought to prevent rivals from penetrating its cocoon around the Gulf, and the continuance of this enduring policy was further confirmed by the emergence of the factors of air and oil. Consequently, by approximately the mid-1930s, the Gulf's peripheral place in the imperial scheme of things had been transformed to an area of increasing strategic importance.[6]

Britain was able to protect its emerging interests in a number of ways. First, London exercised political control over almost all the Arab

[3] For more information on air routes and the RAF in the Gulf, see G. W. Bentley, "The Development of the Air Route in the Persian Gulf," *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society* (JRCAS), Vol. 20, Pt. 2 (1933), pp. 173-89; H. Burchall, "The Air Route to India," *JRCAS,* Vol. 14, Pt. 1 (1927), pp. 3-18; R. A. Cochrane, "The Work of the Royal Air Force at Aden," *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution* (JRUSI), February 1931, pp. 88-102; Robin D. S. Higham, *Britain's Imperial Air Routes, 1918 to 1939* (London: G. T. Foulis, 1960); H. Montgomery Hyde, *British Air Policy Between the Wars, 1918-1939* (London: Heinemann, 1976); and John Salmond, "The Air Force in Iraq," *JRUSI,* August 1925, pp. 483-98.

[4] Sir Hugh Trenchard, the "father of the RAF," remarked in a 1928 meeting of the Persian Gulf Subcommittee of the Committee on Imperial Defence that "a rupture of the Persian Gulf link would be just as grave a disaster to the Air Force as the closing of the Suez Canal would be to the Navy." London, Public Record Office, AIR/8/99.

[5] For more information on the development of British oil interests, see Stephen Longrigg, *Oil in the Middle East: Its Discovery and Development* (3rd ed. London: Oxford University Press, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1968); and Benjamin Shwadran, *The Middle East, Oil, and the Great Powers* (New York: John Wiley, 1973). A recent overview of the development of international oil is contained in Steven A. Schneider, *The Oil Price Revolution* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983).

[6] In this connection, a report by the Chiefs of Staff in 1928 stated the following conclusions: "First, our interests and commitments in the Gulf are greater at the present time that they were in the past; and Secondly, although the source of the potential dangers to our interests has changed, the dangers remain; and, with the advent of air power, they have increased rather than diminished." Public Record Office, CAB/16/94; P.G. 12, Committee of Imperial Defence, Persian Gulf Sub-Committee, "The Persian Gulf: Report by the Chiefs of Staff." See also the assessments, at later dates, in M. L. Heath, "Stability in the Arabian Peninsula," *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution,* May 1960, pp. 174-85; and Elizabeth Monroe, "British Bases in the Middle East: Assets or Liabilities?" *International Affairs* (London), January 1966, pp. 24-34.

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littoral, dictating not only defense and foreign affairs but increasingly many internal policies as well. Second, while Britain did not control the remaining two states, Iran and Saudi Arabia, it did exercise considerable political influence in Teheran and Riyadh. Third, British interests were protected by effective maritime policing: the Royal Navy controlled the sea lanes and policed the approaches to the Gulf and the Peninsula. Fourth, in addition to maritime policing, Britain relied on air policing to ensure that local rulers and forces complied with British goals. This was made possible by a not inconsiderable RAF presence in the region, which also helped to provide protection from outside intrusions.

Fifth, local security was maintained in some areas by armed forces established, trained, and officered by the British. This included not only the Iraqi army and air force, but at a later date the Trucial Oman Scouts and the Sultan's Armed Forces (in Oman). Sixth, Britain maintained effective control of oil exploitation through British ownership (in both the private and public sectors) of the producing companies—except where grudgingly forced to concede minority interests and the Bahrain and Saudi Arabia concessions to American companies.

While the era of *pax Britannica* in the Gulf can be said to have existed for a century or more, complete and effective British control over external access to the Gulf and internal politics in most of the littoral states was more ephemeral, lasting only a few short decades. The apogee of British concern over Gulf security and its ability to guarantee that security was reached during the decade of the 1930s. From then on, the notion of the Gulf as a British "lake" became increasingly dated, and the next quarter-century exhibited a steady British retreat from its predominant position.

In many ways, World War II marked a significant turning point and the beginning of the end of British imperial standing. While the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula were not the center of attention during the war, they did play a role in the conflict. Bombing raids were conducted from Aden during the Italian East African campaign early in the war; Aden and other airfields along the southern perimeter of the Peninsula were useful for convoy escorts and antisubmarine patrols; the Gulf and Iranian corridor was used as a key Allied supply route to the Soviet Union; [7] and air routes through the Gulf and along the southern Arabian rim served as important links in the ferrying of men and materiel to the Pacific theater in the latter stages of the war. One lasting effect of even the relatively minor impact of the war on the Peninsula was the first stripping away of the isolation that the British had imposed.

[7] Approximately one-quarter of wartime aid to the Soviet Union passed through the Persian Corridor, roughly equalling the amount sent around the North Cape to Murmansk.

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American penetration of this British domain, bitterly resented by the British, had begun in the decade before the war but benefited heavily from the need for cooperation in war efforts and became more pronounced in subsequent years. The inclusion of American minority interests in British oil concessions started the process and was followed by the American concession for all Saudi Arabia and the establishment of what was to become the Arabian-American Oil Company (ARAMCO).

During the war, U.S. Army Air Force planes and crews shared the British airfields, as did Pan American Airways. Partly because of this competition, the United States secured permission to build an airfield at Dhahran, which was completed shortly after the war's end and was operated by the United States until 1962. At the same time, the United States began to maintain a permanent naval presence in the Gulf and Arabian Sea and homeported the new Middle East Force (MIDEASTFOR) on the British naval base at Jufair (Bahrain). President Roosevelt even met with King 'Abd al-'Aziz (Ibn Sa'ud) on a ship in the Suez Canal in 1945. These steps were complemented by American pressure for the eventually successful removal of Soviet troops from Iran after the war, and then a few years later by American assistance to Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi in regaining control of his throne. Thus, by the early 1950s, the predominance of British influence in the two most important countries of the Gulf had been replaced by American influence.[8]

The slowly emerging American penetration of the Peninsula occurred simultaneously with a gradual British retrenchment from positions in the Gulf and Middle East. This phenomenon was only the local manifestation of a broader process involving the dismemberment of the British empire and the cumulative abandonment of long-held East-of-Suez responsibilities. The Peninsula and Gulf constituted the tail end of a retreat punctuated by exits from India (1947), Egypt (1954), Iraq (1958), and finally Aden (1967) and the Gulf (1971).[9]

Withdrawal from Aden—also signifying abandonment of Britain's last major military installation in the Middle East—turned out to be a long, involved process. It was acrimonious in the domestic British context, since it partly revolved around the debate over imperial Britain

[8] On this period of U.S. interests in the Peninsula, see Peter W. DeForth, "U.S. Naval Presence in the Persian Gulf: The Mideast Force Since World War II," *Naval War College Review,* Vol. 28, No. 1 (1975), pp. 28-38; James L. Gormly, "Keeping the Door Open in Saudi Arabia: the United States and the Dhahran Airfield, 1945-46," *Diplomatic History,* Vol. 4, No. 2 (1980), pp. 189-205; Barry Rubin, "Anglo-American Relations in Saudi Arabia, 1941-45," *Journal of Contemporary History,* Vol. 14 (1979), pp. 253-67; and Michael B. Stoff, *Oil, War, and American Security: The Search for a National Policy on Foreign Oil, 1941-1947* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980).

[9] On Britain's East-of-Suez policy, see Phillip G. C. Darby, *British Defence Policy East of Suez, 1947-1968* (London: Oxford University Press, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1973); David Lee, *Flight from the Middle East* (London: HMSO, 1980); and "Britain East of Suez — Special Issue," *International Affairs* (London), April 1966.

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vs. "Little England," and also bloody in the Aden context, as the British presence there had faced increasingly violent resistance since the early 1960s.[10]

In contrast, withdrawal from the Gulf seemed far less painful. The military implications were negligible, since only a small naval facility in Bahrain and an RAF base in Sharjah were involved.[11] From London, the political impact was minimal. The prospect of eventual termination of all East-of-Suez commitments had had time to settle in the intervening years since Aden. Even though the Conservatives had decried Labor's announcement of withdrawal in 1968, they were content to allow the decision to stand when they came to power shortly thereafter.[12]

The impact of withdrawal from the Gulf was more substantial in political terms since it necessitated the formulation of an independent political framework for the small emirates along the Arab littoral, but the real impact was essentially psychological. Britain had served as judge, arbiter, administrator, and, of course, protector of this littoral for well over a century. Departure in 1971 was tantamount to removal of the safety net. Obviously, the currents of nationalist and modernist sentiments and ideas had begun to circulate along the shores of the Gulf even before the influx of oil revenues. But apart from Iraq and perhaps Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, few people in the Arab littoral really seemed prepared to shoulder the burden of complete political and international responsibilities.[13]

Nevertheless, the newly independent states of Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE—along with the not-so-much-older nations of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia—adjusted quickly enough. As an indication of the durability of arrangements made at this time, the sixteen years between the momentous announcement and 1984 passed without any serious adverse developments occurring in any of the former British-protected areas of

[10] See R. J. Gavin, *Aden Under British Rule* (London: C. Hurst, 1975); Charles Hepburn Johnston, *The View from Steamer Point* (London: Collins, 1964); Elizabeth Monroe, *Britain's Moment in the Middle East, 1914-1971* (2nd ed., London: Chatto and Windus; Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); Julian Paget, *Last Post Aden, 1964-67* (London: Faber and Faber, 1969); Robert W. Stookey, *South Yemen: A Marxist State in Arabia* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982); Kennedy Trevaskis, *Shades of Amber: A South Arabian Episode* (London: Hutchinson, 1968).

[11] The two RAF bases in Oman were not turned over to the Sultanate of Oman Air Force until 1976.

[12] On the decision and process of withdrawal, see *The Gulf: Implications of British Withdrawal* (Washington: Georgetown University, Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 1969, Special Report Series No. 8); David Holden, "The Persian Gulf: After the British Raj," *Foreign Affairs,* July 1971, pp. 721-35; William Luce, "Britain's Withdrawal from the Middle East and Persian Gulf," *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution,* March 1969, pp. 4-10; and Elizabeth Monroe, rapporteuse, *The Changing Balance of Power in the Persian Gulf: The Report of an International Seminar at the Center for Mediterranean Studies. Rome* (New York: American Universities Field Staff, 1972).

[13] On the regional impact of British withdrawal, see John Duke Anthony, *The Arab States of the Lower Gulf* (Washington: Middle East Institute, 1975); Frauke Heard-Bey, *From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates* (London: Longman, 1982); and Rosemarie Said Zahlan, *The Origins of the United Arab Emirates* (London: Macmillan, 1978).

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the Gulf. More than one doomsayer in the the West was proved wrong in this regard.

The U.S. Role

The "changing of the guard" in the Gulf from Britain to the United States was a long process stretching over several decades. As pointed out earlier, the United States already had taken the first tentative steps toward playing a direct role in the region as early as the 1940s.[14] Still, even with three years or more advance notice, the United States was not fully prepared to accept direct responsibility for the security of the Gulf and Peninsula, let alone take up Britain's shield. Close working relations existed only with Iran and Saudi Arabia, American diplomats had yet to take up residence in the newly independent states, and—apart from the oil companies—there was virtually no cadre of officials familiar with the region. Furthermore, American air facilities at Dhahran had been abandoned in the 1960s and only the small MIDEASTFOR (with its Jufair lease transferred from the British landlord to the Bahraini government and then subsequently renegotiated) remained to represent the American security commitment.

The seeming American inaction concerning the Gulf at this time was not the consequence of indifference, although the Gulf's role in the looming global oil crisis was not generally appreciated at the outset of the 1970s. Rather, the explanation lay elsewhere. Except for the ties to Iran and, to a lesser extent, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf had always been unfamiliar territory. Even later, Washington's perceptions of events and situations in the region in large part were filtered through Pahlavi Teheran and Riyadh. In addition, the simultaneous American dilemma in Vietnam made direct involvement along the lines of the British experience impossible. The consequence was the "twin pillar" system.

In addition to a different approach and outlook, the United States also faced a radically changed situation from the prewar era of British predominance. While Gulf oil had been important to Britain then, in the 1970s that same oil was at the heart of global dependence on an increasingly "vital" resource. Furthermore, the political environment had changed: no longer was the Gulf ringed by minor possessions and quasi-dependencies of an empire; instead, independent states, fully integrated into the international system, had appeared.

[14] It should be noted that the original roots of an American relationship with the Arabian Peninsula date from considerably earlier, including diplomatic representation in Muscat in the early nineteenth century and the establishment of hospitals in various locations by American missionaries at the end of that century. See Joseph J. Malone, "America and the Arabian Peninsula: The First Two Hundred Years," *Middle East Journal,* Summer 1976, pp. 406-24.

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Even though the American strategic interest of denying entry to the Gulf to its superpower rival echoed earlier British attempts at quarantine, the two situations had different implications. The East-West rivalry and the supremacy of the United States and the Soviet Union in a bipolar system represented a far more direct challenge than those of previous years, as illustrated in the stubborn Soviet presence in northern Iran after World War II and emerging Soviet influence in Iraq after 1958.

Finally, the United States was inexperienced in its role as guardian of the Gulf. Britain had had three and a half centuries of experience in that region and had gradually assumed its position of predominance and security responsibility over the course of at least a century. In 1971 the United States found itself thrust into a role not of its choosing. For most of the ensuing decade, Washington looked benignly on the Gulf from a distance, blithely assuming that the status quo would remain undisturbed and that the amount of regulation required could be provided by its two principal clients, Iran and Saudi Arabia. Neither the oil crisis of 1973-74 nor the spillover from continued Arab-Israeli strife shook this complacency. Only the events of 1979 raised alarm signals. The laissez-faire attitude of the 1970s was replaced by a skittish, hawkish attitude in the 1980s. In many ways, the formulation of an effective yet subtle, permanent, and proper policy for the Gulf has yet to emerge out of the first years of the American era in the Gulf.[15]

Briefly, American policy in the Gulf since 1971 falls into two distinct periods: 1971-79 and 1979-present.[16] While the first was characterized by benign inaction, the second has tended toward overreaction. American policy toward the Gulf during the first period was predicated on the Nixon Doctrine, first enunciated on Guam in 1969, which minimized the role of the United States as a world policeman. In large part, the impetus for the doctrine came from America's disillusionment over the war in Vietnam and was aimed at "military retrenchment without

[15] There is a large and growing literature on U.S. security interests in the Gulf and Peninsula. Among those publications taking a longer view, see Geoffrey Kemp, "The Strategic Balance and the Control of the Persian Gulf," in Amirsadeghi, *Security,* pp. 26-42; Emile A. Nakhleh, *The Persian Gulf and American Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1982); James H. Noyes, *The Clouded Lens: Persian Gulf Security and U.S. Policy* (2nd ed., Stanford, Cal.: Hoover Institution Press, 1982); Gary Sick, "The Evolution of U.S. Strategy Toward the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf Regions," in Rubinstein, *The Great Game,* pp. 49-80; and Ronald G. Wolfe, ed., *The United States, Arabia, and the Gulf* (Washington: Georgetown University Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 1980). For a strongly critical view of U.S. policy in the Gulf (and much else besides), see J. B. Kelly, *Arabia, the Gulf, and the West* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1980).

[16] For treatments concentrating on the more recent period, see Harold Brown, *U.S. Security Policy in Southwest Asia: A Case Study in Complexity* (Washington: Johns Hopkins University SAIS, Occasional Paper, 1981); Shahram Chubin, "U.S. Security Interests in the Persian Gulf in the 1980s," *Daedalus,* Vol. 109, No. 4 (1980), pp. 31-65; David D. Newsom, "America EnGulfed," *Foreign Policy,* No. 43 (1981), pp. 17-32; Christopher Van Hollen, "Don't Engulf the Gulf," *Foreign Affairs,* Vol. 59, No. 5 (1981), pp. 1064-78.

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political disengagement."[17] Consequently the search was instituted for a surrogate or surrogates.

Here was the origin of the so-called "Twin Pillars" policy, whereby the United States pledged to assist Iran and Saudi Arabia in their military development in order to protect common security interests in the region. But these were not really two interchangeable pillars. Saudi Arabia's importance in this scheme was due to its possession of the world's largest oilfields, its paramount position among the states of the Arabian Peninsula, and its emerging influence in pan-Arab politics and councils.[18] But Iran was the militarily more significant partner in this arrangement, due to its much larger population, relatively more developed economy, and more powerful armed forces. Consequently, the United States spared no effort to build up the Shah's arsenal, partly in an effort to enhance its ability to police the Gulf (as particularly illustrated by Iran's involvement in the Dhufar rebellion), and partly to satisfy the insistent demands of the Shah and induce his flexibility on oil pricing issues.[19]

The handling of the Dhufar rebellion was hailed as a successful application of this policy. There, a nationalist-turned-Marxist rebellion against the Sultanate of Oman had been put down in late 1975 after more than a decade of conflict. Not only had the sultanate relied upon several hundred British officers and pilots, as well as the Special Air Service (SAS), but Jordan, Pakistan, and even India had provided military assistance. Even more prominent (and controversial) was the decision to accept Iranian help, and the level of aid extended. As many as 5,000 Iranian troops could be found on the Dhufari battlefields at any one time in the mid-1970s, and American-made F-4 Phantoms and destroyers in the Iranian inventory participated in the final year of fighting before the rebels effectively were crushed in December 1975.[20]

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[17] Robert E. Osgood, "The Nixon Doctrine and Strategy," in Osgood, ed., *Retreat From Empire* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), p. 9.

[18] Comprehensive studies of the American-Saudi relationship are contained in David E. Long, "U.S.-Saudi Relations: A Foundation of Mutual Needs," *American-Arab Affairs,* Spring 1983, pp. 12-22; William B. Quandt, *Saudi Arabia in the 1980s: Foreign Policy, Security, and Oil* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1981); and U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, *Saudi Arabia and the United States: The New Context in an Evolving "Special Relationship,"* Report prepared by the Congressional Research Service (Washington: GPO, 1981).

[19] On the American relationship with the late Shah, see Fred Halliday, *Iran: Dictatorship and Development* (2nd ed., Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979); R. K. Ramazani, *The United States and Iran: The Patterns of Influence* (New York: Praeger, 1982); and Barry Rubin, *Paved With Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran* (London: Oxford University Press, 1980; Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1981).

[20] On Dhufar, see John Akehurst, *We Won a War: The Campaign in Oman, 1965-1975* (London: Michael Russell, 1983); K. Perkins, "Oman 1975: The Year of Decision," *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution,* March 1979, pp. 38-45; and J. E. Peterson, "Guerrilla Warfare and Ideological Confrontation: The Rebellion in Dhufar," *World Affairs,* Vol. 139, No. 4 (1977), pp. 278-95.

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But a series of events in the region around 1979 seemed to mark a watershed in U.S. regional policy. In order, these included: the emergence of a Marxist state in Ethiopia; fighting between the new Ethiopian regime and Somalia in the Ogaden; the downfall of the Shah's regime in Iran and the subsequent bloody revolutionary process; the short border war between the Yemens in which South Yemen got the upper hand; the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; and the outbreak of the long-running Iran-Iraq war. The indirect, even inattentive, American approach of the past decade was reversed in a spasm of concern and rhetorical reaction. The broader Gulf region was characterized as an "arc" or "crescent of crisis," and simmering plans for a more direct and stronger American role in the region were put on the front burner. A leaked Pentagon study, "Capabilities in the Persian Gulf" (The Wolfowitz Report), citing U.S. military weakness in the region compared to the Soviet Union, even advocated the use of tactical nuclear weapons in a superpower Gulf conflict. While the immediate reversal of policy occurred during the Carter administration, this policy shift has been made permanent by the actions of the Reagan administration.[21]

Of all these events, the fall of the "peacock throne" in early 1979 had the most effect in forcing a radical alteration of American policy. For one thing, the Iranian revolution in itself posed a threat to Gulf security. Second, there could be no surrogate policy without a military linchpin and Saudi Arabia was not able to take over that role, even if it had been willing. Third, the Carter administration became convinced that the entire region was prey to increasing instability (thus the "arc of crisis" characterization). Fourth, the way the administration came to view the Gulf and its periphery — as an exceedingly vulnerable and fragile area upon which vital American interests depended — was paralleled by the overall deterioration in Soviet-American relations.

The resultant policy was the Carter Doctrine. Obviously, this shift had several objectives, one of which was to display toughness to the Soviet Union. A second, related goal appears to have been to buck up faltering public opinion polls at home. More directly, the doctrine signalled an emerging resolve on the part of the United States to forsake surrogates to carry out American interests and to "go it alone." Adoption of such a policy depended on the development of the appropriate military forces for direct American action, should intervention be required: thus,

[21] On the growing climate of alarm, see Zbigniew Brzezinski's comments in *Time,* January 15, 1979, as well as Henry Kissinger's interview in *The Economist,* February 3, 1979, and Robert W. Tucker, "American Power and the Persian Gulf," *Commentary,* November 1980, pp. 25-41. For a counter-interpretation of the Soviet role, see Fred Halliday, *Threat From the East: Soviet Policy From Afghanistan and Iran to the Horn of Africa* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1982). Paul Wolfowitz's study was summarized by Richard Burt in the *New York Times,* February 2, 1980. Both Wolfowitz and Burt later served in the Reagan administration.

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the birth of the Rapid Deployment Force and its eventual evolution into the U.S. Central Command.[22]

The broad outlines of the new Carter policy were continued by the Reagan administration. Washington remained committed to enhancement of RDF capabilities even as a heavy program of arms sales to and military cooperation with Saudi Arabia continued. But where Carter had embraced a symmetrical approach to containment, by limiting U.S. response to Soviet invasion of the Gulf to counterattack in the Gulf, the Reagan administration altered the emphasis in favor of an asymmetrical approach. Thus the stakes were implicitly raised and Washington was relieved of its sole reliance on a force that might not be capable of countering a Soviet attack in the Gulf, let alone deterring it.[23]

Even within the first few years of Reagan's term, this established framework witnessed a shift of policy. With Secretary of State Alexander Haig as the architect, the administration at first embraced the idea of "strategic consensus" between the United States and all its friends in the region as a bulwark against Soviet penetration. Washington's new officialdom seemed to ignore considerations that this "consensus" would not work while deep divisions remained between Israel and the Arab states friendly to the United States. Nor did it seem aware of the echoes this idea would inevitably raise of the 1950s polarization stimulated by the American-engineered Baghdad Pact (later CENTO). Fortunately, the idea was soon scrapped and was followed by relatively low-profile emphasis on improvement of the RDF, acceptance and approval of the newly formed GCC, and contained uneasiness over the direction of the Iran-Iraq war.

This new activist phase of America's Gulf policy raises a host of questions. At one level, these issues are concerned with the difficulty of engineering a viable RDF along already planned or generally conceived lines. Has the U.S. declaration of its responsibility for the security of the Gulf been translated into the actual capability to carry out its self-

[22] On the RDF and U.S. military options in the Gulf, see Richard Halloran, "Poised for the Persian Gulf," *New York Times Magazine,* April 1, 1984, pp. 38-40, 61; Maxwell Orme Johnson, *The Military as an Instrument of U.S. Policy in Southwest Asia: The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, 1979-1982* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983); Jeffrey Record, *The Rapid Deployment Force and U.S. Military Intervention in the Persian Gulf* (Cambridge, Mass.: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, February 1981); and Albert Wohlstetter, "Meeting the Threat in the Persian Gulf," *Survey,* Spring 1980, pp. 128-88.

[23] See John Lewis Gaddis's assessment of how post-World War II administrations vacillated between symmetry and asymmetry, in his *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press. 1982), especially pp. 352-57. The Reagan administration's response bears a striking resemblance to John Foster Dulles's reaction to Korea: "the free world [must] develop the will and organize the means to retaliate instantly against open aggression by Red armies, so that, if it occurred anywhere, we could and would strike back where it hurts, by means of our own choosing." Quoted in ibid., p. 121. For an evaluation of the suitability of an asymmetrical response to Soviet action in the Gulf, see Joshua M. Epstein, "Horizontal Escalation: Sour Notes of a Recurrent Theme," *International Security,* Winter 1983-84, pp. 19-31. On early Reagan policy in the Gulf, see Johnson, *The Military as an Instrument.*

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MAP 2

THE GULF AND SURROUNDING REGION



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proclaimed task?[24] In addition to the problems of the availability of suitable forces, equipment, and logistical support, viability depends on securing access to regional facilities and cooperation from U.S. friends in the region. But to Washington, these friends have appeared intractable, perhaps even churlish, and in light of the 1984 Iranian attacks on Gulf shipping, "wimpish." Does GCC footdragging on military action and cooperation reflect a basic inability to take forceful steps and face up to necessary risks? Or is GCC cautiousness based on sound perceptions and policy? The answer to this question necessarily should be a principal consideration in U.S. planning for Gulf contingencies.

At a more fundamental level there is the issue of whether or not the underlying architecture of U.S. Gulf policy is sound, viable, and effective. Does it address the real and most likely threats to continued Gulf security directly and accurately? Without discounting a potential Soviet attack on the Gulf, it should be remembered that there are a variety and complexity of threats against which the RDF is not appropriate — and for which insistence on current conceptions of U.S. military intervention are actually counterproductive. Considerable thought and planning have gone into the military defense of the Peninsula and Gulf against a Soviet assault. But how much consideration has been given to the other necessary instruments in an effective American policy? How much attention has been paid to the very real constraints on American action and the limitations of Washington's ability to control and even influence the direction of Gulf politics?

Contrasting British and American Experiences

If the Gulf had ever been a British "lake," even during the heyday of the early-to-middle twentieth century, it certainly could not be mistaken as an American "lake" in the 1970s or 1980s. Much had changed in the Gulf, as well as in the outside world during the intervening half-century. Obviously, it was no longer possible for the United States to emulate the manner in which Britain had been able to exercise direct and efficient responsibility for the security of the Gulf, even had Washington desired to do so.

In particular, British maintenance of security was handled in a number of ways that are not practical today. First, Britain exercised

[24] In addition to the sources noted above, see Thomas A. Fabyanic, "Conceptual Planning and the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force," *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (1981), pp. 343-65; Thomas L. McNaugher, "Balancing Soviet Power in the Persian Gulf," *Brookings Review*, Vol. 1, No. 4 (1983), pp. 20-25; W. Scott Thompson, "The Persian Gulf and the Correlation of Forces," *International Security*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (1982), pp. 157-80; and Kenneth N. Waltz, "A Strategy for the Rapid Deployment Force," *International Security*, Vol. 5, No. 4 (1981), pp. 49-73.

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extensive political as well as military control over six of the eight littoral states of the Gulf and considerable influence over the remaining two (up until the emergence of a U.S. relationship with Saudi Arabia and Iran). These are all independent states today and naturally they are sensitive to any suggestion of postcolonial vestiges. Control or domination by an outside power is now, for all intents and purposes, impossible. But even the exercise of influence requires means of preponderant leverage, and it is not clear that the United States (or the Soviet Union, for that matter) has the ability to exercise that leverage. In fact, influence, as the U.S.-Saudi relationship demonstrates, is bidirectional.

Second, Britain exercised a near-monopoly over the oil industry. HMG, either directly or indirectly through private British oil firms, controlled the ownership of oil deposits, exploration, production, and distribution. Until relatively recently, the only intrusion of this oil domain came from American major oil corporations whose fundamental interests were basically compatible with those of British. Obviously, this situation no longer exists. The old operating companies have been nationalized; new arrangements for exploitation clearly recognize that ownership of oil resources lies with the producing country; and decisions over levels of production and pricing have been shifted from the international oil companies to the producing states.

Third, Britain was able to maintain a presence in the Gulf with the kind and size of establishment determined solely by British discretion. In the political realm this was accomplished through the institution of the Political Residency in the Persian Gulf. The Resident, responsible to the Government of India (until Indian independence, and thereafter to the Foreign Office) was in charge of a network of Political Agents in the various British-protected states of the Gulf, who in turn served not only as the representatives of HMG but essentially as governors-general. Even the location of the Residency, based at the port of Bushire on the Iranian coast until 1947 and then on Bahrain until 1971, is illustrative of the historic nature of predominant British influence over even the independent states of the Gulf.[25]

The British presence was military as well, through air facilities, naval installations, and British-controlled and officered ground forces — the extent and location once again determined solely by British policy considerations. Contemplation of such a political presence, let alone its military aspects, is clearly out of the question today, for reasons of indigenous nationalist opposition, the emergence of truly independent states

[25] Another illustration, lying between the legally subordinate status of the amirates and the independent status of Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, is the Omani sultanate. Legally independent for centuries, the rulers of Muscat were subject to British approval and even determination of their foreign and other policies throughout much of the twentieth century.

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in the region, opposition within the United States to such a role, financial considerations, and even technological developments.

Fourth, the British were able to regulate the entry into the Gulf of individuals, government representatives, and of course military forces. The Gulf's isolation that permitted such an exclusionary policy is gone forever, and the littoral states have become integrated into global, Third World, and Middle Eastern political and economic systems. The Gulf is no longer "closed" ideologically and subordinate to a Western sphere of influence. The Iraqi revolution of 1958 marked the first intrusion of radical nationalist forces and provided the Soviet Union with a window on the region. The Iranian revolution of 1979 further emphasized that the Gulf, like the rest of the Middle East and the world at large, must contend with sharply divergent ideologies, political systems, and foreign policies.

The above points suggest some significant implications for policy formulation. It is obvious that there are more constraints on the exercise of foreign policy today than there were even a few decades ago. In some ways this makes the task of guaranteeing Gulf security far more difficult for the United States than it was for the British. But at the same time, the United States should not be attempting to administer a region or a situation, even indirectly through the application of influence or pressure on friendly regimes. While British concern eventually extended into nearly all spheres of activity — internal politics, public administration, education, social welfare, economic development — American concern is essentially tangential and should be clearly understood as being limited to giving narrowly defined assistance to cooperative actors in the region in a mutually agreed upon manner.

Perhaps the principal external threat faced today — the Soviet Union — is more serious than any faced by Britain in its day.[26] But then the "arsenal" for American response, in nonmilitary areas as well as military, is far more formidable than in the past and, to be successful, does not require the same degree or type of presence and control. The West, and not the Soviet bloc, pays hard currency for its considerable purchases of oil, and constitutes the major trading partner for the GCC states. In addition, the United States is the preferred source of consumer and capital goods, technology, technical assistance, education, devel-

[26] On the Soviet role in the region, see, inter alia, Shahram Chubin, "The Soviet Union and Iran," *Foreign Affairs,* Spring 1983, pp. 931-49; Karen Dawisha, "Moscow's Moves in the Direction of the Gulf — So Near and Yet So Far," *Journal of International Affairs,* Vol. 34, No. 2 (1980-81), pp. 219-34; Keith A. Dunn, "Constraints on the USSR in Southwest Asia: A Military Analysis," *Orbis,* Fall 1981, pp. 607-29; Joshua M. Epstein, "Soviet Vulnerabilities in Iran and the RDF Deterrent," *International Security,* Vol. 6, No. 2 (1981), pp. 126-59; George Lenczowski, "The Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf: An Encircling Strategy," *International Journal,* Vol. 37, No. 2 (1982), pp. 307-27; and Dennis Ross, "Considering Soviet Threats to the Persian Gulf," *International Security,* Vol. 6, No. 2 (1981), pp. 159-80.

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opment help, and military equipment and training. Finally, the American position is helped immeasurably by deep suspicions of Soviet motivation and intentions. Moscow has diplomatic relations with only three of the eight states of the Arabian Peninsula, while the United States maintains relations with all but one.[27]

Regardless of whether it emerged unconsciously or by oversight, British policy in the Gulf was not a haphazard derivation from a grand imperial design. Rather, it evolved over considerable time and consequently was closely tailored to the local terrain and circumstances. Generally, the British officials directly responsible for administering the region had served there for much of their careers: they had personal contact with the region's people, and they possessed in-depth knowledge of the area's history, languages, societies, and religions. Granted, it may have been easier for officials on the spot to devise an appropriate policy for a region that received little routine attention from Delhi, let alone from London. Nevertheless, there is a striking contrast between a British policy based on familiarity with the region and an American policy basically derived as an offshoot of East-West relations.

American Gulf policy remains heavily unbalanced by overemphasis on the Soviet threat and military options. The effort spent preparing for the greater but less likely threat may well not be applicable to the threats that are lesser but far more likely. Britain and France have maintained a far lower profile in the Gulf while providing significant assistance to local states. A British officer still commands the Omani armed forces, in which several hundred British seconded and private contract officers serve. France has maintained a continuous naval presence in the western Indian Ocean for some years, operating out of La Réunion, and France's internal security assistance to Saudi Arabia became known only after the Great Mosque episode in 1979. Both Britain and France provide the GCC states with large amounts of military equipment, yet they do not seek an involved military presence in the region's states.

The seriousness with which potential threats to Gulf security (as defined by American perceptions) is treated in the United States has tended to produce an overheated, almost frenzied, concern with the stability of the countries there and an exaggerated view of their overall

[27] On the Soviet presence in the Peninsula states, see Michael Collins Dunn, "Soviet Interests in the Arabian Peninsula: The Aden Pact and Other Paper Tigers," *American-Arab Affairs,* Spring 1984, pp. 92-98; Mark N. Katz, "Sanaa and the Soviets," *Problems of Communism,* January-February 1984, pp. 21-34; Stephen Page, "Moscow and the Arabian Peninsula," *American-Arab Affairs,* Spring 1984, pp. 83-91; J. E. Peterson, *Conflict in the Yemens and Superpower Involvement* (Washington: Georgetown University Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, December 1981, Occasional Paper); Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "The Soviet Union and the Arabian Peninsula," *The World Today,* November 1979, pp. 442-52; and Aryeh Y. Yodfat, *The Soviet Union and the Arabian Peninsula: Soviet Policy Towards the Persian Gulf and Arabia* (London: Croom Helm; New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983).

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vulnerability. There is no reason to suppose that the Gulf will go up in smoke if the states of the region refuse to dutifully abide by American perceptions, plans, and pressures. Nor is it logical to think that the leaders and governments of the Gulf states cannot grasp the nature and implications of potential dangers facing them, and therefore must be tutored constantly.

The contrast between the "British era" and the newer "American era" reveals the significant and important distinctions to be made between control, influence, and cooperation. Britain "controlled" the policies of most littoral states of the Gulf, access to the Gulf itself, and the Gulf's oil. Obviously, the exercise of control is no longer possible, even if it were desirable. But the alternative to control is not necessarily influence. A policy based on the exertion of influence or pressure, in an unequal or manipulative sense, entails serious limitations. Influence is applicable only in specific situations for the purpose of achieving specific, concrete ends. It can be "successful" only as long as leverage exists and is seen by both parties to exist and only to the extent of that leverage. Because influence is inherently based on inequity, eventually it breeds resentment and is consequently volatile.

In addition, such a policy emphasizes short-term policy goals often at the expense of long-term national interests. This has been illustrated in the Gulf by the U.S. policy of support for the Shah in order to enhance security prospects in the Gulf without direct involvement. But as events have shown, this policy led the Iranians to identify the United States with an unpopular ruler and resulted in enmity between the two countries — a highly negative consequence for U.S. national interests. The tendency to divide the Middle East into "friend" and "foe" created a deep well of bitterness in the 1950s and 1960s and undoubtedly contributed to the radicalization of Arab politics during that period. The recrudescence of this tendency in recent years has also had an effect in the radicalization of regional politics, albeit in a different ideological direction. U.S. pressure on friendly states to comply with American desires on Arab-Israeli matters and to provide the United States with access to military facilities seemingly has sprung from a policy based on pressurized influence. The chances are not good that it will yield substantial benefits.

Given the fundamental convergence of American and GCC strategic interests regarding the Gulf (i.e., preservation of Western supplies of oil and prevention of Soviet penetration of the region), the appropriateness and advantages of a policy based on cooperation, rather than influence, is obvious. Not only are the roots of common political and economic interests present, but the last decade has witnessed a considerable deepening of the ties of interdependence. It is true that national

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interests, no matter how convergent, necessarily diverge at some point. Any constructive relationship must be flexible enough to encompass this. For the United States, this not only involves resisting the tendency to regard the Gulf solely in terms of East-West confrontation, but it also means a realistic recognition and tolerance of regional actors' perceptions, outlooks, needs, and constraints.

The Role of the GCC States

A principal conclusion from the foregoing discussion is that a major share of the responsibility or burden of maintaining security in the Gulf must rest on the shoulders of the littoral states. Furthermore, as long as the United States and the Gulf states have different perceptions of potential threats or challenges to Gulf security, policy differences are inevitable. It is undeniable that important — and even vital — national interests of the United States reside in the Gulf. At the same time, however, American preoccupation with access to a single natural resource is only "temporary" in the broader scheme of things. To Saudi Arabia and its smaller allies, the security of the Gulf will always be of paramount importance, the risks higher, and a misstep catastrophic.

The reluctance of the GCC states to fall in with existing American plans for a buildup of U.S. military capabilities in the region is neither capricious nor temporary. U.S. planning has tended to concentrate on meeting the external threat of the Soviet Union. But to the Gulf states, a direct Soviet assault on the Gulf is one of the least likely threats, and cooperating fully with perceived American needs to meet this threat produces considerable negative side effects and courts both internal and outside opposition. Furthermore, these states see Israel and Israeli policies as posing a far more immediate threat to regional security than Moscow, and in this regard the United States is viewed as an uncritical supporter of Israel's actions rather than an ally.[28]

For regional threats, military action — particularly direct U.S. military intervention — is regarded as the very last resort. In many ways the Peninsula is naturally shielded from invasion due to geography and historical circumstances. Nevertheless, some regional threats do exist, such as attack or subversion emanating from Iran, Iraq, or possibly the Yemens. While the GCC has sought to improve its military preparedness, the small size of its population, its limited industrial base, and the lack

[28] In this connection, it might also be noted that the Gulf states still harbor lingering suspicions that the U.S. might be tempted to act rashly and attempt to secure direct control over the oil fields, with or without the pretext of a Gulf crisis. While the fuel for these suspicions was initially provided by the statements of public officials and hostile writers in the year or two following the 1973-74 oil price revolution, advocacy of such an action occasionally still appears.

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of available manpower prevent any major military build-up. Logically then, these states must rely on diplomacy, negotiation, financial sweeteners, and other indirect means to resolve disputes, rather than on direct confrontation. U.S. rhetorical posturing and high-profile efforts to increase military cooperation and a possible U.S. presence in the region work to inflame delicate situations, rather than to defuse them.

The escalation of the Iran-Iraq conflict in early 1984 into a war on Gulf shipping provides a pertinent illustration of the likelier dangers to Gulf security. The United States made a point of warning Iran on several occasions not to interfere with oil shipping and publicly sought to persuade Saudi Arabia and the UAE to allow the stationing of USAF fighters in GCC airfields. Predictably, these actions provoked angry words and additional threats from Teheran, without ending the tanker war. By mid-summer, it appeared that Saudi caution and minimal response to Iranian provocations had paid off: rather than escalating, attacks on tankers eased off, notwithstanding the downing of an Iranian F-4 Phantom by Saudi fighters.[29]

Finally, there is little the United States can do to prevent or counter most internal threats to GCC regimes. The closer the political and military ties are between the United States and any particular GCC state, the more the likelihood of a negative impact on that state's domestic politics. Even if this factor is of relatively marginal importance in the states of the Arab littoral (unlike the case with Iran), one must wonder whether it is worth taking the risk in order to improve slightly the chances of withstanding a relatively unlikely Soviet assault? Not surprisingly, the GCC states think not. Their argument is for an American "over-the-horizon" approach. The enormous Saudi military expenditures of recent years, far more than necessary for the use of present or planned Saudi armed forces, provide a clear indication of Saudi thinking in this regard.[30]

What can the states of the GCC, individually and collectively, do to assure their future security, given the delicate, finely tuned balance between their friendship with and dependence on the West and their need to cope with and adjust to far-reaching economic, social, and po-

[29] For recent developments in the war, see the "Forum" section elsewhere in this issue of *Orbis*, and U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *War in the Gulf*, A Staff Report (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1984). One State Department official, commenting on a 1984 mission to persuade GCC states to permit the U.S. to station fighters at their bases, was quoted as saying, "Murphy and Poindexter tried to explain that it is hard to be over the horizon and respond effectively. The Pentagon says that it has to have fuel and spare parts, and Coca Cola, and things like that, nearby, and for that, it needs bases in Saudia Arabia." (*New York Times*, May 17, 1984.)

[30] On military modernization in Saudi Arabia, see the Congressional Reference Service study, *Saudi Arabia and the United States*, as well as United States Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *United States Arms Policies in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea Areas: Past, Present, and Future*, Report of a Staff Survey Mission to Ethiopia, Iran, and the Arabian Peninsula (Washington: GPO, 1977).

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litical changes in the region? First of all, these states will find it necessary to continue to evolve in political terms to meet constantly changing circumstances and demands. To the outside world, the considerable change undergone in the last decade or two may not be apparent but, nevertheless, it has been far-reaching and even radical. The next several decades, though, will require even greater accommodation on the part of the power-holding establishment.[31]

In addition, logic dictates that the conservative Arab littoral states band together and move toward closer cooperation in economic matters, including development, policy harmonization, and perhaps eventually integration. The creation of the Gulf Cooperation Council in 1981, while prompted in the immediate sense by the Iran-Iraq war and made possible by the easy exclusion of the two largest Gulf states, benefited from solid foundations established since 1971 and even before. The record of economic integration around the world, not to mention political integration, is not impressive. Nevertheless, these six states share many fundamental similarities and undoubtedly have as good or better a chance than any group of Third World countries. It is worth noting that one member of the GCC, the United Arab Emirates, is itself a living example of successful integration or at least confederation, having been formed from the union of seven small sheikdoms torn by deep rivalries and even open hostilities for decades prior to independence.

Political cooperation and integration is, of course, most difficult to achieve. The hegemonic role of Saudi Arabia is both an asset and a liability in this regard. There can be no doubt that the Saudis were the driving force behind the creation of the GCC, and the council's headquarters / secretariat is located in Riyadh. On the other hand, the other dynasties of the Gulf have had reason over the past several centuries to regard the Al Sa'ud as foes bent on incorporating the sheikdoms into their domain. Even today, the often overbearing manner of the Saudis (sometimes referred to as the "Texans of the Middle East") raises hackles along the Arab littoral. One recent example of the ambivalent attitude of Saudi Arabia's neighbors is provided by Kuwait's refusal to sign a bilateral security agreement with Riyadh in the aftermath of the 1981 abortive coup attempt in Bahrain.

The six GCC states have also taken giant steps toward modernization and improvement of their military establishments. There are, of course, serious limitations on the defense capabilities of these states, and even with all their combined forces they would be no match for a

[31] For a representative study of the challenge facing Saudi Arabia in this regard, see John A. Shaw and David E. Long, *Saudi Arabian Modernization: The Impact of Change on Stability* (New York: Praeger, for the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1982, Washington Papers No. 89).

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determined assault from either Iraq or Iran, let alone an external power. Nevertheless, the enhancement of internal security capabilities has proceeded apace and the lion's share of the militarization effort has gone into air defense capabilities. In the last year or two, efforts have been made to lay the groundwork for a GCC "rapid deployment force" (which could respond to crises within the bounds of the GCC), and for a coordinated air defense network, based on American-supplied AWACS. Saudi Arabia in particular has overstocked equipment, supplies, and physical assets of "military facilities," leading to the assumption that these will be available for U.S. military use if and when Riyadh should request it. In this way the Saudis feel they can minimize the disruptive effects of a foreign military presence while permitting some advantages of a quick U.S. reaction to a sudden threat.

While Saudi Arabia's efforts in this regard are the most extensive, Kuwait, the UAE, and Oman also have placed heavy emphasis on the expansion of air, land, and sea forces; the purchase of extensive, sophisticated arsenals; and the recruitment and training of military personnel. Naturally, the extent to which these states can provide for their own defense against a serious opponent is severely restricted.[32] While GCC military capabilities can counter threats deriving from matters of internal security as well as some of the regional challenges to the GCC, it is clear that the survival of these states in an often hostile environment also depends on the utilization of other methods.

The GCC ultimately must rely on nonconfrontational skills and instruments that are presently at its disposal. First, there is effective diplomacy, both directly and publicly as well as behind-the-scenes. There must also be farsightedness in heading off potential confrontation and spillover from other conflicts. The GCC states have acquired a justly deserved reputation as mediators in recent years. This is illustrated by the role of Sheik Zayid, president of the UAE, as the go-between for the Shah of Iran and Iraq's Saddam Husayn in reaching agreement on the Shatt al-'Arab at Algiers in 1975; by the effectiveness of Saudi mediation in ending the first active phase of the Lebanese civil war in 1976; and by the role of Kuwait and the UAE in prodding Oman and South Yemen to establish diplomatic relations in late 1983 for the first time ever.

Admittedly, the effectiveness of Saudi Arabia and its neighbors as diplomats and mediators has been enhanced immeasurably by their financial resources. GCC apprehension over Iranian foreign policy in recent years was demonstrated in its provision of some $35 billion in aid to Iraq for its war effort. While resented by Iran, this largesse was far less

[32] For a recent assessment of GCC military capabilities, see Thomas L. McNaugher, "Arms and Allies in the Arabian Peninsula," elsewhere in this issue of ORBIS.

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provocative than direct military assistance to Iraq, verbal antipathy, and invitations to external military forces. As a single instrument of foreign policy, money has its limitations, as recent Saudi efforts to influence Syrian policy have demonstrated. Used skillfully, however, money can substitute for other, more traditional forms of foreign policy.

As a last resort, there is the "oil weapon." But the reluctance of Saudi Arabia to disrupt increasingly profound ties with the United States over a single — if centrally important — issue points to the dilemma of Saudi influence in a mirror-image of U.S. policy toward Saudi Arabia. Utilization of this foreign-policy instrument carries the risk of irreparably damaging a complex framework of good relations upon which Riyadh is vitally dependent, without any guarantee of achieving the desired goal — an independent Palestinian state.[33] Just as it is necessary for American policymakers to be aware of and to accommodate the environment and constraints that determine the decisions of Saudi policymakers, so must the Saudis be sensitive to American political and strategic requirements.

The mirror-image analogy is not exact, since Saudi leadership is undoubtedly far more knowledgeable about U.S. politics than the United States is about Saudi politics, particularly in the foreign policy realm, but the principle remains true. The United States and Saudi Arabia — and, along with the Saudis, the other five GCC states — will be mutually dependent for at least the next several decades. Neither can afford to jeopardize the support and cooperation of the other during this period. Consequently, these actors must maintain close coordination of security interests in the Gulf and must build on foundations of mutual trust and sensitivity. Failure would lead to severe economic disruption for the United States and the West, but for the GCC community it would mean complete disaster.

[33] See William R. Brown, "The Oil Weapon," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 36, No. 3 (1982), pp. 301-18; reprinted in J. E. Peterson, ed., *The Politics of Middle Eastern Oil*, pp. 126-43.

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ARMS AND ALLIES ON THE ARABIAN PENINSULA

by Thomas L. McNaugher

Securing U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf area grew dramatically more difficult after Iran's revolution. Threats to U.S. friends and interests increased: turbulence in Iran seemed to invite Soviet intrigue or military action, while the emergence of a revolutionary Islamic regime in Teheran raised the prospect of regional or internal violence around the Gulf. The major U.S. regional surrogate disappeared: whatever the Shah's motives or ultimate goals, he had been willing to offer military and diplomatic support to the weaker Arab regimes across the Gulf on several occasions when direct U.S. support would have been difficult to provide. Finally, U.S. access to the region decreased: no longer able to count on using Iran's bases in a crisis, U.S. military planners were forced to rely more heavily on Gulf rulers far less willing than the Shah to deal openly with the United States.

With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan coming soon after the Shah left Iran, it was only natural that the U.S. response to the new situation focused principally on the Soviet Union. Although the Soviet threat to Iran looks less ominous today than it did in 1980, deterring Soviet moves into Iran remains the principal mission for planners at CENTCOM, the U.S. command responsible for Gulf contingencies.

Considerably less attention has been paid to military issues associated with supporting remaining friends around the Gulf, notably Saudi Arabia and the smaller oil kingdoms of the Arabian Peninsula. Recent events in the Iran-Iraq war have highlighted the kind of internal and regional threats these states must confront. While the current slump in oil demand has allowed oil consumers to maintain a certain detachment from the war, over the long run demand for oil is likely to grow. With it will grow the importance of the oil producers, and especially the peninsular oil states, who possess large, accessible reserves and whose relatively small populations allow them to vary production with greater freedom than populous oil producers like Nigeria or Venezuela. Under conditions of tightening demand for oil, internal instability in the peninsular

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oil states or external attack on them could portend momentous consequences for oil prices and for energy prices generally.

These states obviously worry about security a lot. Over the past decade they have taken delivery of an impressive array of sophisticated and expensive weapons. And in May 1981 the six peninsular oil states (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman) established the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), attaching to it ambitious plans for collective defense. Yet the behavior of these states during the Iran-Iraq war raises important questions about what we can expect from these activities. How much of their security can these states handle on their own, individually or collectively? How can the United States help them do these things better? And what military missions are likely to continue to fall to the United States or its allies?

Answers to these questions can be formulated only by coming to terms with the local security situation. On the one hand, local military capabilities can be assessed only in reference to the kind of threats these forces may have to meet. On the other hand, local preferences concerning the development and actual use of these forces are strongly shaped by the perception rulers in these states have of their overall security situation — their priorities, their sense of the internal threat their forces might pose, and their fear of using their forces, even when such use would appear to be unavoidable. Thus, before turning to questions of military capabilities, this article deals briefly with the peninsular security situation.

The Components of Peninsular Security

U.S. diplomats who scoured the Gulf region in 1980 looking for bases from which U.S. forces could deter Soviet aggression encountered rulers much more concerned about their own internal problems, including those stemming from dealing too openly with the United States. Events since then have confirmed the local view of the security situation. The Soviets have not invaded Iran; indeed, the Soviet position in Afghanistan has been a morass, while Soviet forces north of Iran remain at fairly low levels of readiness. But Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Kuwait have experienced violence related at least partly to Iran's revolution. War between Iran and Iraq has led to sporadic Iranian attacks on Kuwait, to a Saudi-Iranian air battle over the Gulf (at this writing), and to fear that the oil exports from all Gulf states might be disrupted. Meanwhile, a slumping oil market has forced these rulers to manage a substantial and discomforting contraction of their economies. Although there are serious external threats to these states, the place to begin a study of their security situation is with the internal problems GCC rulers confront.

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The Internal Component

If all these rulers had to do was manage the rapid social changes induced by recent and substantial growth in their incomes, they would have their hands full. New classes have developed rapidly; an emerging native bourgeoisie now confronts ruling structures that have their basis in traditional Bedouin society, which has not yet fully disappeared from the Peninsula.[1] Foreign laborers have arrived by the thousands from the world over.[2] Most are contract-hire laborers with no interest in domestic politics. But skilled Palestinians tie these states physically to events in the Levant, while Saudi Arabia relies on a large proletariat coming largely from North Yemen, a neighbor it has always held in suspicion.

These trends only compound the historic regional, ethnic, and religious diversity of the Arabian Peninsula. Arab and Persian Shiite Muslims live in great numbers along the Gulf coast and form a majority in Bahrain; Iranian support to dissident Bahraini Shiites, whose coup attempt in December 1981 was stopped only at the last minute by Bahraini police, illustrates the security threat implicit in this situation.[3] Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, incorporates a variety of formerly separate regions, from the interior Najd, where King Abd al-Aziz ibn al-Rahman Al Saud began his campaign to conquer most of the Peninsula, to the coastal Hijaz and Asir regions, whose loyalty to the ruling Al-Saud has often been questioned.

Rulers of the peninsular oil states would also be kept busy if their only task were to manage the development of modern military forces. Bedouin armies tended to be organized ad hoc along family and tribal lines. The Peninsula's major recent experience with a large, multitribal force, the Ikhwan that Abd al-Aziz used to extend his grip on the Peninsula, produced the Ikhwan Revolt of 1929, a serious threat to the future king's rule.[4] Coups in Egypt, Iraq, and Syria have reinforced the point that forces can threaten regimes as well as defend them. The problem is most acute for the Saudis, whose forces are the largest and most regionally and tribally diverse. As we shall see, Saudi suspicions thus far have led them to limit the internal threat from their forces in ways that also limit their military effectiveness.

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[1] For a note on Saudi Arabia's bourgeoisie, see Michael Field, "The Balancing Act Facing the House of Saud," *Financial Times,* August 12, 1982, p. 27.

[2] On the general problem of foreign labor, see Saad Eddin Ibrahim, *The New Arab Social Order: A Study of the Social Impact of Oil Wealth* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982), esp. pp. 95ff.

[3] For details, see *Defense and Foreign Affairs Daily,* January 7, 1982, p. 2.

[4] See Christine Moss Helms, *The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia* (London: Croom Helm, 1981), pp. 250-72.

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The problems of coping with these internal dilemmas are compounded in this part of the world by the continuing salience of overarching loyalties to race and religion. In the 1960s, Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser manipulated the symbols of Arab nationalism to attack the legitimacy of the peninsular shiekdoms. Today, Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini employs the symbols of fundamentalist Islam to attack these rulers from another direction. The plight of the Palestinians is important in large part because it is rooted in *both* Arab and Islamic sentiments. While diaspora Palestinians, who often occupy important positions in business and government in these states, may pose a threat of terrorism or unrest,[5] the more serious problem is the gradual erosion of legitimacy resulting from the failure of existing Arab and Islamic regimes to deliver either a military victory or an acceptable peace with Israel.[6]

The actual violence associated with internal conflict in these nations has not been large in scale, although in some cases, notably the Bahraini coup incident, quick police action prevented what might have been more serious bloodshed. Still, multiple pressures create a murky security situation that leaves rulers uncertain about threats but reluctant to take chances. Hence their tendency to seek consensus rather than build it; hence also their reluctance to deal openly with the United States, whose strong ties to Israel raise the possibility of domestic as well as regional pressures.

More important, many of these pressures are related directly to events outside these states themselves. The diverse array of ethnic and religious groups in the peninsular states, the power of competing regional ideologies, and repeated demonstrations of Arab impotence in the Arab-Israeli conflict all tie events on the Peninsula to events beyond it. Internal stability thus is not just a function of the way these rulers manage their militaries or their economies. It is a function of broader stability in a region that is not famous for being stable.

The Peninsular Component

Historically, the families and tribes of the Arabian Peninsula fought one another repeatedly for water, territory, glory, and booty. To this day, ruling families in the six oil states are haunted by lingering rivalries and territorial disputes. Over the last two decades, however, tension

[5] A series of terrorist attacks on oil facilities in the early 1970s, for example, is often attributed to Palestinians, although most studies of the Gulf Palestinians show them to be well-off and relatively conservative. See John Duke Anthony, "The Persian Gulf in Regional and International Politics: The Arab Side of the Gulf," in Hossein Amirsadeghi, ed., *The Security of the Persian Gulf* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), p. 180.

[6] See Michael Hudson, *Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), p. 54.

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TABLE 1
MILITARY DIMENSIONS OF THE YEMENI PROBLEM

	North Yemen (YAR)	*South Yemen (PDRY)*	*Saudi Arabia*	*Oman*
Size of Armed Forces	21,550	25,500	51,500	23,550
Size of Army	20,000	22,000	35,000	19,550
Main Battle Tanks	714	450	450	12
Size of Air Force	1,000	2,500	14,000	2,000
Combat Aircraft	75	113	170	37
Paramilitary Forces	20,000 (tribal levies)	30,000 (popular militia)	25,000 (national guard)	3,000 (firqats)

SOURCE: *The Military Balance, 1983–1984* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1983).

among these six families has subsided; the famous Buraimi Oasis dispute, for example, was partially settled in 1974, apparently to no one's complete satisfaction but in the interest of achieving some measure of peninsular unity.[7]

Meanwhile, tension between these states and the Yemens, the two poor states that occupy the Peninsula's southern corner, has grown. The Saudis deploy a substantial portion of their ground forces at bases around North Yemen. They interfere extensively in North Yemen's politics, using aid to both the government and tribal rulers. And the Omanis hold a South Yemeni attack into southern Oman as their principal scenario for defense planning.

Although South Yemen actively supported the unsuccessful rebellion of Oman's southern Dhofar tribes from 1965 to 1975, and engaged Saudi forces in brief conflict in 1969, the military threat from the Yemens is not very impressive. Both Yemens have relatively large inventories of modern weapons (see Table 1), but skill levels in these nations are low, and many weapons go unmanned. Severe political fragmentation in North Yemen draws most of this nation's ground forces into an internal security role. While South Yemen's army has been a reasonably effective fighting force, it is too far from meaningful objectives in either Saudi Arabia or Oman to pose a serious threat on its own. While a unified Yemen would have the largest population of any peninsular state, Yemeni unity is unlikely. Even if achieved, it might only compound internal problems in these states.

[7] The 1974 agreement was between Saudi Arabia and the UAE; it did not include Oman, which still disputes parts of its border with the UAE. See Adeed Dawisha, *Saudi Arabia's Search for Security*, Adelphi Paper no. 158 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979), p. 20.

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The Yemeni problem can be understood only in political, historical, and geographical terms. Both Yemens have experienced political revolutions, although North Yemen's revolution was only partially completed. Both regimes thus pose sharp political alternatives to the other very traditional peninsular regimes. The fact that Saudi forces took the peninsula's Asir region from the Yemeni Imam in 1934 is another source of conflict and suspicion; to this day many Yemenis feel that this verdant region is rightfully theirs, and some of the Asir tribes apparently agree.[8] Finally, it should be remembered that the Yemens lie *on* the Peninsula, rather than across the natural buffers that separate the peninsular sheikdoms from most other neighbors. A hostile Yemeni regime or a hostile outside power (like Nasser's Egypt) in control of one of the Yemens would be in a position to pressure Saudi Arabia and Oman as few outside powers can. In this context the presence of a large underclass of Yemenis in Saudi Arabia takes on political significance.

These historical and political factors tend to magnify the significance of the modest military threats the Yemens can pose to their neighbors. In the Saudi case, in particular, minor border forays by North Yemeni forces into the Asir region could be politically embarrassing and might rekindle anti-Saudi feeling among the tribes of the Asir. A Saudi defeat by South Yemeni regulars might also stand as a blow to Saudi prestige. This may help account for the deployment of Saudi ground forces on the Yemeni borders in numbers out of proportion to the size of the actual military threat there.

For Oman the antagonism is of more recent origin, but the principle is similar. Oman settled the Dhofar rebellion with British, Jordanian, and Iranian military muscle and with generous infusions of economic aid to the local economy.[9] Yet the conflict could return. Moreover, the presence of Soviet, Cuban, and East German advisers in Aden and the size of South Yemen's weapons inventory raises the possibility of a reinforced invasion from that quarter, perhaps aimed at the major Omani air base at Thamarit.[10] This would not be an easy military operation: the distances are long, the terrain hardly constitutes "tank country," and South Yemeni logistics are not well developed. But less ambitious forays might be used to pressure Oman's rule.

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[8] J. E. Peterson, *Conflict in the Yemens and Superpower Involvement* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, 1982), pp. 9-10.

[9] On the Dhofar rebellion, see Richard F. Nyrop, ed., *Area Handbook for the Persian Gulf States* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1977), pp. 385-99.

[10] See Edward N. Luttwak, "Cubans in Arabia?" *Commentary,* December 1979, p. 65.

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TABLE 2

POPULATION AND MILITARY POWER IN THE MIDDLE EAST

State	*Population*	*Size of Armed Forces*	*Military Participation Ratio* [a]
Egypt	46,000,000	447,000	.009
Iran [b]	41,500,000	2,000,000	.048
Iraq [b]	14,300,000	517,250	.036
Syria	9,200,000	222,500	.024
Israel	4,100,000	172,000 [c]	.041
Jordan	2,469,500	72,800	.029
The Peninsular Oil States			
Saudi Arabia	8–12,000,000 [d]	51,500	.004
Kuwait	1,450,000	12,400	.009
Bahrain	400,000	2,700	.007
Qatar	260,000	6,000	.023
United Arab Emirates	1,130,000	49,000	.043
Oman	970,000	23,550	.024

SOURCE: *The Military Balance, 1983–1984* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1983), except as noted below.

[a] The military participation ratio is calculated by dividing size of armed force by population.

[b] Figures for Iran and Iraq are uncertain because of the Iran-Iraq war. Prewar figures for these countries were: Iran — 39,330,000/415,000/.011; Iraq — 12,730,000/220,000/.017. *The Military Balance, 1979–1980* (London: IISS, 1979).

[c] Mobilized strength (48 hours) for Israeli armed forces is 500,000, giving it a participation ratio of .125.

[d] *Military Balance* figures for Saudi Arabia's population tend to be high; a more common figure is 5,000,000, giving a participation ratio of .01.

The External Component

The really serious military threats to the peninsular oil states come from states beyond the Peninsula, whose forces are much larger and more experienced than any on the Peninsula (see table 2). But the Peninsula as a whole is protected from these adversaries by water, which buffers it from Egypt and Iran, and to the north by the arid An Nafud, which confines overland attack by modern military forces to the Peninsula's two corners. Meanwhile political factors limit the military power external adversaries can actually project. For example, Iraq must deal with Iran to the east and Syria to the northwest, not to mention its own Kurds and other internal problems. To the west, Israel absorbs the martial energies of other Arab states. Potential adversaries can bring to bear on

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the Peninsula only what they can spare from other, more pressing missions.

Geographical and political factors thus both limit and channel external threats to a definable range. Both factors encourage air and sea attack, as does the available target structure on the Peninsula. Iran and Iraq, for example, face a lucrative array of oil-related targets along the Peninsula's east coast. As the Saudis move some of their oil infrastructure westward, targets will appear on the Red Sea coast as well, the oil port and industrial complex at Yanbu being an important case in point. External powers may have neither the capability nor the incentive to mount a sustained attack against such targets. But even harassing attacks might serve to coerce the oil states on such matters as oil production levels and market shares.

Israel poses a potential threat of a different sort, that of preemptive strikes against military targets. Such strikes probably would come only in the context of a major Arab-Israeli confrontation that included Egypt, a situation in which Arab pressure might well force the Saudis to use their air force (and would in any case encourage the Israelis to *assume* that the Saudis would use their air force) against Israel. The Israelis probably would seek to eliminate bases close enough to Israel to allow Saudi aircraft to engage in the conflict; at the very least, the several bases around Tabuk, in the northwest, would be hit.[11] Such attacks would also warn the Saudis of the dangers of subsidizing Arab parties to the conflict. They also might threaten internal stability in Saudi Arabia by embarrassing the regime.

Ground forces could be delivered by air or sea much more easily than overland in all cases but Iraq's. But follow-up support to such forces would be vulnerable to interdiction, and in any case the air and sea transport capabilities of nations around the Peninsula are not well developed. Adversaries thus may lie in wait for an invitation arising out of domestic turbulence in one of the oil states, as was the case with Egypt in the Yemen, and with Iran in the Bahraini coup attempt of December 1981.

Overland attack must come from the north, and it is most likely to come via the northeastern corner of the Peninsula, through Kuwait. Such an attack would probably stem from a fundamental shift in the Iran-Iraq balance, and it is primarily for this reason that the Iran-Iraq war has been important to the rest of the Gulf states. In a position of dominance at the northern end of the Persian Gulf, either regime would

[11] For a discussion, see Andrew Duncan, "The Military Threat to Israel," *Survival,* May/June 1982, pp. 100-101.

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be able to attack the peninsular oil states or to coerce them by threatening attack.

Geographic buffers to invasion encourage what might be called "two-stage" attacks in which external antagonists acquire a position anywhere on the Peninsula and then seek to exploit it in ways unhampered by geography. Nasser understood the importance of such a position when he intervened in North Yemen's civil war in 1962. The Soviet position in Aden may likewise be a steppingstone to other areas, although Aden is as politically and geographically isolated as any state on the Peninsula.

Given the difficulties of using military force against the Peninsula, two-stage attacks are more likely to have political origins than military origins. Like Nasser, rulers bent on intervention will either wait for fortuitous political developments in one of the oil sheikdoms to present an opening, or seek by covert means to create such developments, as Khomeini seems to have done in the Bahraini case. Internal problems in the peninsular oil states thus are threatening not only in and of themselves but also because they can invite meddling by outside powers. The power of ideas, and the presence of ethnic and religious groups dissatisfied with traditional regimes, provide external adversaries with a variety of means by which they can actively seek to create an opening for themselves.

The Priority of Internal Security

Even a brief survey of the security situation confronting rulers of the six GCC states exposes the dominant role of internal security problems; even external adversaries and events can affect internal stability in these nations. The size of the internal security forces in these states bears witness to the high priority these rulers place on internal security. Saudi Arabia's internal security forces number about 20,000. The Saudis began to modernize these forces after the Mecca mosque incident and also expanded their power. Borders are guarded by a Frontier Force and Coast Guard totaling roughly 8,500 in strength, and the Coast Guard deploys nearly 500 coastal patrol craft. Finally, the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG), totaling perhaps 25,000 active personnel, plays primarily an internal security role from positions in every Saudi city.[12] Forces and numbers for the other five GCC states are difficult to find. But in these nations even the external security forces could and probably do gear the bulk of their forces to internal security missions.

[12] See Richard F. Nyrop, ed., *Area Handbook for Saudi Arabia* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1977), p. 340; and *The Military Balance, 1983–1984* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1983), p. 62.

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It is difficult to assess the effectiveness of these internal security instruments, secrecy being a dominant theme of the approach these rulers take to security at virtually all levels. Still, a number of basic points can be made about their internal security capabilities. First, we would expect these regimes to do well the internal security missions they have traditionally done well. Saudi Arabia's Shiites have been a problem for decades, even centuries; one would suspect that most Shiite organizations have been well infiltrated by Saudi agents, and interviews suggest that this is the case. It is also probably the case with most of the long-standing sources of internal threat these rulers face — Hijazis or other tribal or regional factions in Saudi Arabia, Dhofaris in Oman, Shiites in Bahrain, and Palestinians in Kuwait. The basic techniques of intelligence, repression, and co-optation in some of these cases are as old as the regimes themselves. There is no reason to expect that traditional approaches are any less useful now than in the past.

Second, the scant evidence available on the subject suggests that these rulers are less well positioned to handle newer internal threats. Iran's revolution has raised the prospect of infiltration by terrorists or subversives into the valuable oil regions of the eastern Peninsula. There are serious technical impediments to trying to stop such infiltration; at best, coast guards and other forms of infiltration police can hope to catch an occasional infiltrator, thereby posing a deterrent to others. But these rulers simply have not worried too much about coastal infiltration, so it demands a new set of skills.

As GCC rulers have taken over their oil fields they have acquired responsibility for general security there as well. Yet they have been slow in moving forces in to protect the fields. For example, responsibility for the oil areas in Saudi Arabia falls exclusively to the SANG; there are no Saudi Army units stationed in the oil-rich Hasa province.[13] Yet SANG modernization began only in 1972, and SANG forces were stationed permanently in the oil region only after the Iran-Iraq war began. Interviews suggest that even today no more than a large battalion of the National Guard is stationed at Hofuf.

Although internal security forces tend to employ indigenous personnel far more than the military forces the nations have amassed, all six states draw on regional and international expertise for help in the internal security realm. The Saudis drew on French and Jordanian advisers to deal with the Mecca incident and in its aftermath signed a long-term

[13] See John Keegan, *World Armies* (New York: Facts on File, 1979), p. 608; Dawisha, *Saudi Arabia's Search for Security*, p. 16; and William B. Quandt, *Saudi Arabia in the 1980s: Foreign Policy, Security, and Oil* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1981), p. 109, n. 2.

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contract with France for training their internal security police.[14] Until recently, British, Jordanian, and Pakistani expatriates occupied most senior positions in the police forces of Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).[15] Pressures in recent years to move nationals into key police positions have lessened the number of expatriates in the internal security business, yet many have tended to stay on as advisers.[16]

Perhaps because cooperation in internal security affairs is a delicate matter for these rulers, movement within the GCC toward greater cooperation in this security area seems to have come less as a result of the council's creation and more in response to the Bahraini coup attempt of December 1981. That the coup conspirators had been able to pass relatively freely among the GCC states using GCC passports suggested that tighter airport and infiltration controls were necessary.[17] That Bahrain's rulers were apparently alerted to the coup by a tip from airport officials in Dubai suggested the benefits of greater cooperation and intelligence-sharing.[18] In the months immediately after the attempt, Saudi Arabia signed bilateral internal security agreements with four of its five GCC compatriots, with Kuwait the only holdout.[19] Intelligence-sharing, based partly on computer files housed in Saudi Arabia, has apparently received some attention.

Within a month after the coup attempt was foiled, Bahraini officials called for the formation of a GCC rapid deployment force (RDF).[20] This produced some interest in a joint military command for the GCC states, and the October 1983 joint maneuvers.[21] The timing of Bahraini interest, coupled with the relatively small size of GCC ground forces in relation to those around them, suggests strongly that such an RDF, if formed, would be primarily an internal security force. To the extent that Iran lay behind the attempted coup in Bahrain, the GCC-RDF may represent the most expeditious and realistic approach these states can take to dealing with the threat Khomeini's regime poses.

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[14] See U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Saudi Arabia and the United States: The New Context in an Evolving "Special Relationship,"* 97th Cong. 1st sess., August 1981, pp. 23-24, 52; and Quandt, *Saudi Arabia in the 1980s,* pp. 83, 93-96.

[15] John Duke Anthony, *Arab States of the Lower Gulf: People, Politics, Petroleum* (Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1975), pp. 59, 67, 79; and Nyrop, *Area Handbook for the Persian Gulf States,* pp. 232, 269.

[16] See, e.g., Nyrop, *Area Handbook for the Persian Gulf States,* p. 269.

[17] Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), "Arabian Peninsula," December 21, 1981, p. C1.

[18] Michael Sterner (U.S. Ambassador to the UAE, 1972-75), "Perceptions and Policies of the Gulf States Toward Regional Security and the Superpower Rivalry," unpublished ms., n.d., p. 35.

[19] Kuwait appears to have objected most strenuously to the extradition clause of the proposed agreement, which violates its constitutional principles. It also objected to a clause that would allow forces of one nation to pursue suspects up to twenty kilometers inside the territory of another. *Middle East Economic Digest,* December 2, 1983, p. 6.

[20] See e.g., FBIS, "Arabian Peninsula," December 23, 1981, p. C1.

[21] On operation "Desert Shield," see *Middle East Economic Digest,* October 21, 1983, p. 3.

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Peninsular Security and External Defense

To the extent that external adversaries and events can affect internal security in the GCC states, these rulers cannot avoid worrying about trends and events in the surrounding region. But internal political weakness alone makes it difficult for them to seek aggressively to control events beyond the Peninsula's edges. Instead, they use their limited range of diplomatic tools to seek accommodation with and moderation in their environment. The delicately balanced diplomacy of Kuwait, the GCC state most geographically exposed to external attack and among the most demographically vulnerable to internal threat, highlights this technique.

Things are quite different within the confines of the Peninsula. Here there are natural incentives for the Saudis to seek to dominate those portions of the Peninsula that were not brought under formal Saudi control earlier in this century. In doing so they take advantage of the natural buffers that protect the Peninsula from the forces of its neighbors, while they can also seek to contain peninsular conflicts that might invite intervention by outside powers. While the Saudis no doubt worry that liberal political trends in the neighboring sheikdoms may force Saudi Arabia to experiment with new political institutions, there is also the worry that the fall of one of these nations might be the beginning of a two-stage attack that would ultimately threaten Saudi Arabia too. And if the smaller sheikdoms resent Saudi pressure, they also must realize that severe turbulence in Saudi Arabia could not help but affect their security as well.

This logic, as much as anything else, underlies the Gulf Cooperation Council. Cooperation among the six GCC states aimed at resolving lingering border disputes preceded by some years the GCC's formation in 1981, suggesting that these states realized some time ago that they had best hang together lest they hang separately. Likewise, Saudi subsidies for the defense of the poorer GCC states — Bahrain and Oman — began in the mid-1970s, suggesting that the Saudis also recognize that for them the Peninsula's borders are as important as their own. While the GCC may be an important step forward in the degree of cooperation among these states, it must also be seen as the natural product of a logic rooted in the peninsular security situation.

The GCC external security problem is twofold. These states must seek to control the rest of the Peninsula, namely the Yemens. And they must find some way to defend against unlikely but potentially serious external threats. In neither case do military instruments play a dominant role. The Saudis use aid and a variety of intrusive political devices to control North Yemen, while Kuwait and the UAE have pursued a diplomatic course with South Yemen that led, late in 1983, to a cautious

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rapprochement between that nation and Oman.[22] Meanwhile, as noted above, the Saudis and Kuwaitis in particular seek stability and moderation in the surrounding region, primarily by using aid and subsidies.

Still, *military* security cannot be ignored. Even limited violence on the Yemeni borders might have potent and harmful side effects. And while geographic features may dampen the prospects for external attack, external threats could emerge that would swamp local military capabilities. Thus each of these states has used a substantial portion of its oil revenues to build up defenses based on some of the world's most sophisticated weapons systems.

Two serious issues are associated with the development of such forces, however. First, the enterprise is a new one; Saudi Arabia began its quest for new forces soon after Egypt intervened in North Yemen in 1962, while some of the smaller GCC states began to amass modern arsenals only in the last five or six years. Second, the enterprise is potentially dangerous; as forces get larger, which is the case especially in Saudi Arabia, they may no longer be controlled by traditional methods, and thence are seen to pose an internal threat. The evaluation of the effectiveness of these forces cannot proceed without first examining these issues and how local rulers have sought to deal with them.

The Newness of the Enterprise

Because historically Bedouin warfare was not a very disciplined affair, commanding modern military forces requires development of new martial and organizational skills. More important, it demands new *technical* skills, given the highly sophisticated weaponry these rulers can afford. Yet if GCC populations are small, their *skilled* populations are tiny indeed. This problem is exacerbated by the opportunities presented to technically competent people by the civilian sectors of these rapidly expanding economies.[23] It also seems to be exacerbated by a culturally based aversion to manual labor, which makes many native personnel reluctant to take on the kind of work that makes military organizations actually function.

In the past the GCC states compensated for their relative backwardness by purchasing whole military capabilities. As recently as 1969, for example, British and Pakistani expatriates piloted Saudi aircraft into the confrontation with PDRY (People's Democratic Republic of

[22] See *Middle East Economic Digest,* September 16, 1983, p. 69. Saudi Arabia and the PDRY also exchanged ambassadors in 1983, having broken diplomatic relations in 1977 over PDRY support to Ethiopia in that nation's war with Somalia. *Middle East Economic Digest,* July 29, 1983, p. 43.

[23] For a discussion and quantification of some of these issues, see Tony Pascal et al., *Men and Arms in the Middle East: The Human Factor in Military Modernization,* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, no. R-2460-NA, June 1979), p. 46.

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Yemen) forces along the nation's southern border.[24] Increasingly, however, military modernization programs have yielded skilled operators, while a large community of foreigners supports the weapons these rulers buy. There are literally thousands of foreign contract-hire laborers working in the defense sectors of these states. Military officers from a variety of states serve on contract in the GCC area. Pakistanis seem to dominate in virtually every nation — over 1,500 serve in Saudi Arabia alone — while Jordanians also appear in great numbers. Finally, there is a more official layer of military advisers, many of whom come with specific weapons purchases, as when U.S. Air Force officers introduce the Saudis to the F-15 or the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS).[25] It is significant that the faster these states modernize their forces, the more they diminish the usefulness of their own skilled support personnel, the best of whom are switched continuously to newer weapons as these enter the inventory. This of course only increases the importance of foreigners.

There are costs as well as benefits associated with the presence of foreign support. Without foreign support these states would be unable to field modern military forces, at least in the short- and mid-term. Official foreign advisers also symbolize commitment. And foreign support personnel may enhance government control over the armed forces, since their loyalty is presumably to their paymasters and they are unlikely to be interested in internecine political squabbles. Yet, large foreign support and assistance groups can spawn resentment among native populations. Official U.S. support is especially problematical given U.S. commitment to Israel. And too many foreigners from a single supplier state can create the appearance, and perhaps the reality, of dependence. GCC elites seek to solve some of these problems by diversifying suppliers, but this is difficult to justify on military grounds, given the logistics and coordination problems that accompany mixed inventories. Thus, efforts to minimize the political costs of military expansion undermine the military rationale for expanding the force.

The presence of large foreign support establishments behind GCC militaries also raises questions about the effectiveness of these forces. Postrevolutionary Iran surprised most observers with its ability to keep sophisticated equipment working, at least during the first year of its war with Iraq. But much more consistently than rulers of the GCC states, the Shah had sought to develop a class of military technicians — the *homofars.* And Iran's industrial base was by all accounts far ahead of that across the Gulf. The loss of foreign support among the GCC militaries

[24] David Holden and Richard Johns, *The House of Saud* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1981), p. 281.

[25] See the excellent discussion of expatriates in Saudi Arabia in Ghassane Salameh, "Political Power and the Saudi State," *MERIP Reports,* October 1980, p. 10.

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thus would be much more likely to lead to a rapid depletion in their capabilities. Force capabilities would depend on the operating skills of local personnel only if foreign help were to stand fast.

The Curse of Modern Military Forces

The second problem associated with the development of modern military forces stems from the fact that such forces may pose a genuine internal threat. Although few rulers discuss such problems openly, fear of an internal threat can be inferred from actions they take or refuse to take. In the Saudi case, in particular, a fairly clear pattern of decision-making can be distinguished in which the Saudi elite has sought to balance modernization with internal control. However, the smaller GCC states, lack Saudi Arabia's defense burden and hence lack its problem with a large military. Here it is less what rulers do than what they are unwilling to do that suggests concern for the internal threat their forces might pose. Four general techniques of control can be distinguished.

First, these rulers are careful about how they organize their forces. Saudi Arabia's tendency to "disorganize" its ground forces into two balancing camps — Army and National Guard — began after the Ikhwan Revolt of 1929. Although these two forces have been modernized at different rates and in different ways, and although the continuing split between the two forces may reflect regional, tribal, and family differences, these forces still tend to balance each other. Similar patterns of organization can be found elsewhere in the GCC. With the exception of Oman, the oil kingdoms have only recently been willing to introduce technological or organizational means of communication between air and ground forces, despite the obvious utility of close air support in actual combat. They also have resisted placing aircraft and air defense missiles under a unified air defense command, despite efficiencies this might yield for air defense. These policies amount to "divide and rule," albeit on a scale smaller than that evident in Saudi Arabia.

Second, personnel policies are used to help control these forces. Promotion in the officer ranks continues to be based on loyalty as well as on merit, especially in the smaller sheikdoms where family members still dominate all forces. The practice applies to the enlisted ranks as well, leading to a preference among these rulers for Bedouin soldiers, whose loyalty outstrips their technical competence. In general, the difficulty of finding indigenous personnel who are both loyal and technically competent limits the size of these forces and leaves some units under strength. One of the two armored brigades of the Royal Saudi Army, for example, is little more than a cadre unit, while many of Saudi

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Arabia's I-Hawk air defense systems remain in storage at least partly for lack of personnel.

Conscription might solve these problems, but it is unpopular with constituents. Moreover, in the Saudi case conscription might bring more potentially disloyal Hijazi, urban, and modern elements into the armed forces.[26] Kuwait enacted a conscription law in 1978, but it is not well enforced, and Kuwait's rulers appear to be content recruiting primarily from among the poorer Bedouin tribes along their borders with Iraq and Saudi Arabia.[27]

Third, the purchase of high-technology weaponry also helps GCC elites deal with the internal military threat. It tends to raise the status and satisfaction — and hence (it is hoped) the loyalty — of military officers. To the extent that modern weapons depend far more heavily than traditional Bedouin forces on logistics and support, GCC elites are able to control their forces by keeping a tight rein on ammunition and spares.[28] They also control the salaries — and hence (it is hoped) the loyalty — of the large foreign support communities that inevitably accompany modern weapons.

Finally, while the diverse array of weapons these rulers have purchased may make little sense from a military perspective, it helps curb the internal threat potential of their forces by making coordination more difficult. For example, the Royal Saudi Army has an armored component based on French tanks, advised by French experts, and trained in French tactics. Its mechanized component is based on U.S. equipment, U.S. advisers, and U.S. tactics. They constitute two armies (the SANG is a third) that rarely train together and that probably would have problems coordinating any action, internal or external.

Ultimately, fear of the domestic threat these forces might pose affects not only their organization or equipment but also the willingness of GCC elites to use them. As William Quandt points out, doing so might give rise to an internal threat: "Serious problems could arise if the political leadership were to order the military into some action that exceeded Saudi capabilities. A humiliated armed forces could turn on the politicians, as occurred in Egypt in 1952."[29] This consideration may account in part for the tendency of both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to deploy forces sym-

[26] Keegan, *World Armies,* p. 619. Also, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Saudi Arabia and the United States,* p. 53.

[27] Alvin Cottrell holds that one-third to one-half of Kuwait's army consists of poorly educated Iraqi or Saudi tribesmen. Alvin J. Cottrell et al., "Military Affairs in the Persian Gulf" in Alvin J. Cottrell, ed., *The Persian Gulf States* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), p. 167. On conscription in Kuwait, see Abdul Kasim Mansur (pseud.), "The Military Balance in the Persian Gulf: Who Will Guard the Gulf States from Their Guardians?" *Armed Forces Journal International,* November 1980, p. 59.

[28] House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Saudi Arabia and the United States,* p. 21.

[29] Quandt, *Saudi Arabia in the 1980s,* p. 103, n. 18.

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bolically — to the Arab-Israeli fronts, for example — yet assiduously to keep them out of combat. But to the extent that ruling elites act in this way, they deprive their armed forces of any chance to develop the competence that only combat can breed, and thus only reinforce their own reluctance to engage those forces in combat.

Local Forces and the Prospects for Cooperative Defense

The constraints on GCC force development outlined above, and the sheer uncertainty associated with assessing forces that have rarely been seen in combat, suggest that pessimistic assessments of these forces — asserting that they are no more than "a deterrent shell"[30] — may well be valid. Still, GCC forces are real and growing; presumably they can function at some level of effectiveness even within political strictures that so far have governed their development. Moreover, political strictures may change, raising the potential of these forces still further. If only to provide a sense of the *most* that can be expected from these forces, it is necessary to spend some time with a cursory examination of those forces that are relevant to GCC security.

The assessment presented here is grouped around the security demands imposed on the GCC states by their external threat environment: the need to meet an overland invasion from the north; to handle harassing border attacks from the Yemens; and to handle air and coastal strikes, especially from the north (Israel and Iraq) and east (Iraq and Iran). Thus ground forces and air strike forces are treated first, air defense is taken up separately, and finally, coastal defense forces are discussed.

GCC Ground Forces

The GCC ground forces outlined in table 3 vary substantially in size and structure. Most are light forces that serve principally to guard the ruling family. Oman's is a combat-tested counterinsurgency force currently lacking the armor for significant deployment against the potential threat from Iran or Iraq. Both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, field armored units capable of deployment against threats from these larger nations. And Saudi Arabia's forces are sufficiently large and diversified to be potentially useful all around the Peninsula.

The armor strength of the Royal Saudi Army (RSA) has grown steadily over the past decade and will continue to grow. But armored and mechanized units are organized around French and U.S. equipment,

[30] Spoken in reference to Kuwait's military by Mansur, "The Military Balance in the Persian Gulf," p. 59.

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TABLE 3

GCC OVERLAND DEFENSE FORCES
(verifiable orders in parentheses)

	Saudi Arabia	*Kuwait*	*Bahrain*	*Qatar*	*The UAE*	*Oman*
Army strength	35,000	10,000	2,300	5,000	46,000	19,550
Organization (Combat Brigades)	1+ Armor 2 Mechanized 2 Infantry 1+ Artillery	1 Armor 2 Mechanized	1/3 Armored Carrier 1/3 Infantry	1/3 Armor 1 2/3 Infantry	1 2/3 Armor/ Armored Carrier 3 Infantry	1 Armor/Armored Carrier/Infantry 1 Infantry
Tanks	300 AMX30 150 M60A1/3	70 Vickers MK 1 10 Centurian 160 Chieftain	—	24 AMX30	100 AMX30 18 OF40 60 Scorpion (18 OF40 MK 2) (20 Scorpion)	6 M60A1 12 Chieftain (15 Chieftain)
Armored personnel carriers/armored carriers	200 AML60/90 350 AMX10P 20 VCC-1 800 M113	100 Saladin 80 Ferret 175 M113 130 Saracen	8 Saladin 20 AML90 8 Ferret	10 Ferret 30 AMX10P (8 Commando)	6 Shorland 90 AML90 VBC-40 AMX10P	36 Saladin
Strike aircraft	65 F5E	30 A4KU	(6 F5E/F20?)	2 Hunter 1 T79 8 Alpha Jet	3 Alpha Jet 10 MB326KD (3 Alpha Jet) (A10?)	19 Jaguar 12 Hunter
Air–surface munitions	Maverick	Super 530 SS-11/12	—	—	AS-11/12	—

SOURCE: *The Military Balance, 1983–1984* (London: IISS, 1983).

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as noted above, and are deployed at widely separate points in the kingdom. Thus they are not amenable to combined operations. Meanwhile, the National Guard has been modernized, principally by the United States, creating the structure, if not the reality, of "a lightly armored reconnaissance screening force . . . ideally suited for the security of cities and the surrounding areas, or the oil fields."[31] There has been some discussion of purchasing heavy tanks for the SANG, but as yet no action has been taken.[32] In any case, assessments of the modernized National Guard are generally gloomy, making it likely that this will remain primarily an internal security force for some time to come.

The Saudis do not publicize precise deployments, but in general the RSA is deployed to the west and south of the nation. Most of its armor, and its armor school, the parachute units, and commandos, are deployed at Tabuk. Completion of a three-brigade complex, King Khalid Military City (KKMC), at Wadi al-Batin, near the western edge of Kuwait, will allow the Saudis to move heavy units to this area of likely ground force threat without unduly compromising the security of the royal family. Mechanized units are stationed along the Yemeni border at both Khamis Mushayt and the smaller outpost at Sharura, built after the 1969 border incident with the PDRY. The infantry is scattered about, including to outposts along the Iraqi border. The RSA's headquarters and logistics centers, but few combat troops, are based at Al Kharj, near Riyadh. SANG units are stationed in all major towns and along the borders, with units at Hofuf in the oil region and a headquarters near Riyadh.

Kuwait's 10,000-strong army began as a small protector of the ruling family, but Iraqi threats to Kuwait in the early 1970s produced a series of budget supplements that refurbished and expanded all services. As shown in Table 3, Kuwait's army today owns 160 of Britain's heavy Chieftain tanks — certainly inappropriate for internal security — and deploys two armored brigades as well as three infantry battalions. Little is known about these forces save their basic outlines, but Kuwait's tendency to recruit relatively unskilled Bedouins raises serious questions about the effectiveness as well as the endurance of Kuwaiti tank units against a serious external threat.[33]

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[31] Ibid., p. 35

[32] A Saudi request to the Federal Republic of Germany for 300 Leopard IIs apparently originated in the National Guard. See John Vinocur, "Saudi Weapons Deal Starts Bonn Debate," *New York Times,* March 26, 1981. Late in 1983 the Germans formally declined to sell the tanks for historical and political reasons. "Germans Won't Sell Saudis Leopard," *Defense Week,* October 17, 1983, p. 18.

[33] Nyrop notes that in the mid-1970s up to 80 percent of the Kuwaiti army and National Guard were Bedouin tribesmen. (*Area Handbook for the Persian Gulf States,* p. 193.)

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Strike Aircraft

Table 3 also highlights relevant data on GCC ground attack (strike) aircraft. The dominant strike force here is comprised of Saudi Arabia's sixty-five F-5Es. These are distributed to bases at Khamis Mushayt, Taif, Dhahran, Tabuk, and probably KKMC when it is operational. The Saudis possess a large inventory of ground attack munitions for these aircraft, including over 2,000 Maverick TV-guided missiles useful for attacking armor, plus several thousand laser-guided bombs and cluster bomb units for use against point and small-area targets like supply depots, antiaircraft installations and radars, and forward staging areas.[34] Although at the moment none of these munitions can be delivered in close support to Saudi ground forces, they could prove useful against massed forces even if used independently of ground forces.[35]

The Saudis have just enough native pilots to fly their full combat inventory of F-5s and F-15s, giving them as yet no depth and hence limited tolerance for combat losses. Assuming that the best F-5 pilots move on to F-15s, overall strike force effectiveness will probably drop temporarily. In 1983 the Saudis assumed full ground support responsibilities for their F-5s, but here too the transfer of the best mechanics to the F-15 and AWACS programs is likely to leave indigenous support quite shallow for some time to come.

The Saudis are said to have recently signed a letter of intent to purchase two squadrons (about forty aircraft) of Tornado interdiction bombers from Great Britain.[36] Technically, these should add a longer-range and more powerful strike capability to Saudi Arabia's forces. But it is not clear at this writing that the deal will be completed; nor is it clear how long it will take the Royal Saudi Air Force to produce trained pilots, not to mention maintenance technicians, for the new aircraft. If completed, the purchase will add a complicating degree of logistics diversity to Saudi Arabia's air force, which has been relatively free of such complexities in comparison to other Saudi and GCC forces. It will probably also increase the sense of threat felt in Israel, even though the purchase was probably prompted by events in the Iran-Iraq war.

The core combat power of Oman's air force lies in its twelve Hunters (provided by Jordan) and its seven Jaguars (twelve more are on order). Both can be used in the ground attack role (including close air

[34] For a discussion of the Saudi munitions inventory, see U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Proposed U.S. Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia,* 96th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 10, 35.

[35] The Saudis appear to have signed a letter of intent to purchase two squadrons of Panavia Tornado interdiction bombers from Great Britain. If carried out, the purchase would increase the range and payload of Saudi Arabia's strike air forces substantially. See "Tornado Sale," *Aviation Week & Space Technology,* May 28, 1984, p. 15.

[36] "Tornado Sale," *Aviation Week & Space Technology,* May 28, 1984, p. 15.

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support), and the Omani inventory of munitions includes cluster bomb units for use against attacking armor. Oman's aging BAC-167 Strikemasters also may be used in the ground attack mode, although these are more appropriate against insurgents than against external attack from the PDRY. These aircraft are based principally at Thamarit, Masirah, Salalah, and Seeb, near Muscat. Thamarit is the main base for offensive aircraft and includes hardened facilities for one squadron of aircraft.

Having emerged from near-compete isolation in 1970, Oman's indigenous manpower problems top even those of Saudi Arabia. In the past Oman's air force relied on seconded and expatriate British pilots, and although about fourteen Omani pilots are being trained annually, it is likely that the British would participate in defending against any PDRY attack. British officers outnumber Omani officers in the air force. Most maintenance is done by civilians on contract; about 10 percent of the maintenance personnel are native Omanis. Although the Sultan is anxious to "Omanize" his forces, he is also currently searching for a new interceptor which, as in Saudi Arabia, will push the Omanization process back rather than forward.

Kuwait's force of about thirty McDonnell-Douglas A-4s is the only other ground attack air capability presently available to the GCC. Little is known about this force, however, save that the Kuwaitis seem to have pilots enough to fly the aircraft. Support probably lies with contract-hire laborers. These aircraft are aging, and the Kuwaitis may well enter the market for replacements in the near future.

Also entering the market is the UAE, or more properly Abu Dhabi, which has test-flown the Fairchild (and USAF) A-10.[37] If actually completed, such a purchase probably would be made in conjunction with Pakistan. An A-10 fleet would be the only one among the GCC air forces designed strictly for low altitude ground attack missions.

Air Defense

Table 4 lists the air defense portions of GCC air forces with air defense missile inventories, radars, and known passive measures, most of which come under ground force control. The table clearly illustrates Saudi Arabia's commanding lead in this area. It also raises questions about the prospects for standardizing an aircraft within the GCC, given the predominance of French aircraft in three states, U.S. aircraft in two, and British in one.

When conversion to F-15s is complete, the core aircraft of Saudi Arabia's air defense fleet will be about thirty F-5s configured for

[37] *Defense Week,* January 17, 1983, p. 4.

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TABLE 4

GCC AIR DEFENSE FORCES
(verifiable orders in parentheses)

	Saudi Arabia	*Kuwait*	*Bahrain*	*Qatar*	*The UAE*	*Oman*
Interceptors	42 F-15C/D 34 Lightning 30 F-5E [a] (20 F-15)	19 Mirage F-1B/C (12 Mirage F-1C)	—	(14 Mirage F1)	30 Mirage 5 (36 Mirage 2000)	(Tornado?)
Surface-air Missiles (Btys, where known)	16 I-Hawk 2 Shahine Redeye, Stinger (Shahine)	4 I-Hawk SA-7	RBS-70 [b]	Tigercat (I-Hawk)	Rapier Crotale RBS-70 [b] (7 I-Hawk) [c]	Rapier Blowpipe
Antiaircraft guns	AMX30SA (30 mm) M42(40mm) Vulcan (20mm)	ZSU2 3/4SP [d]	—	—	(Skyguard 35mm)	4 ZSU2 3/2
Passive Measures	Dispersion Revetments on some runways [e]	—	—	—	—	—

SOURCE: *The Military Balance, 1983–1984* (London: IISS, 1983), except as noted below.

[a] When F-15 deliveries are completed, about 30 percent of Saudi Arabia's F-5E force will be allocated to air defense. U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, "Proposed U.S. Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia," 96th Cong., 1st sess., December 1979, p. 36.

[b] The RBS-70 is a Swedish-made laser beam-riding short-range missile.

[c] See *Middle East Economic Digest,* March 25, 1983, p. 56. Verified with Raytheon.

[d] Mark Heller, Dov Tamari, and Zeev Eytan, eds., *The Middle East Military Balance, 1983* (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1983), p. 146.

[e] Ibid., p. 202.

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this role and fifty-two F-15s (the other ten F-15s in the inventory being needed for training and "float"). Variations of the U.S. AIM-9 series "Sidewinder" air-to-air missiles will serve as the principal weapon for these aircraft. Behind these stand sixteen Improved-Hawk (I-Hawk) surface-to-air missile batteries and their associated radars (many in storage due to manpower shortages),[38] and two batteries of the shorter-range Shahine, with more on order.[39]

Above these will fly the five AWACS aircraft that the United States will transfer to the Saudis in a three-phase program beginning in 1985 and extending into the 1990s, although four AWACS aircraft under U.S. control have been stationed in Saudi Arabia since 1980. As part of the 1981 "Air Defense Enhancement Package," in which the Saudis purchased the AWACS, they also sought to purchase an elaborate command and control net to link those aircraft to their air defense missiles as well as the F-15s and F-5s.[40] Little has been done to develop such a system, however. Links between the AWACS and Saudi I-Hawk batteries thus remain vocal radio links, if even these exist.

Saudi Arabia's enormous size allows the Saudis to disperse their aircraft and thus take advantage of a very cheap form of air defense. Purchase of extended range (fast-pac) fuel tanks for Saudi F-15s, also part of the 1981 Enhancement Package, was justified on grounds that it would allow aircraft based at Khamis Mushayt to respond quickly to attack on the Dhahran area.

The UAE's thirty-five Mirage 5s are configured for air-to-air combat. These originally were heavily supported by Pakistanis,[41] but in recent years Jordanians and Moroccans have taken up some support duties, while the UAE has developed a small coterie of skilled native pilots. Late in 1983 the UAE ordered eighteen Mirage 2000s with an option for eighteen more, and these represent additional support and pilot requirements as well as additional capabilities.[42] The UAE also has recently ordered seven batteries of I-Hawks, to include communications links not only to other elements of the UAE's air defenses but also to Saudi Arabia's AWACS.[43]

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[38] During congressional debates concerning the F-15 sale to Saudi Arabia, it was claimed that an air defense screen of I-Hawks would require *five times* the skilled personnel required by the F-15 fleet. Department of State, "Middle East Aircraft Package, Reference Papers," March 1978, p. 4.

[39] In January 1984 the Saudis announced the signing of a $4 billion air defense agreement with France, with a package based on the Shahine. It is significant that the Saudis claim to have invested in the development of the system they are buying. See "Saudi Arabia Says It Funded French Missile Program," *Wall Street Journal,* January 27, 1984, p. 34.

[40] For details on the AWACS sale and capabilities, see U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *The Proposed AWACS/F-15 Enhancement Sale to Saudi Arabia.*

[41] See Paul Beaver, "Gulf Air Power in Profile," *Islamic World Defence,* Vol. 2, No. 2. p. 21.

[42] *"Emirs Go for French Plane," Defense Week,* November 7, 1983, p. 2.

[43] *Middle East Economic Digest,* March 25, 1983, p. 56.

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Very little is known about the effectiveness of Kuwait's fleet of about twenty Mirage F-1s. It seems likely that support arrangements are similar to those found in the UAE, with Kuwait supplying native pilots to complement largely Pakistani support crews. Four batteries of I-Hawks complete Kuwait's inventory of air defense assets; deployment of these is uncertain.

In May 1984 Kuwait requested Stinger shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles from the United States in response to the increasing tempo of Iranian air attacks on shipping traffic in the Persian Gulf. Although the request was denied, the U.S. did agree to bolster Kuwait's air defenses in less visible ways, notably by linking them more closely with Saudi Arabia's AWACS aircraft. Kuwait then turned to the Soviet Union, and in July 1984 agreed to purchase an air defense package whose value is rumored to be over $300 million. The contents of this package are unknown as of this writing, although informed sources speculate that the deal probably involves relatively less sophisticated items like the shoulder-fired SA-7 or the SA-9, as well as FROG surface-to-surface missiles.[44] If this is the case, the more important deal militarily is that with the U.S., which could increase Kuwait's ability to react quickly to air attack. Still, Saudi Arabia has yet to link its own AWACS and I-Hawks very effectively; the effects of this U.S. effort thus are likely to be visible only over the long run, if at all.

The other three GCC states have no interceptor assets but will soon obtain some. Qatar has fourteen Mirage F-1s on order, although it is doubtful that Qatar has the indigenous skills required to support these aircraft even in the limited numbers available in the UAE or Kuwait. Bahrain has expressed an interest in Northrup F-5s, but in very small numbers (four to six aircraft to start). These might be seen as a small addition to the Saudi F-5 fleet. Finally, Oman is in the market for an interceptor, and the United States has made clear that Oman can buy even sophisticated U.S. models like the F-15. But the strong British presence in Oman makes it likely that they will turn to the Tornado (in which they have reportedly expressed an interest).[45] As for missiles, Bahrain has some I-Hawks on order which will probably fit into the Saudi I-Hawk net, while Qatar and Oman presently have shorter-range systems. In all cases, however, the sheer newness of these assets makes it unlikely that

[44] On both deals, see "U.S. to Buttress Kuwaitis' Air Defenses," *Defense Week*, July 30, 1984, pp. 7, 13.

[45] See *Middle East Economic Digest*, March 2, 1984, p. 41. Note that Oman's interest is in the interceptor version of the Tornado, as opposed to Saudi Arabia's interest in the ground attack version. Still, the Saudi Tornado purchase, if it occurs, is likely to encourage Oman's Tornado purchase as well.

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they will make a contribution to air defense, except perhaps in the hands of experienced foreign personnel.

Coastal Defense

Beginning with Saudi Arabia in 1972, all GCC states have begun to purchase fast attack craft armed with precision-guided antiship missiles (mainly the French Exocet and the U.S. Harpoon), resulting in the inventories and orders shown in table 5. Like GCC air defense forces, fast attack craft inventories are mostly on order; even in the Saudi case they are brand-new within the past three years. These orders suggest a long-term conversion from shore patrol and coast guard activities (which are more properly internal security functions) to some degree of "sea denial" capability. But the very newness of the effort makes evaluation more difficult in this sector than in other defense sectors.

Still, there are grounds for limited optimism. Navies are technology-intensive compared with other military services, and the development of precision-guided antiship missiles increases their firepower dramatically without changing their basic character. In most cases guidance systems in the missiles themselves relieve operators of all but initial "lock-on" responsibilities. Thus it may be relatively more possible to absorb new weaponry here than in other sectors of the GCC defense apparatus.

Coastal defense and sea denial need not be performed by ships alone. As was demonstrated during the Falklands war, aircraft properly armed can also take on the antiship mission. GCC inventories and orders reflect this, though purchases have been of rotary- rather than fixed-wing aircraft, most notably the French Super Puma armed with Exocets. Coastal facilities can also play a role in coastal defense, and shore-mounted guns and missiles have begun to appear in the arsenals of both Saudi Arabia and Oman.

The Best Case and the Prospects for GCC Cooperation

In the worst case the forces described above can do very little. Only the Omani army has seen combat experience, and then only with Iranian, Jordanian, and British help. But there is a *best* reasonable case to be made as well, one that takes in political and logistics constraints but nonetheless posits some capability in portions of these forces. If the best case is not what these forces actually *can* do, it is useful nonetheless as a basis for assisting these forces in a way that is realistic yet not totally

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TABLE 5

GCC COASTAL DEFENSE FORCES
(verifiable orders in parentheses)

	Saudi Arabia	*Kuwait*	*Bahrain*	*Qatar*	*The UAE*	*Oman*
Missile frigates (with main armament)	4 — Otomat [b]	—	—	—	—	—
Fast attack Craft/corvettes — Missile	13 — Harpoon	5 — Exocet (3 — Exocet)	(2 — Exocet)	2 — Exocet (1 — Exocet)	6 — Exocet	3 — Exocet (2 — Exocet)
Fast attack Craft/corvettes — Gun	1		2		6	4
Fast attack Craft/corvettes — Torpedo	3					
Antiship helicopters	(24 Dauphine)	—	—	—	—	—
Coastal patrol craft [a]	20	15	—	35	22	4 1 +Royal Yacht
Minesweepers	4	—	—	—	—	—
Coastal defense	Otomat	—	—	3 Exocet CD Systems	—	—

SOURCES: *The Military Balance, 1983–1984* (London: IISS, 1983); *Jane's Fighting Ships, 1983–1984* (London: Jane's Publishing Co., 1983).

[a] GCC coastal patrol craft often belong to coast guards and are split between the ministries of defense and interior. Numbers shown here are for *armed* craft of either ministry.

[b] Status of the Saudi-France "Sawari II" contract remains uncertain. If financed, however, the contract would add two 4,000-ton frigates armed with Crotale missiles to the Saudi inventory. See Paul Betts, "France Set to Sign Saudi Arms Deal," *Financial Times,* May 12, 1983.

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pessimistic. This section assesses the best case in the overall context of cooperation across the GCC.

The Prospects for Ground Force Cooperation

Once KKMC is occupied, Saudi units will be well deployed in terms of likely threats, but ground force units probably should be assumed to be fixed along specific borders. By contrast, the Royal Saudi Air Force represents a swing force, dispersed for its own protection as well as to cover various fronts, but capable of being concentrated against a specific threat relatively quickly.

Saudi Arabia and Kuwait could each contribute about two brigades to meet the northern overland attack threat, while Saudi Arabia and Oman would be the GCC principals involved in containing the Yemens. GCC air assets might be more flexible, although there are currently so many different types of aircraft that reinforcement to specific fronts would be severely limited. Thus it might be assumed that Saudi F-5s and Kuwaiti A-4s could fly strike (but not close air support) missions in the north, while Saudi and Omani aircraft (but possibly the UAE's A-10s, should they purchase any) could deal with the Yemeni threats.

No amount of ground force cooperation will defend the GCC from the kind of overland threat that could materialize to the north of Kuwait. A reinforced Yemeni threat (with Cuban and Soviet support) would also be too large for GCC forces alone. By contrast, the unreinforced Yemeni military threats might conceivably be handled by Saudi Arabia and Oman, with a GCC rapid deployment force possibly providing assistance, though limited, given disparities in equipment. While GCC ground force cooperation will remain geared principally for internal security, it is not unreasonable to assume that these forces can also handle the Yemens, and hence conflict internal to the Peninsula as a whole.

The Prospects for Cooperative Air Defense

Besides internal security, air defense has been the major area of concern for cooperation within the GCC. Just as aircraft remain the most sought after component of the air defenses of each state, so they remain the weapon on which the GCC as a whole has lavished most of its attention. In particular, the possibility of purchasing a common aircraft for all six GCC states has been raised. Would this produce a better air defense? At what cost?

The tactical advantages of commonality would depend in part on the aircraft chosen, although GCC elites can be expected to select

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from a range of aircraft almost equally high in performance. The most important distinction would be that between an interceptor and a fighter/ground attack aircraft since the latter would lead to improvements in strike as well as air defense capabilities. Given that aircraft of different makes have or can be given the ability to communicate with one another (and with the AWACS), a common aircraft need not produce overwhelming improvements in combat coordination. Still, pilots flying the same aircraft probably would find it easier to coordinate their actions.

The major benefits of commonality would be logistical. Purchase of a common aircraft would produce a dispersed support structure across the GCC and thus other GCC air forces could take advantage of Saudi Arabia's strategic depth, reducing their vulnerability to preemption. (Other aircraft could be dispersed to Saudi bases but could not sustain operations from them.) Cooperative maintenance, with each state taking responsibility for a set of key components, would make maximum use of scarce manpower resources and might lead to the development of a GCC industrial structure based on a similar division of labor. Purchase of one of the U.S. "FX" aircraft — designed to be relatively easy to maintain — would hold out promise of a relatively quick route to independence from foreign suppliers of at least this portion of the GCC's military forces.

Purchase of a common aircraft ultimately would produce the best air defense the GCC states could produce. Putting aside the industrial implications of this alternative, however, in military terms the best GCC air defense is not likely to be — or at least need not be — substantially better than the air defenses these states are likely to produce in any case. Aircraft of various makes can be linked to one another and to the AWACS if compatible communications equipment is purchased. Joint exercises can produce teamwork among pilots flying different aircraft, while the absence of joint exercises is likely to hamper coordination even among pilots flying the same aircraft. Thus the tactical benefits of commonality are likely to be marginal at best, and in any case a function of how the plan is implemented. The advantages of a common support structure apply more to sustained operations than to the sporadic air threat the GCC states are more likely to see, and can to some extent be replaced by passive measures that protect individual airfields.

Moreover, purchase of a common aircraft must be placed within the context of the diverse array of aircraft already in or on order to the GCC states. None of these states is likely to cease development of other elements of its inventory. Saudi Arabia, in particular, would be loath to sideline its F-15s in favor of the Mirage F-1, the F-16, or the Tornado (air defense version). Thus the development of a common inventory would occur as part of broader efforts by each state to develop

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its arsenal independently. The real issue would be the relative importance each state might attach to the common program. At best, a common program might emerge as a dominant part of what would remain a mixed fleet.

Even this best case is not likely to occur soon. Saudi Arabia's F-5 program, based on a relatively simple aircraft, emerged from decisions made in 1971. Aircraft were delivered between 1974 and 1978. The Saudis assumed all front-line maintenance responsibilities in 1983, although higher-level maintenance remains in the hands of foreigners. Similar decisions concerning a GCC aircraft made in the mid-1980s thus probably would not produce a fully equipped common inventory until the early 1990s. Independence — if that were a GCC goal — would not come until much later in the decade. GCC elites could improve the coordination of their aircraft in combat much more quickly simply by purchasing proper communications devices for the aircraft they now own and by continuing joint exercises.

The Prospects for Coastal Protection

GCC naval forces are too new to be assessed on a state-by-state basis, let alone collectively. Still, if individual states are able to deploy their new missile craft with effectiveness, it would seem reasonable to assume that, with minimal cooperation, the GCC could develop a limited coastal denial capability, using these ships in a stand-off mode around key targets. The capability might extend to protecting tankers docked or afloat in the Gulf, but it would not extend much beyond the Strait of Hormuz and Oman's coast.

The Approach to External Defense

Even a realistic "best case" is not very comforting, either to the GCC states or to those who support them. In it the GCC can be expected at best to police the Peninsula — to deal with various threats from the Yemens, and hopefully to settle disputes among themselves amicably. But they cannot hope to defend the Peninsula against external attack, coming potentially from Iran, Iraq, Israel, or even Egypt, not to mention the Soviet Union or the United States. In these cases they can hope at best to deter by promising some damage to the attacker, to limit damage initially, and thus to buy time until reinforcements arrive. These may be worthy goals, but meeting them fully is likely to do little to free

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these states from coercion by their larger neighbors or to provide for their defense from serious attack.

The GCC states have tried to solve the dilemma of their situation by getting help, and regional dynamics have in fact facilitated this process by tossing up the military and diplomatic forces needed to deflect or deter military attack into the GCC area. The way in which this situation works to the advantage of the GCC states can be seen in the major cases over the past two decades in which the Peninsula has been threatened by outside powers: Egypt's entry into the Yemeni civil war in 1962; Iraq's involvement in the Dhofar rebellion in Oman in the early 1970s; and major Iraqi threats to Kuwait in 1961-63 and 1973-76.

Between 1962 and 1967, Egypt deployed as many as 70,000 soldiers in support of the Yemeni Republicans.[46] Nasser had seriously underestimated Royalist support, and in this sense his chances of success were slim from the start. Saudi support to the Royalists was supplemented with aid from Iran and Jordan. When Egyptian aircraft strafed villages in Saudi Arabia in 1963, Faisal was able to call for deployment of a squadron of U.S. aircraft as a show of support.[47] Ultimately Israel's decisive defeat of Egypt in 1967 put a stop to Nasser's Yemen adventure.

Iraqi financial and ideological support to Oman's Dhofari rebels grew as the movement became more radical, especially after 1968, and essentially supplemented the considerable support coming from the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. Oman's British-trained security forces quickly stopped PDRY attempts to mount a campaign of urban terror in the north, while in the Dhofar area itself British advisers and Special Air Service (SAS) troops, Jordanian special forces and engineers, and Iranian paratroopers supported Oman's counterguerrilla forces in suppressing the rebellion.[48] Beginning in 1975 Iraq began to withdraw its support for the Omani rebels, and in June 1976, Iraq closed all PFLO (Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman) offices in Iraq.[49]

Major Iraqi threats to absorb all or part of Kuwait occurred in 1961-63, and 1973-76.[50] In 1961 some 5,000 British soldiers, staged

[46] For a general treatment of the war, see Dana Adams Schmidt, *Yemen: The Unknown War* (London: Bodley Head, 1968); and J. E. Peterson, *Yemen: The Search for a Modern State* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), pp. 98-106.

[47] Nyrop, *Area Handbook for Saudi Arabia,* p. 316. In this case the United States sent a squadron of F-100 fighters on a demonstration visit to Saudi Arabia. In March 1979 the Saudis asked for and received deployment of two U.S. AWACS aircraft to cover a small crisis on the Yemeni border. In October 1980 four AWACS aircraft were deployed to Saudi Arabia to cover the Iran-Iraq war. These represent the major crisis deployments of U.S. forces to the Peninsula.

[48] See J. E. Peterson, *Oman in the Twentieth Century* (London: Croom Helm, 1978), pp. 187-94; and Nyrop, *Area Handbook for the Persian Gulf States,* pp. 385-99.

[49] Robert Litwak, *Security in the Persian Gulf: Sources of Inter-State Conflict* (Montclair, N.J.: Allanheld, Osmun & Co., 1981), p. 76.

[50] On the 1961 crisis, see Elizabeth Monroe, "Kuwait and Aden: A Contrast in British Policies," *Middle East Journal,* Winter 1964, pp. 65-67; and Majid Khadduri, *Republican Iraq* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 166-73. See Majid Khadduri, *Socialist Iraq* (Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1978), pp. 255-59, for a general study of the 1973 crisis.

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through bases in Bahrain, manned the Kuwait-Iraq border soon after Iraq first made its threat.[51] These were quickly replaced by Egyptian, Sudanese, Jordanian, and Saudi forces under Arab League mandate.[52] Egyptian forces departed soon thereafter, but other Arab League forces remained deployed until 1963, when a new regime in Baghdad promised improved relations with Kuwait.

Border violence in 1973 was met by a similar Arab League response, with Syrian and Saudi representatives visiting capitals of both nations to mediate the dispute. The Saudis moved forces to their border, and Iran offered troops in Kuwait's support. Jordan and Iran both offered troops to Kuwait in the event of future crises.[53] Kuwait reportedly threatened to reconsider its aid to the confrontation states, bringing Egyptian diplomatic pressure to bear on Iraq.[54] Under military pressure in the Kurdish area, and in need of Arab backing in its broader confrontation with Iran, Iraq withdrew its troops.[55]

In these and lesser cases over the past two decades, it is possible to distinguish three sources of security for the GCC states. At one level, security has been ensured almost inadvertently by shifting balances elsewhere in the region. For example, Israel hardly acted to defend the Saudis when it attacked Egypt in 1967, but that is partly what it did in defeating Egypt in that year. At a second level, the GCC states have benefited from the help of long-standing regional friends. Jordan, in particular, has been involved in virtually every peninsular security crisis since 1962, while Great Britain has been a constant source of help to Oman. Finally, outside help has been obtained in an ad hoc fashion, as when U.S. fighter aircraft were stationed for a time at Jidda to deter Egyptian attacks on Saudi territory. The Shah of Iran was another essentially ad hoc ally who supported Saudi Arabia and Oman for his own reasons yet on other occasions was viewed with great suspicion from the Peninsula.

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[51] It is significant that the United States offered to support the British move and began moving a small flotilla, then visiting Mombasa, toward the Strait of Hormuz. The British declined the offer "with thanks." Hermann F. Eilts, "Security Considerations in the Persian Gulf," *International Security,* Fall 1980, p. 108.

[52] The presence of Egyptian forces is noteworthy, given the sour state of Saudi-Egyptian relations at the time. Robet R. Sullivan notes that this was the only time in this period that Saudi Arabia and Egypt cooperated ("Saudi Arabia in International Politics," *Review of Politics,* October 1970, p. 448).

[53] *Strategic Survey, 1973* (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1974), p. 97.

[54] Nyrop, *Area Handbook for the Persian Gulf States,* p. 185. Freedman suggests that the Kuwaitis may also have found their relations with Moscow useful in controlling Iraq during this period. Robert O. Freedman, *Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East Since 1970,* rev. ed. (New York: Praeger, 1978), p. 216.

[55] Iraq had broken diplomatic relations with Iran in 1971, after the Shah forcibly occupied three small formerly Arab islands in the southern Gulf. No other Arab Gulf states followed suit, leaving Iraq isolated even before the 1973 crisis began, and possibly more susceptible to pressure from other Arab states, especially Egypt. As John Duke Anthony notes, in Kuwait's case, deterrence of Iraq "is mainly political and diplomatic. In short, not a single Arab dynastic state could be expected to extend a meaningful level of support to any serious Iraqi attempt to violate Kuwaiti territory" (Anthony, "The Persian Gulf in Regional and International Politics," p. 176).

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Likely Sources of Help

If past patterns suggest that the GCC states will protect themselves from external threats by getting help, where are they likely to get help in the future? The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is likely to remain a reliable source of help in crises. Although the Al Saud drove the Hashemite family from the Hijaz in 1926, common conservative values, similar political systems, Saudi aid, and Jordanian military prowess have overcome this potentially disruptive family feud. Still, most of Jordan's forces, which consist of four divisions (two armored, two mechanized), three separate infantry brigades, and a small but well-trained air force,[56] are tied down by the Israeli threat to the west and the Syrian threat to the north. This leaves only the infantry brigades and possibly parts of Jordan's mobile police force as ground forces potentially available for GCC reinforcement, although this could change with changes in Jordan's security situation (peace with Israel, better relations with Syria). A much larger proportion of Jordan's air force would probably be available, except in cases where Jordan itself faced imminent hostilities. Although Jordan has few lift assets, Saudi Arabia's large fleet of C-130s could serve to bring Jordanian forces into the GCC.

Pakistan is a second nearby power deeply involved in GCC security. Pakistani advisers are conspicuous throughout the GCC militaries. Since 1979 the Saudis appear to have taken steps to formalize and expand their security relationship with Pakistan. In return for the promise of financial aid, the Pakistanis are said to have contributed actual combat units, comprised of Sunni Muslim troops, to Saudi Arabia. These apparently have been stationed around Tabuk, although reports indicate that they may be destined for the Yemeni border. Both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan deny the arrangement, although it is clear that the Saudis requested deployment of Pakistani forces, and there has been sufficient coverage of the issue to suggest that Pakistani units of limited size are in fact in Saudi Arabia.[57]

With its relatively large population and high level of technical competence, Pakistan has the greatest military potential of any regional source of reinforcement to the GCC. But Pakistan faces threats from India and from Soviet forces in Afghanistan. It also has experienced serious internal problems. Like Jordan, it needs most of its forces for its own security concerns. A shared border with Iran, plus long-standing efforts

[56] Except where otherwise noted, the basic order of battle information throughout this section is taken from *The Military Balance, 1983–1984.*

[57] See Derlet Khalid, "Pakistan's Relations with Iran and the Arab States," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies,* Spring 1982, pp. 20-21; and Quandt, *Saudi Arabia in the 1980s,* pp. 40-41.

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to improve Pakistan's relations with that nation, make it quite unlikely that Pakistani ground forces could be used to counter an Iranian threat. Finally the presence of growing numbers of Pakistani units in Saudi Arabia is likely to stir resentment in the military forces of both nations. Thus, for political as well as military reasons Pakistan's ground force contribution to the GCC may be limited to relatively small forces confined to fighting on the Yemeni or the domestic fronts. But Pakistan probably could make a relatively larger contribution to GCC air defense, especially through its involvement in the UAE's air force.

Great Britain is the third stalwart ally of the GCC, although Oman will probably remain the focal point of British activity on the GCC's behalf. However, British advisers are still involved in the UAE and with Saudi Arabia's National Guard, and, from their years of association with these nations, they have a keen understanding of peninsular politics. British involvement is low-key, but it could be instrumental in heading off internal trouble in Oman, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia.

The French are relative newcomers to peninsular security, having been reasonably strong supporters of Israel until 1967. French involvement on the Peninsula is the result of trade, mainly in arms. Arms deals with the Saudis, the UAE, Qatar, and Kuwait have brought French advisers to these nations. In Saudi Arabia, the French-run armor school and support staff for the RSA's AMX-30s have brought with them some 2,000 French military personnel. Saudi naval officers train in France, and the Sawari contract has brought French naval personnel to Saudi Arabia.

Although French forces have not been used on the Peninsula, the military resources France could bring to bear there are considerable. The forward portion of the French Maritime Forces of the Indian Ocean (FMOI) operates out of La Réunion and consists of three Exocet-armed frigates plus supporting vessels. Reinforcing elements associated with the FMOI but not necessarily on station in the Indian Ocean include an anti-ship-missile ship, supporting elements, and a marine commando group of about 600 men. From ports in France could come a naval intervention force of a carrier (with about forty fighter/ground attack aircraft), a helicopter assault carrier, support vessels, and perhaps 2,300 marine commandos having limited armor (AMX-30) capabilities. Other forces available would include about 3,600 Foreign Legionnaires, supporting tanks, and a small squadron of Mirage IIIAs at Djibouti, plus a parachute division and a marine division stationed in France.[58]

[58] See Stephen S. Roberts, "French Naval Policy Outside of Europe," Center for Naval Analyses Professional Paper No. 294, September 1980, p. 21; *Jane's Fighting Ships, 1983-1984* (London: Jane's Publishing Co., 1983), pp. 150-81; and Drew Middleton, "French Force in a Vital Area," *New York Times*, May 7, 1981.

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These four nations can be expected to provide small force contingents and advisers capable of helping the GCC states deal with low-level violence. Given the dominance of internal and low-level peninsular threats in their overall security problem, this is no small contribution to GCC security. Moreover, these four states tend to be politically compatible enough with the GCC states to be especially useful for what may be politically delicate military or police operations. Even Britain and France, which once carried the stigma of imperialism, have been sympathetic to the Palestinian problem. And today neither Western power is large enough to pose a serious threat without U.S. backing.

Dealing with larger threats to the Peninsula — notably overland or major air or coastal attack from nearby powers — is another matter. Egypt and the United States are the only two potential sources of help with forces large enough to handle these major contingencies.[59] Questions about the willingness of either power to defend the GCC states aside, it is difficult politically for GCC rulers to invite either power's help. Egypt's relations with these rulers improved markedly after its defeat in 1967, soured after Egypt signed a separate peace treaty with Israel in 1979, and have improved slowly under President Mubarak. The ties of the United States to Israel make its presence on the Peninsula a matter of controversy as well. In both cases, GCC rulers must worry about the sheer size and power, as well as the real goals, of those it is asking for help.

This is not to say that the GCC states would endure an attack rather than turn to Egypt or the United States for protection; serious threats may make more palatable the political risks of calling on either nation. Yet of the six GCC states, only Oman has dealt with the United States on access to bases and prestocking. The other GCC states have been reluctant even to discuss such issues, although it is precisely in the event of major attack that prior planning would be most helpful. Implicitly they assume that the geographic and political factors that have protected the Peninsula from major attack in the past will continue to protect them in the future. But the Iran-Iraq war has challenged this assumption and may yet expose it as wishful thinking.

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[59] In fact, the potential of Egypt's forces is questionable. The ongoing conversion of Egypt's forces from aging Soviet to sophisticated Western equipment will seriously decrease their overall military potential for at least five years. Moreover, Egypt's Western arms purchases have been guided primarily by a desire to maintain independence from a single foreign supplier rather than to develop military effectiveness. Egypt is buying 650 M60A3 tanks and associated M113 personnel carriers, but it maintains its old Soviet inventory and is buying Rumanian tanks as well. Its air force will probably have more F-16s (80 to 120) than any other single aircraft, but in fact Egypt's inventory of aircraft is now more diverse than that of the GCC as a whole. Thus Egyptian forces are likely to be able to operate coherently in packages considerably smaller than the overall size of the force posture would suggest (See *The Military Balance, 1983–1984,* and the series on Egypt's air force in *Aviation Week & Space Technology,* December 14, 1981; December 21, 1981; January 4, 1982; and January 18, 1982).

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The Saudis appear to be using arms purchases as a way out of this dilemma. They have large stocks of U.S. munitions. They are taking delivery of the kind of air defense equipment, notably AWACS aircraft and F-15s, that would probably lead a larger U.S. move into the nation. And they have purchased maintenance and spare parts for their F-15 fleet in excess of their own requirements. Viewed less as a means of enhancing local capabilities than as a way of facilitating reinforcement by outside powers, the GCC's multinational arsenal may indeed make perverse sense, since its very diversity creates an initial logistics support base for the array of British, French, and U.S. arms in the hands of potential reinforcing powers.

Still, using arms transfers in this way remains a halfway measure, especially in the case of major overland attack, where complex arrangements may be necessary to move ground forces onto the Peninsula. Moreover, whether these rulers will see the cure of calling for help as better or worse than the disease is likely to depend on the kind of threat they face and their relations with the United States at the time. If accommodation is possible, it may well be the preferable option. Yet even accommodation may be lethal. How much can these traditional regimes bend before they break?

Merely raising the question points up the weakness of these regimes and the tenuousness of their balancing act, especially at the high-threat end of the spectrum. It reinforces the importance of the political and geographical factors that shield these states from high-level threats. Much of their diplomacy is aimed at preserving the balances that protect them. The failure of that diplomacy is likely to pose dilemmas to their rulers that they simply do not wish to face.

Conclusions

U.S. military planners have been understandably frustrated by the approach Saudi Arabia and its GCC associates have taken to military security. These states have purchased some of the world's finest weaponry; yet the organizational and logistical disarray of their military forces raises serious questions about their interest in self-defense against external threats, some of which are likely to be too large for GCC forces in any case. It seems clear that these states would need help, at least for truly serious military contingencies; yet the United States finds GCC rulers reluctant, if not completely unwilling, to plan realistically for the kind of reinforcement truly serious external threats would require. Unwilling to take up the Shah's burden of being regional surrogates, these states are

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equally unwilling to help the United States project its own forces into the Gulf region.

Yet peninsular security has been preserved despite the complex security problems these rulers face. The GCC states have developed a security system that has worked reasonably well in protecting them from internal as well as external threats. The system employs a division of labor that exploits outside help at virtually every level. GCC rulers themselves focus principally on internal security and on the Peninsula as a whole. Here they use diplomacy, intrigue, and traditional methods of political control far more than force to control internal violence. In so doing they also keep external adversaries at a distance. Observers in the United States see very little of this activity, much of which is designed to prevent the outbreak of violence rather than to deal with it when it occurs.

Against external threats these states employ the services of others, as these are available and appropriate. U.S. forces have been used sparingly, as when F-100s were deployed to Jidda in 1963 or when AWACS aircraft were deployed to the Yemeni border in 1979. More often, the GCC states have turned to Jordan and Pakistan. Among Western powers, they have turned to Great Britain and, more recently, to France. The system has worked well despite its ad hoc nature largely because in crises the enemies of the GCC's enemies have become friends, tacitly or explicitly, and because geographical and political factors make it difficult to attack the Peninsula in any case.

From the perspective of the Western military planner, there may be little that is "rational" about this system, but if we understand the inherent weakness of these regimes and the tension between their need to meet threats and the threat posed by meeting their security needs, the GCC security system evinces a wisdom all its own. Given the newness of the enterprise, the development of GCC military forces could not be expected to produce much in any case. But GCC military forces are "disorganized" for a purpose, and they will continue to be disorganized so long as these forces are seen to pose a threat to GCC rulers. Among external sources of help, GCC rulers have preferred Jordan — militarily able, yet small and politically compatible — and Pakistan — technically capable, yet distant, non-Arab, and Muslim — to the larger forces of the United States. They do so for the same reason that they emasculate their own forces: doing otherwise is likely to be dangerous.

It is doubtful that the United States could change the GCC's approach to security even if it wanted to. But should it want to? U.S. policymakers might appreciate being freed of major involvement in the area's internal affairs, which the United States is no better equipped, and

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less well disposed politically, to handle than others. Indeed, U.S. policymakers might welcome the opportunity to retain a degree of detachment from regimes whose futures are inevitably uncertain, especially when detachment from the United States may actually enhance local security. Against external threats, the tendency of these states to involve outside powers in their security affairs engages U.S. allies in GCC security without the need for grand — and usually unsuccessful — cooperative schemes within the Atlantic Alliance. And to the extent that U.S. forces are called for, the preference of these rulers for a "peninsular" security concept suggests that U.S. forces would be deployed in a way that exploited natural buffers to attack.

The trick for the United States is to make this system work better. It can do this, first, by recognizing that the system exists and has worked well against the low-level violence that comprises the principal threat these rulers face. Most of these threats are neither large nor sophisticated in military terms; even if half the Royal Saudi Army attacked Riyadh en masse, for example, it would amount to two under strength brigades of questionable capability. It is far more important that the responding force be politically compatible with the local situation than that it be militarily sophisticated. While the United States need not eschew all involvement in peninsular security, it can make clear its willingness to move last, if at all, rather than first. The role for U.S. forces in these affairs should be principally to deter intervention by threatening to interdict outside powers who seek to exploit peninsular conflict for their own ends.

Second, U.S. arms assistance policies should be sensitive to the ambiguous role arms transfers play in the GCC security setup. There is no sense pushing the Saudis to develop large, effective ground forces; a more realistic goal would be to enable some portion of Saudi Arabia's ground forces to deal with internal and peninsular threats, notably those from the Yemens. While it might be more politically feasible to help Saudi Arabia develop an elaborate air defense system, the goal of developing local capabilities must be balanced against the goal of creating a logistics base to facilitate reinforcement. To the extent that reinforcement by other Western powers will depend on the presence of their weapons in the GCC area, it makes no sense to seek a competitive edge over Great Britain and France in the GCC arms market.

Third, the United States can plan to use its own forces mainly to protect the Peninsula from external attack. U.S. forces thus could exploit geographic barriers to external attack and rely heavily on interdiction. Defense against air and coastal attack would make use of U.S. military strengths — its sophisticated fighter aircraft and naval vessels — that are either on station in the Indian Ocean or shifted relatively easily to the

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Peninsula. The "worst case" threat — that of ground attack stemming from a shift in the Iran-Iraq balance — would pose a more severe test of U.S. forces. Yet even in this case an interdiction campaign aimed at the Peninsula's northern corner could isolate invading forces from their supplies. And there is plenty of space in the Saudi desert to extract casualties from the force itself.

Consideration of an overland invasion by Iran or Iraq helps point up the political limitations on the GCC's approach to security. GCC rulers might well prefer the risks and costs of accommodation to the risks and costs of inviting U.S. help in such scenarios, and they are still more likely to avoid advance planning for such eventualities. Adroit use of U.S. arms transfers and some low-key discussions might alleviate some, but hardly all, of the military problems associated with projecting substantial U.S. forces for the GCC's defense. And the political problems of introducing U.S. forces to the Peninsula may be attenuated by a more positive U.S. approach to the Palestinian issue. Still, the Saudis are likely always to see grave risks in inviting U.S. help, and such a decision is likely always to be made only at the last minute, if at all.

This inevitably adds a degree of uncertainty to U.S. security planning for the Peninsula, just as the underlying security problems that shape the GCC's approach to security leave GCC rulers themselves uncertain about their security. But there is no way around these problems that does not threaten to fuel internal problems in these states and hence to diminish rather than enhance their security. It would be counterproductive to allow planning for the worst case to drive all other aspects of U.S. security policy before it.

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ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE*

by Donald C. Daniel

There are about 880 submarines worldwide, distributed among thirty-nine nations. About 750 are tactical or general purpose units which, in time of war, would be principally engaged with the destruction of enemy surface ships and other submarines. Another 130 or so submarines carry ballistic missiles, and have both nuclear deterrence and strategic land-attack as main missions.[1] Divided into three main parts, this article highlights some factors that condition the success of operations countering strategic missile and general purpose submarines. Part one identifies physical and oceanographic factors affecting prospects for turning whole oceans transparent in the foreseeable future. The issue of ocean transparency has obvious implications for the survivability of general purpose submarines. However, since about 1978 this issue has frequently been raised by individuals concerned with the survivability of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (termed SSBNs).[2] It is within the context of

* The views expressed herein are strictly the author's and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Naval Postgraduate School or any other agency of the U.S. government. The author is happy to acknowledge the support of the Ford Foundation and the International Institute for Strategic Studies. This article is based on a chapter that will appear in *Technology and Seapower,* edited by Gordon H. McCormick and John H. Maurer (the Foreign Policy Research Institute, forthcoming).

[1] *Jane's Fighting Ships, 1983-1984* (London: Jane's Publishing, 1983), p. 172.

[2] See Owen Wilkes, "Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare and Its Implications for a Counterforce First Strike," *World Armaments and Disarmaments: SIPRI Yearbook 1979* (New York: Crane, Russak, 1979), pp. 427-52; Statement by George H. Heilmeier (Director, U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency), in U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee, *Department of Defense Appropriations FY 1978,* 95th Cong., 1st sess., 1977, pt. 5, pp. 44-46; Bruce Blair, "Arms Control Implications of Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW) Programs," in Congressional Research Service, *Evaluation of FY 79 Arms Control Impact Statements: Report Prepared for the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the House Committee on International Relations,* 95th Cong., 2d sess. 1978, pp. 103-9; Harvey B. Silverstein, "Caesar, SOSUS, and Submarines: Economic and Institutional Implications of ASW Technologies," in Marine Technology Society and Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), *Oceans '78* (Washington; Marine Technology Society, 1978), pp. 406-10; Henry Rowen, "New Weapons Technologies and East-West Security in the 1980s," in *New Conventional Weapons and East-West Security: Part II—Papers from the IISS Nineteenth Annual Conference,* Adelphi Paper No. 145 (London: IISS, 1978), p. 2; Joel Wit, "Advances in Antisubmarine Warfare," *Scientific American,* February 1981, pp. 31-41; Ian Mather, "The Most Secret Service," *Observer Magazine,* May 22, 1983, pp. 33-41; Leslie Gelb, "Nuclear Bargaining," *New York Times Magazine,* June 27, 1982, p. 17; Robert Aldridge, *The*

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SSBN survivability that the issue is discussed further. Part two identifies operational and tactical factors that affect the protection from attack of high-value surface ships or submarines. This problem is considered both in terms of a general war with the Soviet Union and contingencies involving small power navies. Part three presents overall conclusions on the difficulties of antisubmarine warfare (ASW) in the present and foreseeable future.

The Transparent Ocean Threat to SSBN Survivability

The United States and the Soviet Union have thirty-four and sixty-two first-line nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) respectively. These are generally viewed as the ultimate guarantors of deterrence and strategic stability, mainly because SSBNs are expected to survive to respond to a surprise attack. Paradoxically, however, while these submarines were being fitted with missiles allowing them to roam greater expanses of ocean and still remain target-effective, concern increased that technological developments in ASW wide-area search might

Counterforce Syndrome: A Guide to U.S. Nuclear Weapons and Strategic Doctrine (Washington: Institute for Policy Studies, 1978), pp. 45-61; Mark O. Hatfield, "The Age of Anxiety: Emerging Nuclear Tensions in the 1980s," *AEI Foreign Policy and Defense Review,* no. 6, 1980, pp. 14-15; Michael MccGwire, "Technological and Operational Trends in the Field of Strategic ASW and Countermeasures" (Paper prepared for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute; December 1979), pp. 54-56. See also Roger Speed, *Strategic Deterrence in the 1980s* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1979), pp. 56-63; K. J. Moore, "Antisubmarine Warfare," in Michael MccGwire, ed., *Soviet Naval Influence: Domestic and Foreign Dimensions* (New York: Praeger, 1977), chap. 8; Henry Bradsher, "Vulnerability Growing for U.S. Sub-Based Missiles? *Washington Star,* December 12, 1977, p. 1; Burt F. Raynes, "USSR vs. USA: The Coming Window of a First Strike," *Government Executive,* October 1980, pp. 37-41; Brad Knickerbocker, " 'Star Wars' and Ocean Wars Tactics: Good Defense or Not?" *Christian Science Monitor,* August 1, 1983, p. 3; Robert Toth, "U.S. Reliance on Nuclear Subs Being Debated," *Los Angeles Times,* May 22, 1983, p. 1; Stephen Gibert and Loren B. Thompson, "Our Underwater Fleet Is Vulnerable," *Wall Street Journal,* September 19, 1983, p. 32; Jake Garn, "Soviet Superiority: A Question for National Debate," *International Security Review,* Spring 1979, p. 19; William Van Cleave, "Strategy and the Navy's 1983-87 Program: Skepticism's Warranted," *Armed Forces Journal International,* April 1982, pp. 50-51; John Fialka, "MX Push Based on Feeling Subs Vulnerable," *Washington Star,* April 19, 1980, p. 1; "ASW: Is the U.S. Slipping as Russia Begins to Challenge the Last Frontier of U.S. Naval Superiority?" *Armed Forces Journal International,* April 1980, pp. 46-47; Norman Polmar, "Soviet ASW: Highly Capable or Irrelevant?" *International Defense Review,* no. 5, 1979, pp. 721-28; Thomas C. Reed, "News Briefing by Mr. Thomas C. Reed, Director, Telecommunications and Command and Control Systems at the Pentagon, March 4, 1975" (copy of transcript), pp. 2, 5, 8, 9; testimony of William Perry in U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, *Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for FY 1981,* 96th Cong., 2d sess., 1980, pt. 6, pp. 3473-74; " 'Can't Miss Weapons' — Revolution in Warfare: Interview with Wm. J. Perry, Undersecretary of Defense," *U.S. News and World Report,* Sept. 8, 1980, p. 61. See also John C. Barton, III, "Quietly Conventional," *Defense and Foreign Affairs,* November 1980, pp. 19-20; R. Jeffrey Smith, "An Alternative to the MX," *Science,* May 21, 1982, p. 828; Edgar Ulsamer, "In Focus . . . ," *Air Force Magazine,* June 1980, p. 17; Joel Wit, "Are Our Boomers Vulnerable," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,* November 1981, pp. 62, 69; Thomas Burns, *The Secret War for the Ocean Depths* (New York: Rawson, 1978), pp. 33, 42; Frank Barnaby, "Death Beneath the Waves," *New Scientist,* September 27, 1979, pp. 958-60. Testimony of Adm. Stansfield Turner in U.S. House Budget Committee, *Budget Issues for FY 1983,* 97th Cong. 2d sess., 1982, vol. 2, p. 97; John Tierney, "The Invisible Force," *Science,* November 1983, p. 76; and Worth H. Bagley, *Sea Power and Western Security: The Next Decade,* Adelphi Paper No. 139 (London: IISS, 1977), p. 34.

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turn the oceans transparent. The submarine missiles would thus be rendered almost as vulnerable as their fixed, land-based counterparts.

This concern has generally been raised by political scientists, journalists, and individuals interested in influencing the policymaking process. Many such individuals exhibit an inherent faith in or fear of what can be achieved with technology, and some are extremely sensitive to any developments that could affect deterrence and stability. There is no agreement on which nation's submarines might be most threatened, but there seems to be agreement that should the United States turn the oceans transparent, it would do so through improvements in its present capabilities to search wide areas with passive acoustic detection devices anchored to the ocean floor or towed from surface ships. It also seems agreed that any Soviet success would be based on nonacoustic means, in view of the heavy research commitment the Soviet Union has made to investigating such alternatives. We now turn to the factors that affect the success of wide-area search operations by both systems.

Acoustic Methods of Wide-Area Search

The success of wide-area search operations depends partly on the type of submarine signal or indicator relied on for search, the characteristics of the sensors employed, their deployment mode, and the countermeasures available to submarines and the forces supporting them. Of all the signals relied on to find submarines, acoustic indicators have been the most prominent, because water is a good conductor of sound energy — some sounds propagate thousands of kilometers under proper conditions — and a poor conductor of electromagnetic energy, which is relied on to find and track targets in the atmosphere.

Two types of acoustic signals are used in antisubmarine warfare: reflected energy and radiated energy. Reflected energy is generated by ASW forces and bounced against a submarine's hull. Sonars work on this principle and consist of a sound transmitter (or transducer) and a receiver (or hydrophone). When generating reflected energy, sonars are said to be engaged in active search, but they can also be employed in a strictly passive mode in order to detect radiated signals. Radiated energy signals are generated by the submarine and include deliberate acoustic equipment emissions (such as a target submarine activating its own sonar) or incidental noises produced in the course of the submarine's operations. Incidental radiated signals result from the submarine's disturbing the water through which its passes and from the utilization of internal machinery such as motors, pumps, and gears.

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Whatever the source of an acoustic signal, its detection requires that the sensor be in the water and be stationary or moving slowly lest hydrodynamic flows drown out incoming sounds. Hence, because the sensor can cover only limited distance in short periods, it is significant that some sounds can potentially propagate far. How far depends partly on the signal's initial intensity, its frequency, its spreading, and its absorption. The greater the intensity and the lower the signal's frequency, the greater the propagation; but as the signal spreads away from its source, its intensity decreases and some of the signal is absorbed as seawater molecules convert into heat the acoustic energy that strikes against them.

The loss of intensity is doubly significant for sonars because the signal must travel the distance from the transmitter to the submarine and then travel the distance back. In addition, should powerful sonars be used in wide-area search they would have to contend with a serious reverberation problem. The greater the power, the more a sonar produces multiple echoes, which drown out the return of desired signals.

Both the direction and the intensity of the sound are affected by factors that vary markedly, depending on geographic location and, in some cases, time of year and time of day. These factors include (1) the concentration of sedimentary inorganic particles, tiny sea organisms, detritus, schools of fish, gas bubbles, and any other objects or phenomena that can scatter or absorb sound; and (2) horizontal or vertical boundaries in the water column which can duct, refract, block, or attenuate sound.

The most significant horizontal boundaries, other than the sea surface and bottom, are the separations between water layers differing sharply in temperature characteristics. A highly simplified picture of much of the oceans would show three layers, whose depths and extent vary with latitude, season, and time of day: (1) a surface isothermal layer, often ranging from a few tens of meters to a few hundred, where temperature is relatively constant due to the mixing of water by wind and wave action; (2) a middle or main thermocline layer, sometimes up to a thousand meters wide, where temperature drops rapidly and is affected little by variations in surface conditions; and (3) a deep isothermal layer, where temperature is again nearly constant. The discontinuities represented by the boundaries between each layer, coupled with the effect that the pressure and temperature characteristics of each layer have on sound direction, can cause some of the sound to be ducted or channelled between the boundaries. Thus, the transmission and reception of reflected signals, and the hearing of submarine-radiated noise, can be excellent within a duct, but submarine detection can be hampered if the target is in one layer while the detection devices are in another.

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Some sound might travel steeply enough to penetrate from one layer to another. It would undergo related attenuation and refraction, but should it penetrate the deep isothermal layer, it could travel horizontally great distances with relatively little attenuation except for spreading and absorption. It is particularly within this layer — also termed the deep sound or SOFAR (sound fixing and ranging) channel — that sound propagates for many thousands of kilometers.

Cutting across horizontal boundaries in the water column are vertical boundaries associated with ocean eddies, fronts, the interface between two currents, and the presence of underwater mountains and ridges. Such boundaries can stretch hundreds to thousands of miles, and, as with horizontal boundaries, can affect submarine detection if the boat is on one side and the acoustic sensor on the other. For example, a submarine detected in the Labrador Current but crossing into the Gulf Stream has been compared to a person going from an open field and disappearing into an adjoining woods.[3]

Also important for submarine detection and tracking is the interweaving effect of the water's temperature, pressure, and salinity on sound velocity. Decreases in each of these contribute to a decrease in velocity, and sound waves will bend or refract as much as 15 degrees toward water areas that permit slower speed. The bending can cause complex sound-propagation paths and give rise to "shadow zones" — areas where sound does not penetrate. This means that a hydrophone might not hear a submarine even though both were quite close and in the same temperature layer. Similarly, active sonar emissions might be bent away from, and thus not reflect against, a target even when the latter is near the sonar and again in the same layer.

In addition to shadow zones, the bending of sound waves causes formation of "convergence zones," which can help in detection of shallow submarines by sensors placed near the surface many kilometers away. Convergence zones result when sound generated by a shallow submarine propagates downward into deep water and, because of pressure changes, refracts upward until it approaches the surface, where it again propagates downward to repeat the process until the sound is dissipated. Every time the sound approaches the surface, an area roughly five kilometers wide is formed, where the sound converges, that is, becomes compressed or focused. Because it is more intense, the sound is more easily detectable there. Convergence zones occur roughly fifty kilometers apart in the mid latitudes.

[3] D. C. Honhart, "Navy Requirements for Space-Sensed Oceanographic Data," in Marine Technology Society and IEEE Council on Oceanic Engineering, *Oceans '82 Conference Record*, Washington, September 20-22, 1982, p. 481.

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In the very northern latitudes of the Arctic — an area some Soviet SSBNs are believed to frequent — a submarine that remained under the ice might be particularly difficult to find. For two related reasons, most sounds produced by a submarine might not travel great distances. First, according to Tsipis, "the entire composite spectrum" of submarine-generated noise is "confined to a frequency range between 10 and 1,000 Hertz or so."[4] Second, according to Urick,

> It is evident that the transmission [of sound] in the Arctic degrades rapidly with increasing frequency above 20 Hz. It is better than it would be in the [ice] free field (i.e. with spreading) out to some range, and is poorer beyond. This peculiarity is the result of opposing influences on the propagation. At short and moderate ranges, ducting [because of the ice cover] improves the transmission; at long ranges the repeated encounters with the under-ice surface degrade it.[5]

In short, nearly the entire spectrum of submarine-generated sound is in the frequency range that degrades rapidly.[6]

Accounting for most of the degradation of under-ice sound are the numerous ice ridges, with keels — some quite deep — extending downward from the ice canopy. The orientation and spacing of these ridges are "generally random," with one hundred meters being a "representative spacing."[7] These ridges are important not only because they absorb sound and lessen its energy but also because, if a ridge is large enough, it provides a submarine with a nearly perfect place to hide. A submarine could remain hidden by lying quietly against an undersea keel, because noise generated by the submarine would tend to be refracted upward against the ice.[8] Should adversary ASW forces utilize sonar to search actively, the echo would reverberate against the surface, and any coherent return would probably not distinguish the submarine from the keel.

Thus, the propagation and attenuation of acoustic indicators can vary widely, depending on place, season, and time of day. Cox gives an idea of the variation when he writes that the capability of a sonar "can vary . . . from one-half to more than six times any given range simply because the sound transmission capabilities of the ocean vary through a similar spread of values."[9]

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[4] Kosta Tsipis, "Underwater Acoustic Detection," in Kosta Tsipis, Anne Cahn, and Bernard Feld, *The Future of the Sea-Based Deterrent* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1973), p. 182.

[5] R. J. Urick, *Principles of Underwater Sound* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975), p. 158.

[6] See A. S. McLaren, "Under Ice in Submarine," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,* July 1981, p. 109, where McLaren speaks of "significantly reduced under-ice sonar ranges."

[7] O. I. Diachok, "Effects of Sea Ice Ridges on Sound Propagation in the Arctic Ocean," in SACLANT ASW Research Center, *Oceanic Acoustic Modelling,* Proceedings of a Conference Held at SACLANTCEN, La Spezia, Italy, September 8-11, 1975, p. 9-3.

[8] Thomas B. Allen and Norman Polmar, "The Silent Chase," *New York Times Magazine,* January 1, 1984, p. 13.

[9] Albert W. Cox, *Sonar and Underwater Sound* (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1974), p. 6.

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Yet, ASW forces must contend with more than the sound-transmission qualities of seawater. The oceans themselves are noisy. Ocean life, the action of wind on the surface, and human uses and exploitation of the ocean and seabeds all generate background or ambient noise, which can mask or mimic desired signals. U.S. officials have noted that, for purposes of ASW, the ambient noise problem has worsened because of more frequent ocean drilling and, until recently, a rise in the number of large tankers and bulk carriers plying in the ocean.[10]

All the above factors buttress Kosta Tsipis's observation that "in spite of the enormous efforts devoted to developing submarine-detection equipment of exquisite sophistication and manageable size, [acoustic] ASW operations contain a large amount of uncertainty and are critically affected by topical conditions."[11] Indeed, some argue that the more oceanographers and acousticians learn about the variability of ocean conditions, the "more opaque" the oceans seem to become.[12] Tierney provided one basis for this claim when he stated that oceanographers in the 1970s modified the "classic view of the ocean . . . used by acoustic engineers for listening to subs."[13] Instead of viewing the oceans as a "relatively stable mass of water — turbulent at the surface . . . and criss-crossed by great currents like the Gulf Stream, but generally constant and predictable, especially in deep waters," oceanographers came to appreciate the ubiquity of eddies cutting vertically across the water column, disrupting the horizontal transmission of sound even in the deep SOFAR channel. Oceanographers had not been unaware of eddies, but they had not appreciated how widespread they were. Rear Admiral R. K. Geiger, a former Chief of U.S. Naval Research, provided another basis for the opacity claim when he wrote:

> The classic picture of the deep ocean has been one consisting of large sluggish gyres and slowly changing structures, except for the Gulf Stream. Recent basic research has revealed that the ocean is quite complex, and in many respects it is analogous to the atmosphere: it contains the oceanic counterpart of atmospheric weather. The oceanic "weather" consists of highs, lows, fronts, jets, which, relative to general ocean climatology, travel quite rapidly. The sharp temperature gradients associated with this weather are known to cause rapid changes in sonar conditions and provide acoustic shadows that obscure an object from detection.[14]

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[10] See, e.g., Testimony of David Mann, in U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, *Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for FY 1980,* 96th Cong., 1st sess. 1979, pt. 6, p. 2970.

[11] Kosta Tsipis and Randall Forsberg, *Tactical and Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare: A SIPRI Monograph* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1974), p. 20.

[12] Statement of Admiral James Watkins in U.S. House Appropriations Committee, *Department of Defense Appropriations for FY 1984,* 98th Congr., 1st sess., 1983, pt. 2, p. 653.

[13] Tierney, "Invisible Force," p. 74.

[14] R. K. Geiger, "Remote Sensing in Ocean Surveillance—Promises, Problems, and Perspectives," in Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development (AGARD), *Applications of Remote Sensing to Ocean Surveillance,* AGARD Lecture Series No. 88 (London: Technical Editing and Reproduction, Ltd., 1977), p. 1-1.

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Countermeasures that SSBN forces can implement to avoid detection are seeking out acoustic shadows, streamlining the hull to lessen hydrodynamic noise, installing quiet machinery, coating the hull with a sound-absorbent material to muffle active sonar signals, going slowly and maneuvering gently, staying out of ocean temperature layers that can transmit sound to adversary acoustic systems, and taking advantage of the extremely long ranges (up to four thousand or more nautical miles) of submarine-carried ballistic missiles so as to patrol in areas where adversary ASW platforms or fixed acoustic devices are believed to be absent.

Should the improbable occur and a long-range acoustic detection system be devised which guaranteed finding all submarines that entered its nominal area of search, there would still be the problem of false alarms. ASW forces must adjust a sensor in terms of its probability of detection (PD) and probability of false alarms (PFA), but adjusting a sensor to increase the threshold of acceptability of a signal to eliminate false alarms also risks losing true signals. Any lowering of the threshold to capture true signals can in turn increase the possibility of false alarms. Improved signal-processing increases the probability of correctly sorting through incoming sounds, but ASW forces must always decide between PD and PFA and accept the consequences in terms of lost signals or unwanted ones. Furthermore, adjusting PD and PFA may do little to screen out signals deliberately generated by a wily adversary who realizes that decoys, jamming, and even physical disruption of adversary acoustic systems can be cost-effective.

In sum, numerous actual or potential problems attend reliance on long-range acoustic detection systems. On a day-to-day basis, the major problem may be that such systems are critically affected by topical conditions. ASW forces relying on these systems would want to control for those conditions, but if the oceans are becoming "more opaque," as we know more about them, it is doubtful that control consistent with a transparent ocean capability could be achieved in the foreseeable future.

Garwin has suggested that the only potentially foolproof acoustic system is one that does not involve taking advantage of the long-range propagation of sound but consists of blanketing submarine operating areas with short-range direct path hydrophones in interlocked ten-kilometer grids.[15] With sensors placed so closely together, submarine sounds could not escape detection because of the bending or the presence of horizontal and vertical boundaries in the ocean. However, as Garwin points out, such a system would require the embedding of hundreds of thousands of hydrophones per submarine operating area. It would also be subject

[15] Richard Garwin, "Will Strategic Submarines Be Vulnerable?" *International Security,* Fall 1983, p. 66.

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to spoofing, false alarms, and physical disruption. There is no indication that either the United States or the Soviet Union is deploying, or readying itself to deploy, such a system.

Nonacoustic Methods of Submarine Search and Tracking

The United States, the Soviet Union, and other nations have done extensive research in nonacoustic methods, but as yet there is no system operational for open-ocean initial detection of submarines that refrain from any activity (such as communicating externally, activating radars, or firing weapons) that might give away their position. The most widely applied nonacoustic sensor is probably the magnetic anomaly detector, which seeks out disturbances in the earth's magnetic field caused by the passage of a submarine. Such anomalies, however, are inherently short-ranged and, even with highly sensitive detectors, are essentially suited for searching only small areas. Indeed, compared with some acoustic signals, none of the submarine-generated nonacoustic signals can propagate far. As a result, if a nonacoustic system does become operational for searching large areas, it will probably involve observables that can persist behind the submarine in its wake and that can be detected by air or space-based sensors. The greater the persistence, the longer the spatial extent of the signal and the better the opportunity for detecting it. Similarly, the higher a sensor can be while operating, the more extensive the area it can cover in a short period.

Of the observables most prominently mentioned as potentially detectable by air or space sensors are those with the longest persistence and thus the greatest potential for serving as a basis for wide-area search: thermal scars, contaminants, turbulent wakes, and internal waves.[16]

Thermal Scars. Nearly all ballistic missile submarines are nuclear-powered. Thermal anomalies on the surface of the ocean elicited much interest as a basis for detecting nuclear-powered submarines because these submarines ingest and then expel seawater used to cool the reactor spaces. Consequently, great volumes of warm seawater are left in a submarine's wake; and because the discharged water is warmer and less dense than its surroundings, it rises and can cause a thermal scar on the sea surface which can be detected with infrared or passive microwave radiometers. One Soviet author, Rodionov, has suggested that a thermal scar anomaly on the surface could be on the order of .005°K.[17] If pro-

[16] A listing of observables is contained in U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), *M-X Missile Basing* (Washington: GPO, 1981), p. 177.

[17] B. I. Rodionov, *Antisubmarine Forces and Systems in Navies* (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1977), chap. 3, sec. 7.

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duced, a scar would remain in the vicinity of the submarine's wake. Its persistence would depend on the state of the ocean and could range from minutes to hours.[18]

According to Nierenberg, the United States expended "a great deal of time, effort, and resources . . . on [thermal scar research], but no remote sensing resulted."[19] Rather, he says, experiments showed that if scar-sensing had a role, it was localization. The reason may have to do with how thermal scars could be sensed.

Both infrared radiometers (IRRs) and passive microwave radiometers (PMRs) are used regularly to sense sea temperature in oceanographic and other research. IRR performance is seriously degraded if clouds or water vapor come between the sensor and the sea surface, but because IRRs are much more sensitive than PMRs, they provide the better prospect for an operational system to measure thermal scars. Hodara and Wells claim that an airborne IRR could detect temperature changes on the order of millikelvins,[20] a sensitivity consistent with Rodionov's assertion that thermal scars would differ from the ambient on the surface by about .005°K. To achieve the postulated sensitivity, Hodara and Wells' radiometer would operate at altitudes as low as one hundred meters, causing coverage to be so small that it precluded wide-area search.

An airborne PMR could have greater coverage and could overcome the problems of clouds and water vapor, but being less sensitive than an IRR, it would have greater difficulty detecting a signal. Nevertheless, Windsor and Mooney postulate the possibility of an airborne PMR with a one-kilometer footprint, which they say might be capable of "detecting local 'hot spots' generated by submerged submarines."[21] Their postulated system, however, has a sensitivity of only .1°K—not enough if thermal scars differ from the ambient on the surface by thousandths of a degree.

It remains to be seen what utility any space-based IRR or PMR will have. The sensor may be too far from the ocean surface and traveling too fast to pick up signals of interest. Present satellite-based IRRs come closest to the mark because they can measure tenths of a degree Kelvin with input data averaged over one kilometer. They can do this with swath widths of 2,700 kilometers, which, independent of other factors, clearly allows wide-area search. Huh et al. argue, however, "that true all-weather day-night sea-surface temperature data [from satellites] must await de-

[18] Ibid.

[19] William O. Nierenberg, "The United States Navy and Satellite Oceanography: The Charles H. Davis Lecture Presentation at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif., November 17, 1981," pp. 12-13.

[20] See H. Hodara and W. H. Wells, "Infrared Radiometry and Visible Spectrometry," in AGARD, *Applications of Remote Sensing*, p. 6-1.

[21] E. P. L. Windsor and H. M. D. Mooney, "Microwave Scanning Radiometry (Applications)," in ibid., p. 5-25.

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velopment of high-resolution multispectral passive microwave radiometers,"[22] which now achieve sensitivities in tenths of a degree (.2°K on the Tiros-N satellite, e.g.) but require input data averaged over tens of kilometers to do so.[23] This requirement means that satellite PMRs would not be useful for detection of any observable (such as a scar) remaining in the vicinity of a submarine's track with little lateral propagation. The observable's values would probably be indistinguishable when averaged with all other data acquired over tens of kilometers.

Time will tell whether improvements in IRRs or PMRs will bring about a change in the potential of thermal scars as a wide-area search phenomenon. In such a case, one problem that ASW forces will have to contend with is the "enormous number of 'false alarms' that . . . result from local temperature differences on the ocean's surface that are generated by a myriad of mechanisms other than a submarine."[24] For example, natural currents can produce turbulence in the water, which gives rise to temperature differentials on the surface. A second problem is that not all thermal anomalies may make it to the surface. One reason for this would be that the cooling water could become entrapped in the submarine's turbulent wake; it would rise no higher than the wake itself, which normally does not reach the surface. Furthermore, the turbulence of the wake would dissipate and mix the heated water so that its thermal distinctiveness would be quickly lost. Another reason that not all thermal anomalies may make it to the surface is that "the temperature rise of the water in [a thermal] plume decreases rapidly with the increasing height above the source."[25] Thus, rising warm water could cool to its surrounding temperature prior to reaching the surface. A third reason is that a thermal plume of water rising upward can be trapped at boundaries, between temperature layers, especially thermocline boundaries, where the discontinuities are greatest.[26] A fourth possible reason is related to the speed of the submarine: the greater the speed, the less time there is for warmer water to remain concentrated in one place. This effect, however, may be counteracted, since the faster the submarine, the more heated water it produces.

Contaminants. A submarine introduces a variety of products into the ocean or the atmosphere above. These result from the leaching

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[22] Oscar K. Huh et al., "Outbreaks of Polar Continental Air: Windows on the Mesoscale Structure of the Upper Ocean," *Naval Research Reviews,* no. 1, 1982, p. 36.

[23] H. N. Kritikos and J. Shiue, "Microwave Sensing from Orbit," *IEEE Spectrum,* August 1979, p. 37.

[24] Kosta Tsipis, "Antisubmarine Warfare—Facts and Fiction," *New Scientist,* January 18, 1975, p. 176. See also Igor Lobanov, "Sea Watchers in Space," *Oceans,* November 1981, p. 40.

[25] William P. Schimmel and William N. Sullivan, *Experimental Study of Thermally Induced Buoyant Plumes in Water* (Albuquerque, N.M.: Sandia Laboratories, 1975), p. 10.

[26] B. Gebhardt, D. Hilder, and M. Kelleher, "The Diffusion of Thermal Buoyant Jets," in T. F. Irvine and J. Hartnett, eds., *Advances in Heat Transfer,* vol. 16 (New York: Academic Press, 1984).

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of antifouling paint, the leaking of lubricants from propeller shafts, retractable masts, or control surfaces, the dumping of various types of waste, corrosion and pitting of the submarine's outer surface and propellers, and formation of radioisotopes following the escape of neutrons from the nuclear reactor into the seawater.[27]

Most contaminants could persist from minutes to hours, but the extent to which a contaminant remains concentrated determines its detectability. The spreading that occurs as a result of the submarine's movement and the action of winds, waves, underwater flows, currents, and the like contributes to mixing and dilution. Most contaminants would mix too rapidly and reduce themselves to background levels before they could spread far as a detectable phenomenon. Thus, they provide a better basis for localization than for wide-area search. Also, contaminants discharged under water into a submarine's wake would be confined to the wake, which in turn usually remains at the general depth stratum of the submarines. Observation of these contaminants before they dissipated would depend on whether there was a sensor at that depth.

Submarine personnel have some control over the release of waste products. This control is important because personnel can release waste products only periodically—when, where, and in ways that release would pose the least hazard. For example, because the trace element that detectors use to find most contaminants must be brought into the immediate vicinity of the submarine's track by ship or airplane in order to be effective, a submarine could release waste products when no ship was around and when weather or intelligence information suggested that airplanes would not be present. In addition, because most contaminant sensors must remain near the water, they are not able to cover a wide area in a short period.

Turbulent Wake. Turbulence in the water behind the submarine results from the turning of the propeller and the resistance of the seawater to the submarine's passage. This resistance causes both turbulence in the layer of water immediately adjacent to the hull and an associated shedding of vortices from the edges of rough spots, the sail, and appendages. The resulting wake can potentially propagate to several kilometers astern of the submarine and persist for many minutes or longer.[28]

Several factors affect the degree of turbulence and its continuity. One is the extent to which the submarine's designers have streamlined its shape to facilitate water flow around the submarine. Submarine

[27] Speed, *Strategic Deterrence,* pp. 60-61; and Allen and Polmar, "The Silent Chase," pp. 26-27.

[28] MccGwire, "Technological and Operational Trends," p. 14.

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size, depth, and speed can also be significant: the greater the value of each, the greater the turbulence. Finally, the continuity of a wake is conditioned by the strength and direction of underwater currents and flows that act on it.

An important factor affecting detection of the wake is that it remains confined in the general vicinity of the submarine's depth stratum.[29] Hence, the only air or space sensor capable of detecting a wake is a blue-green laser, which has the unique ability to generate beams that can penetrate the water from above, bounce against the wake, and return to the source. The laser would probably be carried on an airplane, since spacecraft utilization will first require the solution of "a host of technical problems, including the development of high power laser sources."[30]

Whatever the carrying platform, other problems will have to be addressed before wide-area search of turbulent wakes can be carried out. One problem is that a submarine which cruised deep enough might well avoid detection of its wake. Estimates of beam penetration vary from less than one hundred meters to a few hundred, with any one estimate being nominal because local water turbidity and clouds will greatly lessen how deep a laser will actually penetrate and return to the source.[31] Whatever the laser's depth penetration, its swath width would probably be limited, since the beam should be thin and "at near-perpendicular incidence to the sea surface" for effective penetration.[32] This could seriously degrade the laser's utility for wide-area search, even though turbulent wakes may persist for extended periods.

Internal Waves. An internal wave is a vertical oscillation of the water column. "A moving submarine leaves behind it a wake of internal waves" because the water displaced by the submarine's movement fluctuates up and down as it seeks to return to its original density equilibrium.[33]

For three reasons internal waves have the greatest potential among the nonacoustic observables to serve as a basis for wide-area search. First, internal waves produced by nature can sometimes persist for days; those produced by a submarine may not persist as long, but if they last for hours the wake of waves could easily stretch tens of kilometers. Two other related reasons are (1) that natural internal waves (and

[29] See L. D. Landau and E. M. Lefohitz, *Fluid Mechanics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1959), p. 25.

[30] William Perry, Statement in *The Role of Technology in Meeting the Defense Challenge of the 1980s,* Report of a Conference Sponsored by the Arms Control and Disarmament Program, Stanford University, August 6-8, 1981, pp. 41-42.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Wilkes, "Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare," p. 443.

[33] Christopher Garrett and Walter Munk, "Internal Waves in the Ocean," in M. Van Dyke, J. V. Wehausen, and J. L. Lumley, eds., *Annual Review of Fluid Mechanics,* vol. 11 (Palo Alto, Calif.: Annual Reviews, Inc., 1979), p. 343.

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presumably those caused by submarines) produce effects on the surface of the ocean by modulating the short capillary waves superimposed on the ocean's larger surface gravity waves, and (2) that the surface manifestations are detectable by what is termed a "synthetic aperture radar," or SAR.[34] The significance of the SAR arises from its remarkable ability, even at satellite altitudes, to detect the manifestations with great detail and precision. Unlike IRRs and lasers, a SAR also has the advantage of being able to sense through clouds and rain.

Notwithstanding the positive features of the internal wave/SAR combination, some knowledgeable observers are skeptical about the potential utility of internal wave phenomena for submarine detection. Those who focus on the area of greatest interest—surface manifestations of internal waves—agree that reliance on such manifestations is presently not feasible and remains an open question.[35] For example, former U.S. Undersecretary of Defense William Perry has stated that while one could conceptually describe how such manifestations might serve as observables, any operationalization of such a capability would be "exceedingly difficult." Perry does not think that broad ocean-search systems will become operational in the foreseeable future.[36]

The above judgments are based on the characteristics of internal waves themselves, what is known about them, and the limitations on SAR for observing them. First, internal waves are "a ubiquitous phenomenon in the ocean," and "it remains a major oceanographic problem to determine the dominant sources of internal waves, evaluate their interaction with each other and with motions of other scales, and unravel the mechanisms and secondary effects of their dissipation."[37] There is as yet no model that can account for observed internal wave features and effects.[38]

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[34] There is no simple way to describe a synthetic aperture radar (SAR). A SAR is an exception to the proposition that, all other things being equal, an increase in coverage means a decrease in spatial resolution. It overcomes the coverage/resolution tradeoff by "synthesizing" or simulating a very long antenna. A real aperture radar (RAR) is limited by the true size of its antenna (up to ten or more meters long) in the amount of attention it can direct to any spot on the earth before the satellite or aircraft moves it on to another spot. In contrast, a SAR takes advantage of the forward movement of its platform and of discernible shifts that occur in its signals (termed Doppler shifts) as it approaches, goes over, and leaves behind some earth location. It takes multiple looks of the same spot, and by exploiting the shifts it integrates them together to produce what is analogous to a composite picture or hologram much richer in detail than an RAR picture. From the perspective of an object on the ground imaged by a satellite SAR, the latter equates to a RAR whose antenna is several kilometers long.

[35] Nierenberg, "U.S. Navy and Satellite Oceanography," p. 15.

[36] William Perry, "Technological Prospects," in Barry Blechman, ed., *Rethinking the U.S. Strategic Posture* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publications, 1982), pp. 137-38.

[37] Garrett and Munk, "Internal Waves," pp. 339, 357. See also Charles Elachi, "Radar Images of the Earth from Space," *Scientific American,* December 1982, p. 61; H. N. Kritikos and J. Shiue, "Microwave Sensing from Orbit," *IEEE Spectrum,* August 1979, pp. 40-41.

[38] Garrett and Munk, "Internal Waves," p. 271; and L. M. Brekhovskikh et al., "Short Period Internal Waves in the Sea," *Journal of Geophysical Research,* vol. 80, no. 6, 1975, p. 863.

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There are numerous ways to generate internal waves, and this helps account for their ubiquity.[39] Surface ships, winds, surface waves, atmospheric pressure fluctuations, movements of currents and tides over irregular bottom topography, and actions of currents at the interface between ocean density and temperature layers all generate internal waves. So it is not surprising that a high false alarm rate could attend reliance on internal wave manifestations as submarine observables.[40]

Potentially detectable surface effects are not understood well and seem to be dependent on local conditions.[41] Among these effects are wind, rain, large-scale circulation patterns, shear currents, thermal layer depths, sea state, and the water's density gradient, all of which interact to accentuate or minimize surface manifestations. It may also be that deep operations by a slow-moving submarine in waters with an appropriate thermal-density profile might mute generation of internal waves or their surface effects.[42]

As for the SAR, natural scientists agree that much research remains to be done in order to understand better "the mechanisms for the visibility of internal waves in SAR images."[43] They do know, however, that the angle at which and the direction from which radar signals strike the surface also influence the strength of the return achieved.[44] A lingering question is whether SARs might be able to sweep widths much larger than one hundred kilometers; if they could, their potential for wide-area search would be significantly enhanced. The answer at this time would seem to be no. A SAR is designed to try to maintain a constant sensitivity to the return it receives across the range against which its signals are directed. It is also designed to ensure proper synchronization of its signals as the radar approaches, passes over, and looks behind to some spot on the ground. Both these and other factors impose geometric constraints which would seem to limit its ability to go to significantly larger swath widths without major design changes.[45] As a result, if SARs are used to

[39] Garrett and Munk, "Internal Waves," p. 359.

[40] U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), *M-X Missile Basing,* p. 188.

[41] See J. W. Miles, "Internal Waves Generated by a Horizontally Moving Source," *Geophysical Fluid Dynamics,* vol. 2, 1971, pp. 63-87; O. M. Phillips, *The Dynamics of the Upper Ocean* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 211-17; J. R. Booker and F. P. Bretherton, "The Critical Layer for Internal Gravity Waves in a Shear Flow," *Journal of Fluid Mechanics,* vol. 27, 1967; T. H. Bell, Jr., *Distortion of Internal Wave Patterns by Background Shear: A Case Study* (Washington: Naval Research Laboratory, 1979).

[42] John P. Craven, "Ocean Technology and Submarine Warfare," in *The Implications of Military Technology in the 1970s,* Adelphi Paper No. 64 (London: IISS, 1968), p. 42.

[43] J. F. Vesecky and R. H. Stewart, "The Observation of Ocean Surface Phenomena Using Imagery from the SEASAT Synthetic Aperture Radar: An Assessment," *Journal of Geophysical Research,* vol. 87, no. C5, 1982, pp. 3424-25.

[44] See C. Elachi et al., "Shuttle Imaging Radar Experiment," *Science,* December 1982, p. 1003.

[45] R. L. Jordan, "The SEASAT—A Synthetic Aperture Radar System," *IEEE Journal of Oceanic Engineering,* April 1980, p. 161; and R. C. Beal, "Introduction," in R. C. Beal et al., *Spaceborne Synthetic Aperture Radar for Oceanography* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), pp. 15-16.

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search a wide area, a great number would have to be mobilized to do the task.

Aircraft and Spacecraft as Sensor Platforms. There are differing advantages and disadvantages to the use of aircraft versus spacecraft as sensor platforms. Aircraft have the advantage of being able to fly closer to the water; the closer nearly all sensors are to an observable, the more likely it is that the observable will be detected and the more precise the measurement will be. In addition, because aircraft are bigger than satellites, they can store more equipment for providing power to the sensor and for processing data. Another advantage of aircraft is that upkeep and repair of equipment are easier because aircraft can land. Finally, aircraft are more flexible than spacecraft; they can remain in an area of interest, while spacecraft must inevitably move forward.

Aircraft, however, do not have the coverage potential of spacecraft. Roger Speed points out, for example, that thirty aircraft flying three hundred knots and each sweeping a band fourteen nautical miles wide, can cover one million nautical miles—roughly the area of the Mediterranean Sea—in eight hours.[46]

Nonetheless, it is instructive that neither superpower generally uses aircraft to search very wide areas. One explanation may be cost. Continuous search operations would be expensive, especially since an inventory of at least three, and closer to six, aircraft are needed to keep one aloft at all times. And unless search operations are to be disrupted, additional aircraft would be needed to localize and prosecute targets. Two other factors could be a lack of appropriate bases and the effects of weather on air operations. Commercial aircraft regularly fly above or around heavy weather, but for ASW aircraft to do so would leave gaps in their coverage.

When weather is not a problem, wide-area search could also be conducted by flight vehicles not generally in use today—airships, lighter-than-air craft, and wing-in-ground (WIG) effect planes. One strength of these platforms is their endurance. WIGs are particularly interesting because they can fly at normal airplane speeds (i.e., in out-of-ground-effect) to reach a search area quickly and then switch to the WIG mode of flying very low (within one wing chord of the surface) and slowly. In that configuration, a WIG might stay aloft for twenty-four hours if crew fatigue problems could be resolved. The Soviet Union has experimented with WIG craft, but there is no indication that it will soon put them in operation.[47] There is also no indication that either superpower is experimenting with any of the other craft mentioned.

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[46] Speed, *Strategic Deterrence* p. 158, n. 65.
[47] *Jane's Fighting Ships, 1983-1984,* p. 549.

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There is much interest in the use of spacecraft in ocean surveillance and other military activity. Spacecraft in high geosynchronous orbit (around 40,000 kilometers) move at the same speed as the earth, so they are constantly over the same point on the globe. Therefore they can provide continuous coverage of whatever is in view of their sensors, but they do not provide global coverage. These spacecraft are also too high for effective use of most ocean surveillance sensors, which are usually found on satellites whose orbits do not exceed 1,000 kilometers. Low-orbit satellites have a remarkable speed over ground of about 25,000 kilometers an hour and can circumnavigate the globe in roughly ninety to one hundred minutes. While developing antisatellite technologies may put low-orbit satellites in danger, they have flown over regions where manned aircraft would be risked only in exceptional cases.

Spacecraft in very low orbits (such as 300 kilometers) stay aloft only a few days before air drag effects on the fringes of the atmosphere cause them to fall toward earth. A higher orbit makes for longer endurance—500 kilometers can result in a lifetime of several years, but too high an altitude generally restricts the effective use of on-board sensors. This is because a sensor's spatial resolution—that is, its ability to discriminate objects or phenomena of minimum size or area—usually decreases with height.

Fitting a satellite with a drag-makeup propulsion system enhances its endurance; the system boosts the satellite upward to compensate for loss of altitude. Such evolutions can consume fuel, however, and the system takes up space and weight that could otherwise be devoted to sensors and sensor support systems.

A drag-makeup system can also serve to maneuver a satellite from one orbit to another. This can be important because the orbit determines where a spacecraft overflies the world, when it does so, and how often. It can take a long time to position a satellite over an area of interest.[48] Consider, for example, a sensor that circles the earth fifteen times a day in a near polar orbit between 500 and 700 kilometers and has an extremely broad 2,700-kilometer swath width. It would take one day to provide both fully global coverage and revisit the same spot. It could take eighteen days for a sensor sweeping a narrower 148 kilometers across. By maneuvering a satellite from one orbit to another, the drag-makeup system reduces the time otherwise required to have a satellite fly over a desired area, but as with drag-makeup, these maneuvers can themselves be propellent-intensive and therefore also limited in number and extent. A space shuttle offers the possibility of refueling and servicing satellites, but it remains to be seen if and when refueling will occur

[48] B. Jasani, *Outer Space—Battlefield of the Future?* (London: Taylor & Francis, 1978), p. 18.

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regularly and what this will imply for maneuvering beyond drag-compensation.[49]

Rather than refuel other military reconnaissance vehicles, a space shuttle might be used to conduct its own reconnaissance. Again, it remains to be seen whether shuttles will be assigned any type of surveillance role (of submarines or otherwise) as a regular mission. Of the U.S. space shuttle, Abdel-Hady and Sadek conclude: "For purposes of military reconnaissance . . . [it] could be of limited value because of its short flight duration, its high orbital inclination, and difficulty of repetitive coverage of exact location." [50]

In short, any one spacecraft has greater potential for extensive coverage than any aircraft, but spacecraft have their own limitations — not the least of which is that many of them would necessarily have to be coordinated if they are to be used for recurring wide-area or even limited-area search.

In sum, the wide-area search prospects of nonacoustic methods is based on two factors: the use of sensors operating high above the water and covering long distances in short periods, and the persistence of signals in the submarine's wake, with thermal anomalies, contaminants, turbulent wakes, and internal waves having the greatest potential in this regard. But when one considers (1) the factors that affect the generation, location (i.e., within the water column, on the surface, or above), and persistence of the signals, (2) the factors affecting the relative utility of air and space vehicles, and (3) the characteristics and capabilities of sensors operating from such craft, it is not surprising that no nonacoustic system is yet operational for wide-area search. The number and nature of problems justify skepticism that any state will, through nonacoustic means, turn the oceans transparent in the foreseeable future.

The most critical problem for the bulk of nonacoustic sensors is whether the phenomena they might detect constitute reliable submarine indicators for wide-area search. For this reason numerous individuals have argued that only acoustic systems provide a realistic basis for such a search. Garwin recently expressed that view: "Long-range detection mechanisms of strategic significance are limited to acoustic detection and readily countered." [51] Yet it is precisely because acoustic systems can be "readily countered" that others such as Michael MccGwire argue that "there appears to be no intrinsic reason why, in the longer term, [satellite-

[49] See Mark Settle and J. V. Taranik, "Use of the Space Shuttle for Remote Sensing Research: Recent Results and Future Prospects," *Science*, December 3, 1982, p. 995.

[50] M. Abdel-Hady and A. Sadek, "Verification Using Satellites: Feasibility of an International or Multilateral Agency," in B. Jasani, ed., *Outer Space—A New Dimension of the Arms Race* (London: Taylor & Francis, 1982), p. 284.

[51] Garwin, "Will Strategic Submarines Be Vulnerable?" p. 66.

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based ocean surface phenomena detection systems] should have a lower detection rate" than fixed passive acoustic systems.[52] Nevertheless, if Garwin is correct, there may be a reason: acoustics may provide the only reliable indicators.

In addition, nonacoustic systems are probably no less vulnerable to countermeasures than their acoustic counterparts. Simply operating deeply and slowly, for example, would probably negate or significantly lessen most ocean surface effect signals. Nonacoustic systems could also be jammed and their communications links disrupted. The earlier discussion of potential nonacoustic indicators suggests also that nonacoustic sensors might be just as subject to natural and enemy-produced false alarms, and to the PD/PFA problem, as acoustic sensors. It would be foolish to argue that the United States or the Soviet Union will never achieve a transparent ocean wide-area search capability; but, before either does, it will have to contend with the many physical and oceanographic factors identified above as limiting the achievement of such a capability. Until then ASW should remain a war of attrition where submarines, of whatever type, are eliminated one by one and not all at once.

Protecting High-Value Units from Submarine Attack

A tactical submarine charged with attacking a high-value surface ship or submarine has a more difficult task than a ballistic missile submarine. The latter is charged with avoiding any engagements with enemy naval forces, while the former is charged with the opposite. The tactical attacker must usually contend not only with the high-value unit but also with the naval forces assigned to protect it. We now turn to factors that affect the success of the protecting forces, using superpower concerns and lessons of the 1983 South Atlantic war as a basis for the discussion.

Superpower Concerns

To the United States, the problem of protecting against general-purpose submarines is most sharply focused on the threat to aircraft carriers. For the Soviet Union, it is most sharply focused on protecting ballistic missile submarines. The United States is not unconcerned with protecting its own SSBNs, but the U.S. philosophy is that once an SSBN reaches the open sea it can best protect itself through stealthy independent operations that take advantage of the millions of square miles in which it can hide. Similarly, the Soviet Union is not unconcerned about the

[52] McCGwire, "Technological and Operational Trends," p. 24.

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survivability of its own high-value surface ships; rather, in a war, these will be drawn back or retained within a maritime defense perimeter around the Soviet homeland in a mutually supportive relationship with friendly submarines, other surface ships, and land- and sea-based aircraft.

The U.S. Approach. The approach taken by the United States to protect carriers begins with establishment of far-forward ASW barriers in order to neutralize enemy general-purpose submarines even before they come in the vicinity of carriers and their defending forces. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger spoke directly to this point in his latest Annual Report to the Congress when he wrote: "The best means of neutralizing enemy submarines is to engage them in forward areas and barriers — before they come within range of our attacking forces." As a result, the "layered defensive screen surrounding [U.S.] task forces and convoys" would have to contend only with the "submarines that escape forward screens and penetrate our ASW barriers." [53]

It is highly important to the forward attrition effort that the United States has allies fronting transit routes of Soviet submarines (e.g., through the Norwegian Sea). Also important are the continued operation of U.S. wide-area search systems and the U.S. intent, especially with its own nuclear-powered attack submarines, to put the Soviet navy and its submarines on the defensive in waters near the Soviet homeland.

Some Soviet submarines, including those that had been deployed prior to the onset of a U.S.-Soviet war, will survive to confront the high-value groups, and the aim of the ASW screening forces is to put a protective cordon around the carrier to ensure that the submarines do not have the opportunity to attack. The greater the number of protecting forces, the tighter the defensive ring they can establish. Similarly, the greater the number of attacking forces, the more likely they are to overwhelm or destroy the defenders, and the more likely that one attacker will find a hole in the defensive ring and approach close enough to fire its weapons. If the weapons are nuclear-armed, one submarine firing may be enough.

A critical factor when countering Soviet submarines is the range of the weapons with which they can attack. In World War II the attacking submariner actually saw the target and fired a torpedo whose maximum range was only a few thousand yards. Today some Soviet submarines can fire missiles against targets thirty to three hundred miles away, depending on the type of submarine. This places a great strain on the screening forces, for if they sought 360 degrees of protection, the circumference of the circle around high-value units could be as much as

[53] Caspar Weinberger, *Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1985* (Washington: GPO, 1984), p. 147.

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1,900 miles and the area as much as 280,000 square miles. If the attacker were an older Echo-2 type submarine, which carries eight missiles, the screening forces benefit because the submarine would have to surface before it could fire, thereby making itself vulnerable to visual or radar detection. But if the submarine was one of the new Oscar ships, it would not have to surface. It could launch twenty-four missiles — a formidable number — from under water and do so two hundred to three hundred miles away from its target. This, coupled with the probability that the Oscar is much more quiet than previous classes, such as the Echo, puts a premium on both the number and the type of screening forces.

The U.S. solution includes assigning nuclear-powered tactical submarines (SSNs) and tactical towed array ships to support its carrier battle groups. The SSNs have an excellent acoustic sensing capability and can operate in the same medium as enemy submarines. The towed array ships drag a long chain of hydrophones, which can cut across temperature layers. The signals acquired are then processed by shipboard computers and the data passed on to units whose task is to pinpoint and kill the submarine. These units consist not only of ships, such as frigates and destroyers, but also of fixed-wing ASW aircraft and helicopters carried aboard the aircraft carrier. In addition, some of the screening frigates and destroyers carry their own small helicopters. This airborne capability allows quick response to targets detected at distances far ahead of the carrier group.

While the increase in the ranges of weapons since World War II has complicated efforts to protect high-value units, it allows an additional protection measure, which should be mentioned even though it does not fall under the rubric of antisubmarine warfare as that term is generally understood: Long weapons ranges have also complicated the task of the attacking forces, which, unlike the World War II commander, do not see the target they are firing at and have to rely on outside targeting support. Hence, if the carrier protection forces can eliminate or disrupt the surveillance systems tracking the carrier, if they can prevent the submarine from receiving targeting data, if they employ cover and deception such that the submarine or the forces supporting it do not know where the target is or have too many false targets, they may be able to forestall or frustrate the submarine's attack even though the submarine itself is not destroyed. From the viewpoint of protection forces, it is preferable to destroy the submarine so that it does not live to fight another day, but the potential difficulties and problems associated with performing ASW make it clear that an antisubmarine (or an anti-air or anti-surface ship) strategy can include more than efforts to find and eliminate adversary weapons platforms.

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In sum, the problem of protecting high-value units for the United States is most often equated with the survivability of aircraft carriers. Protecting them against submarine attack is geographically widespread in two senses: (1) in the establishment of forward ASW barriers along Soviet submarine transit routes to areas where carriers may be, and (2) in the extensive protective cordon that must be emplaced around carriers to protect them from long-range missile shooters that evaded forward barriers.

Soviet Concerns. From Moscow's perspective, the primary high-value unit to be protected from attack—not only from U.S. tactical submarines but also from all U.S. ASW forces — is the ballistic missile submarine. Western analysts agree that most Soviet SSBNs will constitute a national strategic reserve in war and will be kept in sanctuary behind a maritime defense perimeter encompassing all or parts of the Greenland and Norwegian seas on one side of the Soviet Union, the Seas of Japan and Okhotsk, and parts of the Northwest Pacific off Kamchatka on the other, and the various Arctic seas to the north. In war the vast majority of Soviet naval forces will operate in those waters under the protection of land-based air cover, and SSBN support will be a major task. Indeed, according to U.S. officials, the best of Soviet general-purpose naval forces will be "extensive[ly] use[d]" to that end, with ASW forces in particular being "concentrated in home waters in support of newer classes of Soviet ballistic missile submarines." [54]

Like U.S. efforts to protect carriers, Soviet general-purpose naval forces will both establish ASW barriers far forward of the SSBN operating areas and operate in the direct vicinity of SSBNs. While Soviet efforts will be no less resource-demanding than U.S. efforts for U.S. carrier protection, the Soviet ASW problem may be more simple for three reasons. First, submerged submarines are more difficult to find than aircraft carriers, and second, concentrating ASW collection systems and prosecution forces in near and home waters will achieve efficiencies and prospects for mutual support. A third reason concerns the mode of operation of U.S. tactical submarines, all of which would be SSNs. By tradition, a U.S. SSN operates independently, and it would certainly do so in Soviet-defended waters because of communication and other difficulties that would attend any attempt to coordinate closely with other submarines. In addition, the U.S. SSN would rely on its standard weapon, the conventional warhead Mark 48 torpedo, for staging attacks. This would mean approaching the target to some thousands of yards. The U.S.

[54] Rear Admiral Sumner Shapiro, Director of Naval Intelligence, Statement Before the Subcommittee on Seapower and Force Projection of the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 4, 1981, pp. 14-15; and Weinberger, *Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1983* (Washington: GPO, 1982), p. 11-13.

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boat would not have the luxury given Soviet antiship cruise missile submarines, which can strike at a carrier ten to hundreds of miles away.

Being stealthy as well as more quiet with superior acoustic sensing systems than Soviet submarines, the U.S. SSN could well approach close enough to get off the first shot, but it would then have to contend with alerted enemy units. They would undoubtedly activate their sonars, negating the U.S. submarine's passive acoustic advantage, and aggressively prosecute any suspicious contacts.[55] The hope is that the U.S. submarine would take advantage of the confusion caused by its initial attack. It may also benefit from a Soviet concern not to strike one of their own protecting submarines if they fire too precipitately.

The Soviet SSBN protection problem seems less complex than the U.S. aircraft carrier protection problem, but it would be no less resource-demanding on Soviet ASW forces if the bulk of them were to concentrate in Soviet near and home waters to interdict U.S. SSNs both in forward barriers as well as in the immediate vicinity of Soviet SSBNs.

Non-superpower Perspectives: The South Atlantic Case

Our discussion has concentrated mainly on superpower concerns, yet most states have neither SSBNs to protect nor enemies that have (or are expected to have) submarine-launched antiship cruise missiles. The essence of antisubmarine warfare for these states will continue to be the countering of torpedo-firing submarines that threaten surface combatants, troop carriers, merchantmen such as oil tankers, and the like. This was the case in the 1983 South Atlantic war, and the ASW aspects of that campaign are worth inquiry because they put in stark relief the resource needs for performing ASW and the consequences of not performing or not performing well.

In the South Atlantic war, the Argentines suffered because they had almost no ASW capability. Even while the British surface contingent, led by two aircraft carriers, was still on its way to the Falkland / Malvinas Islands, the prospect that it had been preceded by two nuclear-powered tactical submarines was enough to limit sharply Argentine surface-ship activities. Goldrick points out that the aircraft carrier *Veinticinco de Mayo,* in company with guided-missile destroyers and other Exocet-armed escorts, "gave the Argentine Navy a force of sufficient strength that the British might have been forced to divert both [U.K.] carrier groups to deal with the threat, lest they risk defeat in detail." Nevertheless, Goldrick

[55] See Richard Pariseau, "How Silent the Silent Service?" in *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,* July 1983, pp. 40-44; and David Rivkin, "No Bastions for the Bear," in *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,* April 1984, pp. 37-43.

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adds, the "Argentine Navy failed because, without antisubmarine forces of adequate capability in weapons, numbers, and training, the . . . group based around the *Veinticinco de Mayo* could not risk attacking British units." [56] The Argentines held that view well before the cruiser *General Belgrano* was sunk by the submarine *Conqueror*. Until it was hit, *Belgrano* had stayed well away from the British surface contingents, and its sinking no doubt strongly reinforced the decision to keep the Argentine surface navy in port and ineffective.

With two ASW aircraft carriers, seven destroyers, fifteen frigates, and six submarines, the British were much better equipped to perform ASW, and to do so against what was minimal opposition, for Argentina had only two submarines available.[57] The *Sante Fe* was an old former American unit whose "sensors were unreliable and [whose] batteries could take only a limited charge." [58] Eliminated early in the fray after capture on the surface, it had just completed a covert transfer of marines to the Georgias and was seeking water deep enough to submerge when it was attacked by land-based helicopters.

The second submarine, the *San Luis,* was a Type-209 purchased from West Germany. It "was technically fully operational, but her crew had only recently been assembled." [59] There are recurring reports that the *San Luis* had penetrated the British ASW screens to fire at an auxiliary ship and, more important, at one of the two carriers, the HMS *Invincible*.[60] It is said that in the first case the torpedoes did not find their mark and that in the second case they struck the carrier but were faulty and failed to explode. Had the *Invincible* been incapacitated, the effect on the British task group would probably have been devastating; its eight Harriers and ten Sea King helicopters were critical to British plans.

The *San Luis* reports have not been confirmed. One London *Sunday Times* article claimed that "defence sources in Britain and America tend to believe the story." [61] Furthermore, *Jane's Naval Review* points out that the British conducted "sustained" ASW operations and that there was "reasonable opportunity for the sole surviving [Argentine] submarine in the area to attack the task force." [62] The U.K. Defence Ministry report

[56] J. V. P. Goldrick, "Reflections on the Falklands," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,* June 1983, p. 102.

[57] U.K. Secretary of State for Defence, "The Falklands Campaign: The Lessons," December 1982, p. 37.

[58] Robert L. Scheina, "Where Were Those Argentine Subs?" *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,* March 1984, p. 115.

[59] Ibid.

[60] Robin Morgan and Andrew Thompson, "How an Argentine Sub 'Torpedoed' *Invincible,*" [London] *Sunday Times,* July 24, 1983, p. 1.

[61] Ibid.

[62] John Moore, "The Falklands Campaign: The Lessons," in John Moore, ed., *Jane's 1983-1984 Naval Review* (London: Jane's Publishing, 1983), p. 16.

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on the campaign says little about its ASW aspects, but it does point out that ASW operations were "extensive" and that the Defence Ministry "planned a number of improvements in our ASW capability . . . and . . . an examin[ation of] what other measures are now required." [63]

Especially if the *San Luis* reports are true, the South Atlantic war well illustrates the significant impact even a small number of submarines can have. It would also show that antisubmarine warfare aimed at protecting surface ships is an inherently unfair game biased in favor of the submarines. The ASW forces can protect the surface ships, but the resources required to do so are extensive. Offensive operations by submarines against surface ships seems to be much more cost-effective than defensive operations against those submarines by the surface ships and allied forces.

Conclusions

The U.S. and Soviet solutions to protecting high-value units from submarine attack are similar to each other. They entail setting up forward ASW barriers and assigning forces to provide immediate protection to aircraft carriers on the one hand and to SSBNs. Although the problem facing the United States is more complex, the resource demands on both nations are great and reinforce the conclusion offered at the end of the South Atlantic war discussion: Warfare against general-purpose submarines seems inherently unfair to ASW forces because of the resources they need to play the game and the potential for loss of valuable units.

Antisubmarine warfare is a difficult endeavor, and it seems unlikely that a technological breakthrough will soon bring about a turning point in favor of ASW forces. This is especially true of warfare against SSBNs because their primary task, until they launch missiles, is to avoid all enemy forces. Not every SSBN would remain unscathed in a future war, but SSBN forces are likely to contribute significantly to nuclear deterrence and stability even in the midst of war.

Submarines whose task is to eliminate high-value units should have a more difficult time in war if they confront nations, such as the United States or the Soviet Union, that have expended great sums on ASW systems and forces. Against the ships of nations less committed to protecting themselves against this kind of attack, however, the submarine should retain the upper hand far into the future. Argentina suffered the consequences of that situation in 1983. Its adversary, Britain, did not,

[63] U.K. Secretary of State for Defence, "The Falklands Campaign," pp. 22-23.

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and its commitment to ASW may well have been one reason. If the *San Luis* reports are true, however, then luck was certainly another.

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ROMANIAN POLITICS AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY*

by William Crowther

Until recently little attention has been devoted to the impact of the international economy on the Socialist bloc.[1] The historically limited interaction between Socialist states and the international capitalist economy is chiefly responsible for this decided lack of interest. This situation has changed at a rapid rate since the early 1970s, and the topic is presently worthy of pursuit, both in light of its increased policy salience and its theoretical interest.

This article explores the impact of the world market on Romania's domestic and international politics in the postwar period. Romania presents a particularly interesting case study because of its history of real, if limited, independence from the Soviet Union, and its concerted attempt to establish an autonomous national industrial base. Many current conceptions argue that national politics are shaped by a country's location within the international division of labor.[2] That is, national political institutions are determined by international economic forces. Here the opposite argument will be advanced. While the two phenomena are intimately related, Romania's role in the world economy was, initially, an effect, not the cause, of its domestic and international political circumstances.

Political reasons led Romanian leaders at an early date to enter into relations with the Western international economy. Once Romania became committed to this course, however, its world market links began

* The author wishes to thank the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) for its support during 1983-84.

[1] Yet there have been any number of highly influential publications concerning the effect of the international economy on domestic politics in developed capitalist nations and the "Third World." For example, Alexander Gershencron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective,* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962); Peter Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed: International Sources of Domestic Politics," *International Organization,* Autumn 1971; James Kurth, "The Political Consequences of the Product Cycle: Industrial History and Political Outcomes," *International Organization,* Winter 1979; Guillermo O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics* (Institute of International Studies, University of California, Politics of Modernization Series no. 9, 1973).

[2] Probably the pre-eminent statement of this position is found in Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System* (New York: Academic Press, 1974).

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to exert a powerful influence both on the country's foreign policy orientation, and on its domestic politics. Recent events have accentuated this trend. Faced with a balance of trade crisis beginning in 1980, Bucharest reacted in a manner strikingly similar to that seen in non-Socialist developing countries.

The Background to Independence

Initially, Romania's leaders increased their involvement in the international economy in an effort to establish a degree of autonomy, both economic and political, from the Soviet Union. Prior to World War II Romania was among the most underdeveloped of the European nations.[3] In spite of its extensive natural resource base it failed to achieve appreciable industrialization; its population was concentrated in labor intensive agricultural production, and its exports consisted largely of raw agricultural products and minerals.[4] The historical pattern of its economic development has been typified as "peripheral" in the same sense that characterizes the many nations of the Third World in their interactions with the industrialized West.[5]

Therefore at the inception of Communist Party rule in 1947, Romania was at an economic disadvantage vis-à-vis not only the capitalist West, but also its more developed northern neighbors within the Socialist bloc (e.g., Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, and Poland). The leadership that emerged from the power struggles in the Romanian Communist Party (RCP) of the late 1940s and early 1950s, however, was committed to ending the country's relative backwardness as quickly as possible through a program of heavy industrial development.

By the late 1950s the emergent Romanian leadership was already on fairly uneasy terms with Moscow. This resulted from the success of Gheorghui Gheorgui-Dej, the Romanian party first secretary, in outmaneuvering his political rivals, among whom were those individuals who were on the best terms with Moscow during Stalin's reign (Anna Pauker, Vasile Luka, and Teohari Georgescu), and liberal elements within the party that might have constituted an alternative to his rule after Stalin's death (Miron Constantinescu and Lucretiu Patrascanu). The faction that ended up in control of the Romanian Communist Party, Dej and his close

[3] For example, Romania's per capita national income for 1937 was $81, compared with $440 in Great Britain and Sweden, $265 in France, and $170 in Czechoslovakia. It was followed only by Yugoslavia, at $80, and Bulgaria, at $75. (Ivan T. Berend and Gyorgy Ranki, *East Central Europe in the 19th and 20th Centuries* [Budapest: Akademiai Kiado, 1977], p. 99.)

[4] Andreas C. Tsantis and Roy Pepper, *Romania: The Industrialization of an Agrarian Economy under Socialist Planning* (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1979), p. 24.

[5] Daniel Chirot, *Social Change in a Peripheral Society: the Creation of a Balkan Colony* (New York: Academic Press, 1977).

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supporters, were orthodox Stalinists and "national" communists, having spent most of the war years in Romanian prison camps. Thus, the process of destalinization took a different form in Romania than in most other Socialist countries. Dej managed to stabilize a domestic Romanian leadership which was neither reformist nor in line with the ascendant faction in the CPSU.[6]

In the early years of socialist development Romania's economic stance was neither remarkable nor problematic among the East Europeans. The transformation that took place was rapid and at points harsh. Beginning from a very low base, investments increased by 431 percent between 1950 and 1960, and industrial production by 340 percent.[7] In the immediate postwar period foreign trade was shifted from Western Europe to the Socialist bloc. By 1958 the Soviet Union accounted for over 50 percent of all foreign exchange; an additional 20 percent went to the rest of CEMA, and less than 25 percent to the developed West.[8]

The end of the 1950s saw the beginning of Romanian particularism. Unlike other East Europeans, Bucharest initiated its "New Course" not in order to liberalize or decentralize, but to maintain its economic model in the face of Russian attempts to increase East European integration through a program of supranational planning at the expense of Romanian industrialization.[9] Resistance to the Soviets' 1962 plan to increase the socialist international division of labor, relegating the Balkan CEMA members to the position of raw material producers for the economically advanced Northern Tier, was primary among the factors culminating in the famed April 1964 "Declaration of Independence" from the Soviet Union.[10]

The policy of autonomous national economic development caused a substantial alteration in Romanian foreign trade. Commercial relations with the West began to develop dramatically in 1959, climbing by 80 percent in that year alone, and rose throughout the 1960-65 plan period.[11] By 1965 the Soviet Union's share of total foreign trade had been

[6] For a discussion of Romania's postwar leadership and its policies, see Ghita Ionescu, *Communism in Romania; 1944–1962* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964); Stephen Fischer-Galati, *20th-Century Romania* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970); and Kenneth Jowitt, *Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971).

[7] Trond Gilberg, *Modernization in Romania Since World War II* (New York: Praeger, 1975), p. 149.

[8] John Michael Montias *Economic Development in Communist Romania* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1967), p. 164.

[9] See, for example, the discussions found in Fischer-Galati, *20th-Century Romania,* and Ghita Ionescu, *Communism in Romania.*

[10] Graeme J. Gill, "Romania: Background to Autonomy," in Fischer-Galati, *20th-Century Romania,* p. 98.

[11] Montias, *Economic Development* p. 163.

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reduced to 38 percent and that of the West increased to 36 percent.[12] This rapid shift illustrates the degree to which Romania's foreign economic behavior has been shaped by political considerations at least since the end of the 1950s.

Ceausescuism and the Turn to the West

Far from reversing this tide of events, the ascent of Nicolae Ceausescu to the leadership of the Romanian Communist Party in 1965 reinforced the prevailing trend. Faced with political competition from well-established rivals within the Party leadership and severely limited possibilities for support from Moscow, the new Party leader chose to intensify Romania's independent course. At the Party's Ninth Congress in July 1965 Ceausescu reaffirmed the country's independence. This was symbolized by dropping the existing title of the Romanian Workers' Party in favor of the current Romanian Communist Party, and changing the name of the country from Romanian Peoples' Republic to Socialist Republic of Romania. His policy, intended to strike a resonant chord with the Romanians' traditional nationalism and anti-Russian feelings, clearly succeeded with the population. Three years later, during the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, Ceausescu's highly publicized stand in defense of national autonomy established him, for the moment at least, as a truly popular leader.[13]

This show of independence, coupled with a period of reform in the late 1960s, provided Ceausescu with a badly needed base of personal popular support. In the following years he ensconced himself in firm control of the RCP. A series of territorial and administrative reorganizations in the late 1960s facilitated placement of his supporters in key positions, and a progressive tightening of his grip on the country.[14] However, the ultimate goal of these tactics was far from the liberalization that his early rhetoric led the population to expect. Within a decade Ceausescu had established himself as the most powerful personal ruler in Eastern Europe, and he remains so today. The regime that he molded was ultimately little more than a modified version of the repressive apparatus wielded by Gheorghui-Dej.[15]

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[12] Directia Centrala de Statistica, *Anuarul Statistic al Republicii Socialiste Romania 1980* (Bucharest: 1980) p. 503.

[13] Daniel Chirot, "Social Change in Communist Romania," *Social Forces,* December 1978, p. 491.

[14] Mary Ellen Fischer, "Nicolae Ceausescu and the Romanian Political Leadership: Nationalization and Personalization of Power," (Washington: National Council for Soviet and East European Research, 1983), pp. 11-24.

[15] Chirot, "Social Change in Communist Romania," p. 495; Gilberg, *Modernization in Romania,* p. 31; Trond Gilberg, "Ceausescu's Romania," *Problems of Communism,* July/August 1974, p. 31.

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The strain of extreme nationalism that became a pervasive feature of Romanian political life after the mid-1960s is closely tied to maintenance of the Stalinist model, in both its political and economic manifestations. Mary Ellen Fischer has expressed the relationship in the following way:

> Certainly the Soviet leaders tolerate Romania's foreign policy in part because the tight internal control prevents a serious threat to communism within the country. Equally important, personalized power has made national autonomy feasible by enabling the Romanian Communist Party (RCP) to depress the domestic standard of living and simultaneously maintain high rates of investment for autarkic economic growth. Depressed consumption was not popular and required tight political control, but without this internal source of funds the RCP would have been forced to lower growth rates or rely on Soviet support. On the other hand, nationalism has contributed to the personal power of Nicolae Ceausescu since his most successful appeals for popular support stress his role in keeping Soviet troops out of Romania. Either policy would be very difficult to maintain without the other.[16]

This complex of related foreign and domestic policies, that might justly be termed Romanian "national communism," manifested itself in foreign trade as well. The diversification, begun in 1959, gained momentum under Ceausescu's leadership. The world market presented the prospect of substantial advantages for Romania. It allowed the Romanians to take advantage of their natural resource base as a source of exchange for Western industrial raw materials and equipment in short supply in the East, while continuing their inter-CEMA trade in "soft" goods that could not find a market in the West. Politically, it provided the RCP an added margin of insulation from the pressure experienced as a result of its growing feud with Moscow.[17]

Disenchantment between the two formal allies increased as Romania became the first bloc member to return its ambassador to Albania (in January 1963) despite that country's "excommunication" from the Soviet alliance, and took an "independent" position with respect to the Sino-Soviet split. Bucharest also became a thorn in the side of Soviet Warsaw Pact policy: reducing compulsory military service, resisting Soviet dominance of the Pact command structure, and refusing to participate in joint military exercises.[18] This increasingly hostile environment made it essential to reduce possible avenues of Russian leverage. Limiting economic dependence on the USSR was one important means of doing so.

Romania's need for oil was among the immediate problems impelling trade with the West. Possession of substantial domestic oil resources (over 80 percent of Eastern Europe's total) enhanced Bucharest's

[16] Fischer, "Ceausescu and the Romanian Political Leadership," p. i.

[17] Aurel Braun, *Romanian Foreign Policy Since 1965: The Political and Military Limits of Autonomy* (New York: Praeger, 1978), p. 4.

[18] Gill, "Romania: Background to Autonomy," p. 99.

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independence from the Soviet Union in the early stages of industrialization, but complete energy autonomy soon became impossible. Domestic production began to level off, growing by only 1.6 percent annually between 1966 and 1973, while the ambitious expansion of the Romanian petroleum processing industry increased demand at a much greater rate.[19] The oil industry was considered crucial; providing goods for the hard currency market, it was intended to play a key role in future industrial development. But Romania's problematic status in CEMA made it impossible to obtain low-priced petroleum products from the Soviet Union under the conditions applied to other East Europeans. As a result Bucharest sought outside sources, and soon established a cordial relationship with members of OPEC.[20]

Progress along the economic course charted by the RCP transformed both Romania's needs and capacities in international trade. Early exchange served primarily to obtain capital equipment, but over time an expanded industrial base increased its ability to supply itself from the domestic machine industry. Analyzing the share of Western machine imports in total equipment investments, a mere 10 percent in 1975, Marvin Jackson concluded that this level of independence could only have resulted from the conscious application of a policy of industrial autarky.[21]

This development strategy eased the demand for imported equipment, but simultaneously increased requirements for industrial raw materials. It also affected exports, facilitating production of light consumer goods and semi-manufactures for the external market. Between 1960 and 1970 this sector's contribution to foreign exchange rose from 5.8 percent to 18.1 percent, while the relative share of raw materials in total exports fell. The USSR's importance in overall trade also continued to decline, from approximately 38 percent in 1965 to 26 percent in 1970, while the fraction absorbed by the developed Western economies steadily increased.[22] Therefore, as Romania moved into the 1970s the demands of industrialization coupled with increasingly hostile political relations with the Soviet Union expanded its foreign trade links with the nonsocialist world.

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[19] Christopher C. Joyner, "The Energy Situation in Eastern Europe: Problems and Prospects," *East European Quarterly*, Vol. 10, no. 4, p. 498.

[20] Ceausescu's government signed trade agreements with Iran in 1968 and 1969 totaling $315 million. Braun, *Romanian Foreign Policy*, p. 25. By 1970 Romania was importing 2.29 million tons of oil annually from the West, while its imports from the Soviet Union remained at zero. Joyner, "The Energy Situation in Eastern Europe," p. 516.

[21] Marvin R. Jackson, "Perspectives on Romania's Economic Development in the 1980s," in Daniel N. Nelson, ed., *Romania in the 1980s* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981), p. 271.

[22] The West's share grew from 32 percent to 38 percent of Romania's imports, and from 23 percent to 29 percent of exports. Tsantis and Pepper, *Romania: The Industrialization of an Agrarian Economy*, pp. 554-57.

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Domestic Conditions Through the Mid-1970s

In the early years of its existence the Romanian socialist economy made rapid advances. Between 1950 and 1975 the growth rate of overall industrial production was among the highest in the world, increasing at approximately 13 percent annually.[23] The most rapidly expanding sectors were chemicals and engineering goods, while consumer goods and agriculture lagged behind the overall economy. But by the late 1960s the Romanian economic mechanism was on its way to becoming the dinosaur of the Socialist world. Romania was last among the East Europeans to experiment with decentralization, and then its attempts were halfhearted. This "reformist" trend was quickly reversed, and the country experienced a slow but steady recentralization.[24]

As a result, by the 1970s the Romanians were approaching the limits of effective development within their existing "extensive" framework. Simply increasing inputs of labor and raw materials no longer provided a commensurate increase in growth rates. The RCP leadership, intent on rapid development through investment in heavy industry, could not bring itself to accept the decrease in control associated with reform. During the first half of the decade, accumulation absorbed over 35 percent of national income in order to maintain a growth rate of approximately 11 percent.[25]

Thus despite the increasing cost of bottlenecks, consumer shortages, and massive resource misallocation due to lack of information, the economic model was retained and other means were sought to insure progress. The RCP ultimately fell back on further integration into the international economy for reasons of both finance and trade. Implementation of the 1971-75 Five-Year Plan required approximately $21 billion in total investments; $4 billion of this amount was to be procured from Western sources.[26] Romania sought to procure more technologically advanced producer goods from the developed capitalist economies, as well as industrial raw materials. In exchange, the industrial goods it produced in sizable quantities were to be marketed on the international economy.[27]

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[23] This increase breaks down into 14.5 percent in producer goods and 10.5 percent in consumer goods. If one looks at the more general indicator of per capita net national income, increases are less impressive but still quite good, at 5.3 percent annually. Ibid., p. 192; Chirot, "Social Change in Communist Romania," p. 472.

[24] Gilberg, *Modernization in Romania,* p. 161; and Franklin D. Holzman, *International Trade Under Communism — Politics and Economics,* (New York: Basic Books, 1976), p. 18.

[25] The actual rate varied between 10.5 percent and 11.3 percent. *Anuarul Statistic 1980,* p. 91; Tsantis and Pepper, *Romania the Industrialization of an Agrarian Economy,* p. 93.

[26] Braun, *Romanian Foreign Policy,* p. 24.

[27] Tsantis and Pepper, *Romania: The Industrialization of an Agrarian Economy,* p. 117.

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Foreign Policy Correlates of Trade Diversification

To achieve these goals the RCP launched a determined program of "bridge-building" to the West. Long-term technical cooperation and trade agreements covering the period of the fifth Five-Year Plan were signed with both France and Germany. In 1971 Romania became a member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and in 1972 it became the first Socialist country to join the International Monetary Fund.[28] The Romanian government also permitted a number of new joint ventures with Western firms to join the Renault plant (begun in 1966) in operating on Romanian territory. Finally, the United States extended Most Favored Nation (MFN) status to Romania in 1975.

During the late 1960s and early 1970s the "infatuation" between the Ceausescu regime and the West reached a peak. It was obvious to Western governments that Romania was a valuable asset in the ongoing competition with Moscow. The RCP's outspoken divergence from the Soviet Union on matters such as the Sino-Soviet rift and supranational planning in CEMA broadened to include Romania's extension of diplomatic relations to West Germany, failure to take a strong stand against Israel in 1967, and outspoken opposition to the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia.[29] Unlike more loyal allies, Romania voted with the Soviet Union on only 76 percent of all ballots cast in the United Nations from 1970 to 1976, while the remaining bloc members voted over 97 percent in its support.[30]

The value of Ceausescu's public stance in defense of national self-determination in such forums as the U.N. and the opportunity that Romania presented for developing relations with the East outweighed any reservations that Western leaders might have had concerning its domestic affairs. Western appreciation of Bucharest's changing international status was symbolized by Richard Nixon's 1969 state visit, making Romania the first East European country to receive a visit from an American President in the postwar period. Despite the 1971 purge and ideological campaign that quickly came to be known as the "little Cultural Revolution," Western benevolence toward the Ceausescu regime failed to erode substantially.[31]

This favorable evaluation was reasonable considering Romania's generally positive domestic sociopolitical appearance at the time. The Western economic connection allowed the government to increase con-

[28] Braun, *Romanian Foreign Policy,* pp. 24-25.

[29] Gill, "Romania: Background to Autonomy," p.99

[30] William Zimmerman, "The Energy Crisis, Western Stagflation, and the Evolution of Soviet-East European Relations: An Initial Assessment," in Neuberger and Tyson, eds., *The Impact of International Economic Disturbances,* p.435.

[31] Trond Gilberg,"Ceausescu's Romania," p. 30.

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sumption at a rate of approximately 8.4 percent per year while maintaining the pace of industrialization, and without economic reform.[32] Improved consumption coupled with Ceausescu's ostentatious nationalism and populist rhetoric ensured general passivity if not active support among the vast majority of the Romanian population, apparently outweighing the regime's marked failure to reduce political suppression.

Trade and Foreign Policy Redirection in the Mid-1970s

Initially the Romanian trade strategy for the 1970s progressed as planned. Between 1970 and 1973 imports grew by 8.2 percent, exports by 10.8 percent, and Bucharest made rapid advances in shifting its trade to what it considered a more acceptable area from the perspective of national security.[33] By 1973 the total CEMA share of its trade was reduced to 45.5 percent of exports and 40.66 percent of imports; Western commerce filled the economic gap, and compatible foreign policy links had been established.[34] These successes allowed the Romanian leaders to maintain their course in spite of clearly signaled Soviet dissatisfaction. But future economic difficulties were already presaged by their failure to find a sufficient market for Romanian industrial consumer goods, whose share in exports increased by less than 1 percent from 1970 to 1973. Meanwhile, planners were depending on exports to produce growing amounts of hard currency in the succeeding period.[35]

In the last two years of the 1971-75 fifth-plan period the foreign trade situation deteriorated as a result of both Romania's internal economic problems and the international climate. Nineteen seventy-four saw the beginning of the oil crisis's impact. This not only increased the cost of imports, but also softened the market for Romanian exports, turning a substantial trade surplus into a huge deficit practically overnight.[36] Initially the deficit was met by restricting Western imports, shifting goods intended for export to CEMA into the hard currency market, and by limited borrowing. Imports grew by only 4 percent in 1975, while exports rose by 14 percent, bringing overall trade back into balance.[37] But the curtailment of imports could not be sustained without damage to the development effort, and there was an end to the supply of hard currency products that

[32] Tsantis and Pepper, *Romania: The Industrialization of an Agrarian Economy*, p. 175.
[33] Ibid., p. 120.
[34] The Soviet Union's share dropped to 22 percent of exports and 19 percent of imports, while the developed Western economies accounted for 32.2 percent and 41.4 percent, respectively. Ibid. pp. 574-577.
[35] Ibid., p. 578.
[36] The previously positive trade balance was transformed into a 1.3 billion lei deficit in 1974. *(Anuarul Statistic 1980.)*
[37] Ibid., pp. 498-501.

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could be squeezed out of the CEMA trade. As the problem continued unabated, RCP leaders were forced to searching for more permanent solutions.

Rather than limiting development, reorganizing internally, or turning back to CEMA, planners pinned their hopes on a changed international posture. The RCP's new strategy relied on expansion of industrial exports to developing countries to generate the hard currency needed to offset increased oil imports. This was coupled with restriction of imports from the developed economies. Redirection was achieved with striking speed: the LDCs' share in Romania's total trade rose from 7 percent in 1970 to almost 25 percent in 1980.[38] The increase in imports is clearly accounted for by the rise in oil import magnitude and prices, but exports to the Third World rose dramatically as well, from $68 million to $2,121 million over the same period.[39] Planners also succeeded in restraining imports from the industrialized West while Romania continued to market industrial raw materials and consumer manufactures to its developed trading partners. Between 1970 and 1975 imports had expanded at approximately 38 percent annually; from 1975 to 1980 this rate dropped to 15 percent.[40]

As in earlier years, foreign policy initiatives once again followed the mid-1970s transition in economic relations. In essence, RCP diplomacy sought to identify Romania economically as a Less Developed Country, and politically as a member of the nonaligned movement. This status was advantageous in a number of ways. It could (and did) help to obtain tariff advantages from the industrialized West. It also helped convince LDC leaders that Romania was a more politically appropriate trading partner than the developed capitalist states.

In its new incarnation the Romanian government became a vocal supporter of the New International Economic Order, called for reforms to increase the power of the General Assembly in the United Nations, and took a much more active interest in establishing diplomatic links with the Third World.[41] By 1976 President Ceausescu had made state visits to over thirty LDCs.[42] Romania joined the Group of 77, and

[38] In dollar amounts imports grew from only $117 in 1970 to $4 billion in 1980. CIA, *Handbook of Economic Statistics,* 1982, p. 106.

[39] Linda S. Droker and John A. Martens, "Romania: Performance and Prospects for Trade with the U.S. and the West," in *East-West: The Prospects to 1985* (Washington: U.S. GPO, 1982), p. 242; CIA *Handbook of Economic Statistics,* 1982, p. 106.

[40] Imports from the developed West declined from a peak of 42 percent of total imports in 1975 to only 27 percent in 1980. This helped at least partially to ameliorate the huge deficit that was developing in trade with OPEC. Ibid., pp. 106-107.

[41] Walter M. Bacon, Jr., "Romania: Neo-Stalinism in Search of Legitimacy," *Current History,* April 1981, p. 159; Robert L. Farlow, "Romania: The Politics of Autonomy," *Current History,* April 1978, p. 171.

[42] Braun, *Romanian Foreign Policy,* p. 37.

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participated with "guest" status at conferences of the nonaligned movement.[43] Not entirely unrelated to the oil situation, the PLO was recognized as the legitimate representative of the Palestinians, and allowed to establish a quasi-official embassy in Bucharest. Romania began to vote consistently with the Arab states on issues that concerned them in the U.N., and it supported the Arab boycott of Israeli business.[44] Bucharest's efforts with the developed West met with success as well; it obtained treatment as a developing nation from the United States under the terms of the General System of Preferences (GSP), and similar concessions from the West Europeans.[45]

As part of the effort to make economic and political inroads among LDCs, joint ventures were formed abroad for the first time. By 1977 Romania was participating in at least twenty-eight joint production enterprises outside its borders, concentrated in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia.[46] In order to promote further friendly relations (particularly with an eye to increasing exports) Bucharest also provided foreign aid to its less-developed trading partners. From 1970 to 1975 this averaged $350 million per year, by far the highest level among the East Europeans.[47]

In implementing this policy Romania shifted to an intermediary position in the world market by the late 1970s. The absence of substantial internal restructuring made some international redirection of this sort inevitable. Unlike Hungary, which chose a course of economic reform, Romania was simply unable to compete effectively with the enterprises of the developed countries. On the other hand, its own recent experience with the problems of early industrialization and the relative simplicity of its production techniques could be advantages in relations with the developing nations. The RCP leaders also showed themselves to be quite adept at exploiting their limited diplomatic assets (independence from both major alliance systems) to develop an international political posture conducive to this economic strategy.

Participation in the international market thus increased Romania's autonomy from the Soviet Union as intended by its leaders, and allowed them to sustain the pace of industrialization without abandoning economic and political centralism. All too soon, however, cracks appeared in the facade of economic well-being they had constructed. Most

[43] Mark Hunter Madsen, "The Uses of Beijingpolitik: China in Romanian Foreign Policy Since 1953," *East European Quarterly,* September 1982, p. 302; Robert H. Linden, "Romania's Foreign Policy in the 1980s," in Nelson, ed., *Romania in the 1980s,* p. 223.

[44] Braun, *Romanian Foreign Policy,* p. 28.

[45] Droker and Martens, "Romania: Performance and Prospects," p. 240; Linden, "Romania's Foreign Policy in the 1980s," p. 223.

[46] These included companies involved in extraction and production of minerals, chemical and wood processing facilities, tractor production and assembly, and power plants. Tsantis and Pepper, *Romania: The Industrialization of an Agrarian Economy,* p. 125.

[47] Linden, "Romania's Foreign Policy in the 1980s," p. 234.

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economic goals were met up to the mid-1970s, but only by a process of debt accumulation that ultimately proved unmanageable.[48]

Economic Deterioration and State Response

Dramatic as it was, trade restructuring did not resolve the foreign exchange problem. While remaining within tolerable limits, the hard currency debt approximately doubled during the 1970-75 plan period, from $1,227 to $2,449 million.[49] But Romania became a net petroleum importer in 1976, and thereafter its shortfall continually grew.[50] Coupled with sluggishness in the export market, this added burden turned the balance of trade against the Romanians. Their hard currency debt grew by an average annual rate of over 36 percent in the second half of the decade, reaching $6.7 billion by 1979.[51]

In a sense, sustaining growth through borrowing only exacerbated the unfolding crisis by increasing demand for imported raw materials to feed industries in which labor productivity was low even by East Eurpoean standards, and whose products could not find adequate foreign markets. It has been estimated, for example, that by 1980 Romania was losing as much as $900,000 per day on its exports of refined petroleum products.[52] Under these conditions even accelerated borrowing could not stave off deterioration in the second half of the 1970s.[53]

These economic problems were accompanied by increased political instability. The Party's social management difficulties were compounded by its inability to maintain the rate of increase in consumption, and by the emergence of a larger, more diverse elite stratum. Large-scale labor unrest, typified by the Jui Valley miners' strike, began to be seen for the first time during the Ceausescu period. The intelligentsia became more active as well, forming the Free Trade Union Movement, and attempting to establish communication with human rights groups abroad.[54] The initial state reaction to this challenge consisted of a renewed ideological campaign to spur workers to greater productivity, and reassignment or demotion of Ceausescu subordinates in charge of particularly troubled economic sectors. But as the gulf dividing the official version of "multi-

[48] Gabriele Tuitz, "Romania," *East European Economics,* Summer 1981, p.41.

[49] CIA, *Handbook of Economic Statistics,* 1982, p. 54.

[50] Imports rose from approximately 10,000 barrels per day to over 16,000 barrels per day in 1980. (Droker and Martens, "Romania: Performance and Prospects," p. 277.)

[51] Ibid., p. 242.

[52] Droker and Martens, "Romania: Performance and Prospects," p. 249.

[53] National product growth declined from an 11.3 percent average during the first half of the decade to 8.4 percent in 1976, and then to 6.2 percent by 1979, in spite of the 33-34 percent accumulation rate. (Tuitz, "Romania," p. 45.)

[54] Farlow, "Romania: The Politics of Autonomy," p. 169.

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laterally developing socialist society" and the reality of everyday life widened, the power of moral appeals dwindled.

The Jui Valley strike in August 1977 was symptomatic of growing instability, and its handling presents a microcosm of the regime's treatment of social unrest in the country as a whole. Faced with open opposition, President Ceausescu took a direct hand, orchestrating the official response, and visiting the disaffected areas to make personal appeals to the workers. The worst offending local cadres were dismissed, management was reorganized, and limited concessions were made to the workers. By these gentle means, calm was soon restored in the region. As soon afterward as practicable, however, the state's carrot was transformed into a stick. Those identified as leaders in the strikes were arrested, dismissed, or transferred; large numbers of workers were returned to their villages. Activity of the military and security forces increased, and strikers' *gains were eroded by changes in work norms.*[55]

The same combination of cosmetic reform and repression is evident on the national level. In 1978 Bucharest introduced a "New Economic Mechanism" that devolved limited authority to intermediate industrial organizations with great public fanfare, while overall central control was retained. Even this limited decentralization met substantial bureaucratic resistance, and was only partially implemented.[56] The regime also initiated new "populist" appeals. Workers' self-management became a national byword, and the moribund Working Peoples' Councils were lauded as the epitome of direct workers' democracy. In fact, the Councils' power is severely restricted (their primary function is actually the promotion of factory discipline) and workers' participation in them is formalistic at best.[57] At the same time, consumption was being constrained and the level of repression increased.[58] Dogmatism gained power in Romania's already stifling cultural life, nationalistic rhetoric was stepped up, and political suppression of dissidence intensified.

Economic Crisis And Domestic Response Since 1980

By the beginning of the 1980s Romania's economy had reached the point of near collapse. The hard currency trade deficit climbed to $2.4 billion for 1980 alone before being controlled.[59] As planners

[55] Braun, *Romanian Foreign Policy*, p. 53; Farlow, "Romania: The Politics of Autonomy," p. 169.
[56] Bacon, Jr., "Romania: Neo-Stalinism in Search of Legitimacy," p. 168.
[57] Daniel N. Nelson, "Workers in a Workers' State: Participation in Romania," *Soviet Studies*, October 1980, p. 551.
[58] Retail trade turnover dropped from 11.6 percent to 5.8 percent between 1978 and 1979; real wages rose by 2.1 percent instead of 6.7 percent. (Tuitz, "Romania," p. 44)
[59] Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates, Jan Vanous, ed., *Centrally Planned Economies Current Analysis*, vol. 2, no. 89, November 9, 1982, p. 7.

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struggled to find the funds to cover their import needs, indebtedness rose dramatically. When total debt increased from $6,700 million in 1979 to $10,350 million in 1981, Bucharest had reached the end of its financial rope.[60] Repayment proved impossible in late 1981, and loan restructuring agreements had to be negotiated for both 1982 and 1983.[61] The effect of the debt crisis on trade was immediate. Between 1980 and 1981 imports from the industrialized West were reduced by 17 percent.[62] In the following year this slide became an avalanche; 1982 imports were reduced by another 45 percent, and exports declined sharply as well. The decline resulted largely from shortages of raw material imports for export producing industries. Trade with LDCs also fell off, but remained above 1980 levels, and its relative share continued to increase.[63]

While external conditions were extremely adverse, their severe impact on Romania is accounted for by its inadequate internal organization. Just as in the late 1960s, the 1978 reforms announced by the Party were never fully implemented.[64] Growth had been maintained only by continually increasing investments, and by the late 1970s the size of these had outstripped economic planners' capacity to manage them effectively.[65] Nonetheless, the regime retained close control of the country's economic processes as part of its more general endeavor to dominate social life, and proved willing to accept the attendant costs. Gross inefficiencies had been subsidized by capital inflow from the West, and under the impact of external disruptions the irrationalities of the system became painfully obvious.[66] In 1980 Romania showed its second worst economic performance since World War II, and problems continued to grow in the

[60] CIA, *Handbook of Economic Statistics,* 1982, p. 54.

[61] Paul Gafton, *Radio Free Europe Situation Report,* no. 1, January 13, 1983, p. 6

[62] CIA, *Handbook of Economic Statistics,* 1982, pp. 106-107.

[63] Figures on trade with LDCs are from Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates, Jan Vanous, ed., *Centrally Planned Economies Current Analysis,* vol. 3, no. 24, April 4, 1983, p. 2. This was coupled with a tendency toward obtaining more industrial raw materials from within CEMA than had previously been the case. Both imports from and exports to Eastern Europe declined somewhat between 1979 and 1981, though less than trade with the West; then saw an upturn in 1982 as Romania began to adjust to its new circumstances, increasing 6.0 percent and 11.2 percent respectively. Ibid., p. 2.

[64] *Radio Free Europe Situation Report,* no. 3, Feb. 19, 1981, p. 4.

[65] Jackson, "Perspectives on Romania's Economic Development in the 1980s," p. 275.

[66] Energy consumed per dollar produced of Net Material Product, for example, was two to four times higher in Romania in 1982 than in advanced Western economies. The inadequacy of the state's response is exemplified by its energy conservation program. Beginning in 1979 a program of stringent energy conservation in both industry and private consumption was initiated. Although clearly a necessary effort, conservation in the context of Romania's political/economy had a major disruptive effect. Under central pressure to reduce energy consumption, local authorities overrode more general priorities in their attempts to comply. In a number of instances power supplies were cut off to factories while they were in full operation, damaging machines and wasting thousands of hours of labor. In some cases power to mines was cut without warning while miners were still underground, forcing them to climb to the surface and wait until it was renewed, or their shift ended. (*Radio Free Europe Situation Report,* no. 7, April 18, 1983, p. 21; personal communications to the author in Romania during 1982-83.)

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following year.[67] The government responded to economic decline with an austerity program similar to those of nonsocialist LDCs caught up in the same cycle of debt accumulation.

As a result of the RCP's investment policy the level of personal consumption in Romania has never been high during the postwar period.[68] Between 1975 and 1980 conditions eased somewhat, but the current economic crisis reversed this trend. Many goods that only recently became available have disappeared from shops. Official reports show a 1.9 percent decline in consumption in 1982; in fact the situation is far worse than this would suggest.[69] Typical of the Ceausescu policy, exports of food were increased and imports limited in order to generate hard currency, and the burden of the shortfall was born by the population. In 1982, for example, food exports rose by 12.3 percent while imports decreased by 66.8 percent.[70] Long lines appeared as consumers struggled to obtain such basics as flour, potatoes, corn meal, oil, and sugar. In 1981 rationing (for those items plentiful enough to ration) was reintroduced for the first time since 1953. A series of increasingly strict penalties was as enacted against "hoarders and black marketers," who were made scapegoats by the mass media for the severity of the shortages.

These cutbacks in consumption combined with generally depressed conditions to cause an upsurge of social unrest. Reports have reached the West of over fifty strikes and work stoppages in 1980 and 1981, as well as demonstrations by consumers, and other antigovernment manifestations.[71] By mid-1982 it became necessary for the Party to assign militia to keep order in the food lines that have become an all too common aspect of life in Romania. While certainly not unknown among other socialist countries, such active display of resentment toward the ruling Party is quite unusual in the postwar Romanian context.

The regime's reaction has been consistent with the pattern established over the past two decades. The extravagance of the personality

[67] Official estimates put Net Material Product growth in 1981 and 1982 at 2.2 percent and 2.6 percent, respectively; in fact even this estimate appears to be optimistic. Aurel Braun, "Romania's Travails," *Problems of Communism,* May/June 1982, p. 51; *1982 Yearbook of International Communist Affairs* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1983), p. 461. For Romanian reports, see Paul Gafton, *Radio Free Europe Situation Report,* no. 4, March 7, 1983, p. 11. For a representative Western estimate, see Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates, Jan Vanous, ed., *Centrally Planned Economies Current Analysis,* vol. 3, no. 23, April 1, 1983, p. 2.

[68] In 1975 it was somewhere between 60 and 80 percent of that found in Bulgaria, a country which was at least as underdeveloped as Romania at the time of World War II. Jackson, "Perspectives on Romania's Economic Development in the 1980s," p. 289.

[69] Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates, Jan Vanous, ed., *Centrally Planned Economies Current Analysis,* vol. 3, no. 23, April 1, 1983, p. 5.

[70] Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates, Jan Vanous, ed., *Centrally Planned Economies Current Analysis,* vol. 3, no. 24, April 4, 1983, p. 4.

[71] *1982 Yearbook of International Communist Affairs,* p. 462; Braun, "Romania's Travails," p. 53.

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cult surrounding Ceausescu has reached a new peak.[72] The liberal element of the intelligentsia, that made motions in the direction of resistance, has come under increasing attack as a purveyor of "decadent Western cultural influences." Official hostility was symbolized in the spring of 1982 by the purge of several high ranking intellectuals that came to be known as the "transcendental meditation affair."[73] Combined with growing criticism of the cultural establishment, the purge was widely viewed as a reminder to members of the elite that their positions are secure only on Party sufferance.

A larger number of high officials have lost their jobs since 1979 than at any other time since Ceausescu consolidated his position. Over half of the country's County (Judets) Party First Secretaries have been removed.[74] Prime Minister Ilie Verdet and Minister of Foreign Trade Cornel Burtica were deprived of their positions although both are Ceausescu family members, until recently a politically sacrosanct group.[75] Constantine Dascalescu, appointed to replace Verdet as prime minister, and known primarily as an ideologue and party organization specialist, is expected to concentrate his energies on increasing Party discipline, not reforming the economy.

In conjunction with replacements at the top of the system, organizational measures were instituted to eliminate abuses and tighten control over policy implementation. Since 1982 Central Committee members have been delighted to spend time each month overseeing the work of Judets Party Committees as "public instructors," while representatives of the Judets Party organizations are similarly assigned to review local affairs.[76] New appeals have been addressed to the Romanian people. Ceausescu's highly publicized personal tours of inspection to virtually all areas of the country, in the course of which he publicly evaluates the efforts of local leaders, have become more frequent; and workers, peasants, and students have been urged to increase the nation's productivity by devoting more hours to unpaid and theoretically voluntary "patriotic work."

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[72] Fischer, "Ceausescu and the Romanian Political Leadership," p. 41.

[73] In this somewhat strange incident a circle of desperate meditators centered at Bucharest University under the guidance of a Romanian expatriate who had re-entered the country with the knowledge and permission of the government were pounced upon by the Romanian secret police and accused of becoming the tools of sinister foreign forces. A number of high officials were subsequently dismissed for allowing such subversive activity to occur. (*Radio Free Europe Situation Report,* no. 9, (1982), p. 2.)

[74] Fischer, "Ceausescu and the Romanian Political Leadership," p. 41.

[75] Patrick Moore and George Cioranescu, *Radio Free Europe Situation Report,* no. 18, October 26, 1982, p. 2; *1982 Yearbook of International Communist Affairs,* p. 458.

[76] *Radio Free Europe Situation Report,* no. 9, (1982), p. 2.

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Foreign Policy Effects of the Crisis

Three trends stand out in post-1980 Romanian foreign policy. The first is the intensification of efforts to cement relations with the Third World as an alternative to the industrialized West, with whom relations were clearly entering a period of decline. By 1981 LCDs accounted for 30 percent of Romanian imports and 25 percent of exports.[77] Romania has maintained its policy of supplying low-cost industrial goods and technological aid to its less-developed trading partners, and has even undertaken limited arms exports.[78] Efforts to establish Romania as a leading representative of LDC aspirations have also been reinforced. Bucharest launched a propaganda crusade against international economic exploitation and the "brain drain" to the industrialized West. The Romanian president's already active schedule of visits to Third World capitals expanded, as did his rhetorical denunciation of the arms race and emphasis on Romania's independence from superpower military blocs.[79] Both Ceausescu's five-nation Asian trip in November 1982 and statements at the New Delhi conference of the nonaligned movement underscored Romania's LDC status and call for a more just international order. These pronouncements have drawn attention not to issues that divide the world between socialist and capitalist, but to those separating rich from poor.[80]

Second, by 1979 problems in the international economy led Romania to re-evaluate its relationship with CEMA, seeing it as a possible alternative source of badly needed industrial raw materials. Bucharest refused, however, to alter its position on supranationality, and in fact added even further demands, claiming special concessions as a "Developing Country." Present relations with Moscow make the political cost of gaining more favorable terms unacceptable, and no progress has been made. While at least tolerable to the developed West, and welcomed by LDCs, the RCP's recent foreign policy initiatives could hardly have been

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[77] Despite declines in both categories during 1982 due to foreign exchange shortages the relative importance of their share of hard currency trade has continued to grow. CIA, *Handbook of Economic Statistics,* 1982, pp. 106-107.

[78] The regional differentiation of its trade reflects Romania's current intermediary position in the world economy. In its exchange with the industrialized West, Bucharest has become an exporter of processed petroleum products, basic industrial products, (simple iron and steel products, yarn and fabrics, etc.) and light consumer manufactures. Western developed countries' exports to Romania are dominated by basic industrial raw materials, and machines and equipment. In contrast Romania's position with respect to LDCs is now that of a developed nation. Exports are led by industrial goods, machines, and more recently refined petroleum products, while imports consist largely of raw materials. (Vladimir Socor, *Radio Free Europe Situation Report,* no. 11 [1983], p. 11; Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates, Jan Vanous, eds., *Centrally Planned Economies Current Analysis,* vol. 3, no. 24, April 4, 1983, p. 2; Droker and Martens, "Romania: Performance and Prospects," pp. 254, 265, 269; Braun, *Romanian Foreign Policy,* p. 28.)

[79] Fischer, "Ceausescu and the Romanian Political Leadership," p. 44.

[80] George Cioranescu, *Radio Free Europe Background Report,* no. 259, December 16, 1982, and *Radio Free Europe Situation Report,* no. 6, March 30, 1983, p. 11.

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expected to win favor in the Kremlin. The Soviets have been alienated by the RCP's criticism of rich rather than capitalist rich countries, and imperialism rather than capitalist imperialism, and they are irate over the Romanians' growing involvement in the nonaligned movement. As a result they have proved far from willing to lend a fraternal helping hand. Though in a position to do so, the Soviet Union provided Romania no aid in dealing with its economic problems.[81]

Disagreement has been particularly acerbic with respect to oil sales. Replacements for Romania's Western supplies, disrupted by the Iran-Iraq war, were purchased from the Soviet Union at fairly high levels in 1979, 1980, and 1981 ($618 million in 1981 alone).[82] This trade, however, was conducted at world market prices and only in exchange for Western currency or "hard" commodities. News of the sales was first announced to Romanian listeners not by their own government, but over Radio Moscow, along with the pointed comment that other CEMA members were obtaining Russian oil at 40 percent below the world market price.[83]

The cold shoulder from the East elicited an outpouring of polemic against CEMA for the problems that it, in the Romanian view, has caused their economy.[84] The Soviet Union, in turn, called for a closing of ranks among all Socialists in response to increased hostility in the West, with only thinly veiled references to Bucharest. Soviet and Romanian theoretical journals entered into a heated discussion of the primacy of "class character" as opposed to the interest of the "nation" in international relations. Early 1983 saw their exchange continued on a slightly less covert level with the opening of a "literary" debate focusing on the Soviet role in Romania's postwar history, and ultimately on Romania's right to follow an independent national course.[85] Thus the economic crisis, which initially appeared to be forcing the Romanians back toward closer ties with the rest of the Soviet Bloc, has in fact resulted in a marked cooling in their affairs.

Finally, relations with the industrialized West have soured as well. The Romanians have made it clear that they lay primary blame for their problems, and those of other developing countries, squarely at the door of Western capitalist governments and the international financial

[81] Droker and Martens, "Romania: Performance and Prospects," p. 238.

[82] Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates, Jan Vanous, ed., *Centrally Planned Economies Current Analysis,* vol. 3, no. 24.

[83] *Radio Free Europe Situation Report,* no. 14, October 10, 1980, p. 5.

[84] For a summary of the Romanian position, see Anneli Maier, *Radio Free Europe Situation Report,* no. 1, January 13, 1983, p. 10.

[85] See articles by Vasile Iota in *Contemporanul,* June 3, 1983, and Eugen Florescu in *Romania Libera,* April 18 and 25, 1983, or Anneli Maier, *Radio Free Europe Situation Report,* no. 9, May 24, 1983, p. 2.

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community. Official Romanian statements on the sources of the international economic crisis have become more frequent and more harsh. During 1982, criticism of developed countries (particularly the United States) for their role in causing world poverty became a ubiquitous element of Romanian mass media and made its way into the Western press as well.[86] They denounced unjustifiably high interest rates, the arms race, and an unfair international trading order as general causes of the global recession. More pragmatically, Romanian leaders are dissatisfied with the failure of their products to perform as expected in the developed Western economies, and with the credit terms obtained from Western banks.

A further complication, illustrative of the difficulty of Bucharest's situation, has arisen over the question of emigration. Romania's preferred status in the West has always been predicated on at least minimum compliance on this issue. As economic conditions deteriorated, however, there has been a massive increase in the number of people seeking relief through departure to the West. Concentrated among the most educated stratum of society, this desire to abandon the homeland is considered both an international embarrassment and an economic drain by the Ceausescu regime, which brought substantial pressure to bear on those wishing to emigrate. Applicants (the process actually entails first applying for permission to apply for permission) risk dismissal from their jobs and risk incurring the harassment of the heavy-handed Romanian security service.

Despite these efforts to stem the flow, applicants continued to come forward. Finally, in desperation, Bucharest announced the imposition of an "education tax" on those wishing to leave the country in late 1982.[87] The tax, which might otherwise have been treated as an internal matter, demanded payment in hard currency. Since possession of hard currency is illegal for Romanian citizens under most circumstances, the tax was interpreted in the West as a political barrier to emigration. Reaction was swift and its severity was apparently unexpected. The United States announced its intention to revoke Romania's MFN status in June 1983.[88] Pressure was applied by the Federal Republic of Germany through delay of debt rescheduling agreements, and discussion of the possibility of refusing to extend the existing Romanian-West German cooperation

[86] See, for example, Ceausescu's inteview in John B. Oakes, "Ceausescu on Romania, the West and East," *New York Times,* August 4 1982, August 5, 1982.

[87] *Scinteia,* November 6, 1982.

[88] This occurs at a time when maintaining the balance of trade is considered critical by Bucharest. It is estimated that loss of MFN would have cost Romania from one-half to two-thirds of its exports to the United States, or approximately 3 to 4 percent of its total exports to the West. Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates, Jan Vanous, ed., *Centrally Planned Economies Current Analysis,* vol. 3, no. 24, April 4, 1983, p. 8.

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agreement.[89] Perhaps just as important, loss of preferential treatment by these governments would have damaged Bucharest's relations with the private sector, particularly Western banks.

This confrontation placed the Romanians in an uncomfortably tight position. Strained relations with the Soviet Union foreclosed the possibility of aid from that direction, except at an unacceptably high political price; and while the connection with the LDCs was increasingly important, it could not serve as a replacement for the West. Therefore, when faced with this strong response, Bucharest was forced to retreat uncharacteristically on an issue with which President Ceausescu is personally identified. Following an extended round of negotiations involving visits by Romanian Foreign Minister Stefan Andrei to both Bonn and Washington, an agreement was reached whereby the education tax will not be enforced and Romania undertakes "not to create economic or procedural barriers to emigration." In return, Romania's trading relationship with its most important Western partners will not be disrupted. Most-Favored Nation status was renewed, loan rescheduling with the Germans completed, and the hard currency payment by Bonn per emigrant to the FRG raised.[90]

The recent economic crisis presented Bucharest with stark alternatives: closer integration into CEMA, but only on Soviet terms (which would necessarily undermine Ceausescu's personal position) or compliance with Western demands regarding what Romanian leaders consider to be a purely internal political matter. It might have been possible to reject both the East and West and accept the domestic consequences, but this would have certainly devastated economic development plans and, in light of the experience of the past three years, could well have proven fatal to the survival of the regime. On consideration the RCP leaders prudently chose to maintain their Western economic ties. Given the alternatives, they had little real choice; Romania has clearly come under a degree of political constraint as a result of its ties with the world market.

Conclusion

Maintaining a degree of independence from the Soviet Union has been a fundamental foreign policy goal of Romania for at least the past two decades. While it was not feasible for a country of its size to cut off all foreign economic ties, its leaders could, and did, reduce their

[89] George Cioranescu, *Radio Free Situation Report,* no. 8, May 2, 1983.
[90] Details of the agreement are given in *New York Times,* June 4, 1983, and George Cioranescu, *Radio Free Europe Situation Report,* no. 10, June 7, 1983, p. 4.

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vulnerability through trade diversification. Domestic policy has been dominated by the RCP's determination to continue with centralized economic and political control, and to maintain the stability of its rule. Romania initially became involved in the world market as the result of a conscious decision that these internal and external goals would be served by such a course.

Yet the international economic ties engendered by this policy are now so interwoven into the pattern of interests permeating Romanian society that its continuation is intimately related to the fate of the regime. Insulation from the Soviet Union has permitted Ceausescu to keep up the nationalistic rhetoric that is a fundamental pillar of his rule. Participation in the world market provides technology and financing that has allowed the centralized economic mechanism to survive longer than it otherwise could have, enabling the RCP to avoid the economic reforms undertaken in other Eastern European countries. Any major rejection of the present foreign economic posture would now necessarily affect Romania's political stability.

Once limited to responses compatible with continued participation in the world market, the Romanians inevitably behaved in accordance with its rules. The nature of their reaction to the current economic crisis is clear, and familiar. It is characteristic of the policies employed by many nonsocialist developing nations faced with similar conditions. After the collapse of the balance of trade, imports were maintained through foreign borrowing that quickly got out of control. The resultant debt crisis further damaged the economy and ultimately led to implementation of a national austerity program. This caused political unrest that was met with an intensification of already existing proclivities toward repression, and some cosmetic restructuring at the top of the political system.

In its mediation between the international economy and its own population, the Romanian state appears to have taken on the role of a collective capitalist; forcing down wages and social overhead as a response to declining profits. The most apparent distinction between it and other developing countries caught in a similar economic position is the Ceausescu regime's greater familiarity with, and possession of, the means of repression; and therefore greater facility in imposing a program of austerity. Because the Ceausescu leadership is so closely identified with the present socioeconomic model, no fundamental alteration of this course can be expected. The limit of its capability for change is exemplified in the most recent series of reforms, that leave the basic issues of adjusting the country's economic priorities and reshaping the distribution of political

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power unaddressed. For the near term the "system" will be retained, authoritarianism will intensify, and the economic and political costs will simply be absorbed.

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BERLIN AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT WITH THE USSR*

by Paul R. Viotti

The security regime associated with the governance of Berlin is a model of conflict routinization. That one rarely reads of this city nowadays is indicative of the degree to which conflicts that once brought the superpowers and their allies to the brink of war have come to be managed successfully. The various parties to the regime do follow the rules and procedures that have been established over time, thus removing this city (for the time being at least) from the list of global flash points that threaten to engage the superpowers in armed conflict.

Maintenance of this security regime depends heavily on the overall climate of relations between East and West in general, and between the superpowers in particular. Agreement to conduct affairs in Berlin according to established rules and procedures has certainly not eliminated conflict between East and West over Berlin. Deterioration of East-West relations to cold war levels of hostility could again put Berlin and Western access to the city in jeopardy. U.S.-Soviet relations are clearly not what they were during the period of détente in the 1970s, but they have also not returned to the poor climate that existed during crises in 1948 and 1961. Moreover, relations between the two Germanies, though not always good, continue to exhibit growth in terms of expanding commercial and cultural ties originally spawned by Brandt's *Ostpolitik.*

Berlin remains a city under occupation from the view of the three Western allies, who see their role as guarantors of freedom to West Berliners legitimized by their continuing presence as occupiers. By contrast, the Soviets have elevated the position of East German authorities to the extent that doing so undermines Western claims to authority based on occupation. Checkpoint Charlie, the principal point of allied transit between East and West Berlin, is manned by military personnel on the Western side (thus asserting their rights as occupiers). East German border authorities man the "Soviet" side of the checkpoint, a denial in principle of Western claims to Berlin as a city under occupation. In practice, of

* The views expressed in this article are those of the author and should not be construed as representing the views of any agency of the U.S. government.

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course, Soviet military presence in and around the city and assertion of prerogatives beyond those normally accorded an ally makes them occupiers in fact even as they deny any such formal role.

Berlin as an International Security Regime

The term *regime* is more commonly used to refer to the domestic constitutional order of a given state — the set of rules by which politics are played.[1] When the term *regime* is used in an international context it refers to a set of rules (and associated institutions or organization structures, if any) voluntarily established and voluntarily maintained by states to govern their relations in a given issue area. Although there is an asymmetrical distribution of capabilities or power among states, none claims the right or authority to enforce the rules of a given regime. Some of these rules may even have the binding or obligatory character of international law, particularly those contractual obligations established by treaty or convention, but there is still no enforcing authority, given claims to sovereignty and the absence of any hierarchy of authority among states. It is precisely this voluntary character of *international* regimes that differentiates them sharply from regimes that establish the political rules of a *domestic* order.

Most studies of international regimes have tended to focus on those established by states for dealing with economic, social, and other non-security issues. Perhaps reasoning that non-security issues lend themselves more to collaborative efforts, the study of international *security* regimes has been minimized.[2] The study of collaborative arrangements and conflicts among members of an alliance is well established. An even more compelling focus, perhaps, is on the ways and means of establishing and maintaining regimes among adversaries when the character of the relation is inherently one of conflict.

The international security regime associated with Berlin exemplifies a set of rules and organizational arrangements for managing conflict among adversaries. Conflicts associated with this city have not been resolved, but they have been reduced to routines, in an effort to maintain the status quo or to avoid armed conflict over such matters. This has not always been the case: such crises as the closure of ground access to Berlin by the Soviets in 1948 and their erection of the Berlin wall in 1961 brought the major powers close to war.

[1] For a thorough discussion of the conventional, domestic meaning of the concept *regime*, see David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965), pp. 190-211.

[2] See the discussion of security regimes and the applicability of the concept in Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes," *International Organization*, Spring 1982, pp. 357-78.

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The Western powers retain the pretense of being "allies" with their Soviet adversary, jointly occupying the capital city of the defeated German Reich. This legal status serves as a formal basis for collaborative activity between the two sides even as conflicts between them remain unresolved. The status of occupying ally is of particular importance to the Western powers who rely upon it to legitimize their continuing presence in the Western sectors of the city, essential as that presence is to maintaining a liberal democratic order there. Paradoxically, the Soviets deny having status as an occupying power, resting their presence in Berlin and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) on other bases. Even as they assert that their occupation of Germany and Berlin ended decades ago, the Soviets continue to conduct themselves as occupation forces in Berlin and the GDR as a whole to a much greater extent than the Western allies even pretend to practice.

Specifying Berlin as an International Security Regime

What, then, are the rules that define the security regime associated with Berlin? The most important of these from the Western perspective are those rules that specify their rights of *access* to the city.

Passage into the Soviet sector (East Berlin) across Checkpoint Charlie by American, British, and French military personnel or into the West by their Soviet counterparts follows procedures that retain the position of the four occupying allies while diminishing the status of Berlin or German authorities on both sides. The Soviets defer to the East Germans who maintain sentries on their side of the checkpoint, thereby recognizing the status of the East Germans and granting them symbolic authority in a city that they regard as the capital of the German Democratic Republic. As a practical matter, however, the Western allies do not defer in any formal sense to the East German authorities. Clearance of Western military personnel by allied authorities occurs at the checkpoint respectively by American, British, and French sentries. Individuals are then cleared for passage by their own national authorities and proceed across the checkpoint, using the uniform without name tag as the exclusive form of identification. The Western right of access is accorded to uniformed personnel, and no individual identification by East German authorities is permitted. By contrast, civilians, (including dependents of military personnel), particularly those proceeding on foot, must clear with East German authorities. Civilians on military buses (mainly military dependents or retired military personnel) must show passports through the bus windows, but in no instance are East German authorities allowed to board.

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While in East Berlin, allied military personnel are instructed not to challenge, but also not to defer to East German authorities in any way. If stopped by them (a rare occurrence indeed), the traveler is instructed to demand to see a Soviet (allied) officer. As a matter of principle, then, only Soviet authority is recognized; thus preserving the Western view of Berlin as a city under occupation. At the same time, it is the East German (not Soviet) authorities who physically lift the gate to allow access to the Western allies, an attempt to assert East German prerogatives. In any event, neither side yields anything in principle while practice is allowed to go on in a "business as usual" fashion.

Just as there are well-established rules and procedures for Western access to East Berlin, there are also rules and procedures to govern Western allied access by land and by air. Aside from the question of access, a second set of rules is associated with the Western allied status as occupation forces charged with administering their respective sectors. Even as the Western allies defer to Berliners and indirectly to West Germans the tasks and costs of administering the city, allowing a maximum of local autonomy, they are careful to preserve their rights and prerogatives, particularly as they pertain to security matters. The Western allies are the principal means of contact with their Soviet "ally" and through them to the East German authorities for dealing with various administrative matters.

The Berlin Kommandatura, originally part of the Allied Control Authority for all of Germany, remains the highest legislative body for the city with effective jurisdiction over all of West Berlin.[3] Since the Soviet commandant walked out in June 1948, the Kommandatura has been composed of the three Western allied commandants. So constituted, the Kommandatura from time to time still issues legislation in fact (Berlin Kommandatura Orders or BKOs) or instructions in the form of letters to the Senat, the cabinet of the Berlin House of Representatives. Three allied legal advisers review all legislation of the West German Bundestag that would apply to Berlin. If there is no allied objection (particular scrutiny is given to security aspects that could affect their status), the legislation is passed to the Senat for consideration by the House of Representatives.

Organizational arrangements among the allies are complex. Chiefs of Mission for the three Western allies are the three ambassadors in Bonn, a vestige of the occupation when the allied High Commissioners exercised authority over all Germany including Berlin. Military commandants remain technically in command as the senior ranking officers resident in Berlin, although the Assistant Chief of Mission role is filled by a

[3] Technically, the Kommandatura retains jurisdiction over the entire city. In practice, of course, this has not been exercised since 1948.

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career diplomat, the senior ranking resident civilian in the mission. Members of the mission serve on such allied committees with administrative or governing responsibility for the city as the Civil Affairs and Economics committees. As a practical matter, most issues are deferred to West Berlin officials. On the other hand, the Western allies are careful to retain their rights as ultimate authorities on those matters affecting their interests, and essential to maintaining the security of the city.

Regime Construction and its World War II Origins

That Berlin would be jointly controlled was decided by Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin at the Teheran Conference in December 1943, where they also decided that Germany would be divided among them into zones of occupation.[4] Details of the occupation regime would be worked out by military agreements among the parties and at meetings in London of the European Advisory Commission, a tripartite body established at the ambassadorial level at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in October 1943. At the Quebec Conference in September 1944, Churchill and Roosevelt would reach agreement on their separate zones of occupation and on U.S. transit rights from the North Sea port of Bremerhaven across the British Zone to the American Zone in southern Germany.

France would be included among the allies by decision at the Yalta Conference in February 1945; the French "zone would be formed out of the British and American zones." [5] Apparently no formal mention was made of Berlin at Yalta; the French sector in the city would be decided finally at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945.[6]

With Western troops arriving in Berlin and withdrawing from what was to be the Soviet Zone, an Allied Kommandatura for Berlin, composed of the military commandants of each ally and their staff representatives, was established in July 1945. An Allied Control Council for all Germany was established the following month.

Western access to Berlin had not been discussed extensively with the Soviets, although the Western allies assumed that access to the city was a necessary part of the package giving them rights to station troops in Berlin. Indeed, Soviet Ambassador Gusev had told members of the European Advisory Commission in November 1944 that "arrange-

[4] David J. Nelson, *Wartime Origins of the Berlin Dilemma* (University, Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 1978) p. 32.

[5] "Protocol of the Proceedings of the Crimea (Yalta) Conference," February 11, 1945, Section IV, as reprinted in U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Documents on Germany, 1944-1961*, December 1961, p. 9

[6] For a detailed study of this conference, see Charles L. Mee, Jr., *Meetings at Potsdam* (New York: M. Evans & Co., 1975).

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ments for transit facilities will be made, providing United States and United Kingdom forces and personnel full access to the Berlin zone across Soviet-occupied territory." [7]

In response to Western allied requests for access via three rail lines, two highways, and two air lanes, Soviet Marshal Zhukov told General Clay and General Weeks on June 29, 1945, that he "felt that one rail line and one highway should certainly be adequate," and that "he could not agree to two air lanes" either.[8] Zhukov would relent on the latter point, allocating one air lane from Berlin westward toward Magdeburg, but two leading separately from Magdeburg to Hannover in the British Zone and Frankfurt in the American. Both Clay and Weeks agreed that their staffs would "notify the Russians one hour before takeoff or arrival over Soviet territory, giving the number of aircraft and destination." [9] In any event, Clay also noted agreement that "all traffic — air, road and rail, . . . would be free from border search or control by customs or military authority." [10]

By decisions reached in November 1945 within the Allied Control Council, the Western allies expanded their rights to three, twenty-mile-wide air corridors connecting Berlin with Hamburg in a northwest corridor, Frankfurt am Main in a southwest corridor, and with the British headquarters at Buckeburg via Hannover in a west corridor. Although the Soviets agreed to these, they rejected Western allied proposals for similar air corridors connecting Berlin with Warsaw, Prague, and Copenhagen; Marshal Zhukov did express confidence that "in due course the other air corridors would be opened." [11]

The most important single document to emerge with respect to the air corridors was a set of flight rules published by the Allied Control Authority Air Directorate on October 22, 1946.[12] The three air corridors were specified as Frankfurt-Berlin, Buckeburg-Berlin, and Hamburg-Berlin, each "20 English miles (32 kilometers) wide, i.e., 10 miles (16 kilometers) each side of the center line." The agreement did not specify altitudes, but in practice the Soviets have seen the Western allies constrained to a 2,500-foot floor and a 10,000-foot ceiling. Transports probed

[7] Nelson, *Wartime Origins*, p. 70.
[8] Ibid., p. 131.
[9] Ibid., p. 132.
[10] Ibid., p. 133. Cf. Lucius D. Clay, *Decision in Germany* (Garden City, N.Y.: 1955), p. 26.
[11] See Allied Control Authority Coordinating Committee Note and Attachment dated November 22, 1945, and Minutes of Meeting dated November 27, Allied Secretariat Note and Report to Allied Control Authority Control Council dated November 28; and Minutes of Meeting of Control Council Approving Establishment of Air Corridors, dated November 30. All of these are contained in *Documents on Germany*, pp. 63-72.
[12] See "Flight Rules by Allied Control Authority Air Directorate for Aircraft Flying in Air Corridors in Germany and Berlin Control Zone," October 22, 1946, as reprinted in *Documents on Germany*, pp. 63-72.

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to heights greater than 10,000 feet in the spring of 1959, but were harassed by Soviet fighters, resulting in President Eisenhower's decision in 1960 not to press the altitude question. Since 1959 the 10,000-foot ceiling has been observed in practice, though the right to fly higher has never been yielded in principle.

Given takeoff and landing needs, the Western allies also established their right to fly within a twenty-mile (thirty-two kilometer) radius of Tempelhof, the American airfield located in downtown Berlin. This twenty-mile radius around Berlin, established formally in the same October 1946 Flight Rules, is the so-called Berlin Circle or, more formally, Berlin Control Zone. Except for a two-statute mile, 2,650-foot (800-meter) altitude safety zone around each allied air base, flying within the Berlin Circle is understood by the Western allies to be unrestricted. Following the October 1946 Flight Rules, it is "a zone of free flight for all aircraft entering the zone to land on the Berlin airfields or taking off to depart therefrom." Although the rules state that it is "desirable" that "local flights (testing, training etc.) be executed above the national sectors," it is not a strict requirement: "If necessary they may be executed above the remainder of the Control Zone, subject to normal clearance by the Berlin Air Safety Center." Aside from the same 2,650-foot floor, two-mile radius restriction to be waived only by "permission from the Berlin Air Safety Center," American, British, and French aircraft can overfly GDR and Soviet bases in the Berlin Circle much as Soviet aircraft would have the same rights with respect to Western allied bases there.

Although Western allied fighters have been flown in the corridors, since 1953 only noncombat aircraft have been flown in either the corridors or the Berlin Control Zone. Again, this has been Western allied practice rather than any surrender of de jure right. Nevertheless, to reverse this practice and thereby challenge the Soviets on this point would require agreement by all the Western allies.

Road access to Berlin is via the Helmstedt-Berlin autobahn. Drivers of cars containing military personnel and nonmilitary passengers pass through Checkpoint Alpha at Helmstedt and Bravo at the western border of Berlin, the latter located adjacent to the Soviet checkpoint at Drewitz. Western allied trains also pass from Helmstedt through the Soviet checkpoint at Marienborn on the GDR border with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG); trains making the return trip from Berlin pass through the same checkpoint en route to destinations located in the former zones of occupation in West Germany.

The terms by which the sovereignty of the new Federal Republic of Germany would be established left important residual authority to the former occupying states — the United States, the United Kingdom,

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and France. The most explicit statement of these retained rights was in the Bonn Convention of May 26, 1952; however, the terms would be softened somewhat by the Paris Protocols of October 23, 1954. For example, the provision in the Bonn Convention (Article 5, Paragraph 7) that had allowed "any military commander" — American, British, or French — "if his forces are imminently menaced" to "take such immediate action appropriate for their protection (including the use of armed force)" was deleted. On the other hand, the right was retained by virtue of a letter of understanding sent by Federal Chancellor Adenauer to the three foreign ministers (including the American Secretary of State) wherein he allowed the provision in Article 5, Paragraph 7 in the FRG's opinion "is the inherent right of any military commander according to international law and therefore to German law," this "right . . . will not be affected by deletion of that paragraph." [13]

The Western allies granted in Article 1 that "the Federal Republic shall have . . . the full authority of a sovereign State over its internal and external affairs"; they stated at the same time in Article 2 that "the Three Powers retain the rights and responsibilities, heretofore exercised or held by them, relating to Berlin and to Germany as a whole, including the reunification of Germany and a peace settlement." Consistent with this charter, their rights "which relate to the stationing of armed forces in Germany and which are retained are not affected." [14] The Three Powers would normally defer exercise of such rights "which relate to the protection of the security of armed forces" to the new German government, taking independent action "only after consultation, insofar as the military situation does not preclude such consultation, with the Federal Government and with its agreement that the circumstances require such exercise." [15]

That Berlin would remain under occupation was reasserted in a public statement by the American, British, and French foreign ministers on October 23, 1954. They were "determined," however, "to ensure the greatest possible degree of self-government in Berlin compatible with Berlin's special situation." This special situation was elaborated in a letter from the three High Commissioners to Chancellor Adenauer (dated May 26, 1952, as amended on October 23, 1952). Although their rights of occupation in Berlin would be retained, they would "exercise their right relating to Berlin in such a way as to facilitate the carrying out by the

[13] The relevant documents are "Convention on Relations Between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany and Related Conventions," Office of the Executive Secretary of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, 1952; and "The Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany, Official Texts," 1954. See also "Paris Protocols" in *Documents on Germany*, pp. 155-75.

[14] Bonn Convention as amended by the "Paris Protocols," Article 4, Paragraph 2.

[15] Ibid., Article 5, Paragraph 2.

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Federal Republic of its Declaration on Aid to Berlin . . . and to permit the Federal authorities to ensure representation of Berlin and of the Berlin population outside Berlin." Moreover, the three powers would "have no objections if, in accordance with an appropriate procedure authorized by the Allied Kommandatura, Berlin adopts the same legislation as that of the Federal Republic." This provision has been retained to the present day in that all legislation passed in Bonn is sent, following the procedure described earlier, to the three powers who, finding nothing adverse to their interests associated with their rights as occupation forces or contrary to the security of Berlin, pass it on to the Berlin government for enactment or amendment. The price for Bonn's special relationship with Berlin would be its commitment not only to aid Berlin financially and materially, but also to accept "charge on the Federal budget of the occupation costs of the Three Powers in Berlin."

The three High Commissioners also sent the Chancellor a separate letter on October 23, 1954, indicating that air transit by foreign carriers to Berlin through the air corridors would only be approved if prior approval had been granted by Bonn "to overfly the Federal territory." Although this concession was consistent with the grant of sovereign authority to the Federal Republic, authority to grant permission to fly in the corridors was retained by the allies. Moreover, the need to receive prior approval to overfly Federal territory en route to the corridors was not to apply to the United States, the United Kingdom, and France.

Regime Construction and the Quadripartite Agreement of 1971

One major point of difference between the Soviets and the Western allies, left somewhat ambiguous in the Quadripartite Agreement, is whether Berlin as a whole or just West Berlin is a city under occupation. In the careful diplomatic language of the Quadripartite Agreement, vague references are made to the "relevant area." The only specific references to the city are to the "Western sectors" or to the "American sector." That the four powers, based on postwar rights of occupation, were the parties to the Quadripartite Agreement and affirmed that "wartime and postwar agreements and decisions of the Four Powers" would not be affected by the new accords, underscored the Western view that the entire city (not just the Western sectors) remains under occupation. Moreover, specific reference to "Western sectors" implied the existence of another part of the same city under occupation. Nevertheless, the Soviets have retained the view expressed by Ambassador Abrasimov that "for years there has been Berlin, Capital City of the German Democratic Republic, and a second city, West Berlin, over which the Occupation

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Powers exercise control." Denying specifically the existence since the 1950s of a "Soviet Sector of Berlin," he adds: "Although they adjoin each other, they are two quite distinct and different entities. They are separated not by a 'demarcation line' but by an international frontier, like that between West Berlin and the territory of the GDR." [16]

Paradoxically, the Western allied view of Berlin as a whole city, not two separate cities, was also the view of GDR officials. The original East German view, expressed by Walter Ulbricht, was that Berlin as "the capital city of the German Democratic Republic" is "not subject to Four-Power control." [17] Similarly, the West German view, reflected in the October 1971 statement by West Berlin Governing Mayor Klaus Schuetz, was that "the relevant area mentioned in the Agreement is therefore not restricted to the Western Sectors, it is all Berlin." [18] Indeed, this is the position most consistent with the West German view of Berlin — not the capital of the GDR, but ultimately the future capital of a reunited Germany when occupation rights there are finally terminated. The Soviets reject this line of thinking, denying the legitimacy of West German references to Berlin as a constituent part of the Federal Republic.[19]

These conflicting views were not resolved by the Quadripartite Agreement and remain unresolved. What the agreement accomplished was a formal Soviet recognition of Western allied rights in Berlin. In return, explicit references in the agreement to the German Democratic Republic established the basis for formal recognition of the GDR as a sovereign state and subsequent establishment of diplomatic relations by the Western allies and other countries. Although one view is that West German rights to conduct political activities in Berlin were curtailed (such as use of the Reichstag for parliamentary sessions), at the same time, denial of certain rights was accompanied by Soviet concurrence in the assertion of others. Thus, the four powers collectively agreed that "the Western Sectors of Berlin . . . continue not to be a constituent part of the Federal Republic of Germany and not to be governed by it." They also agreed that "ties between the Western Sectors of Berlin and the Federal Republic will be maintained and developed" — an important concession to the Western allied view.

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[16] Pyotr Abrasimov, *West Berlin: Yesterday and Today* (Dresden: Verlag Zeit im Bild, 1980), pp. 134-35.

[17] Honore M. Catudal, Jr., *The Diplomacy of the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin* (Berlin: Berlin Verlag, 1978), p. 75. Cf. Dennis L. Bark, *Agreement on Berlin: A Study of the 1970-1972 Quadripartite Negotiations* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute and Stanford, Calif.: The Hoover Institution, 1974).

[18] Catudal, *Diplomacy of the Quadripartite Agreement*, p. 244, n. 15.

[19] Abrasimov, *Yesterday and Today*, p. 134. The texts of the Quadripartite Agreement and associated documents may be found in various places to include the appendices of both the Catudal and the Abrasimov books.

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Maintenance of the Berlin Regime

Maintenance of the security regime in Berlin means, in practical terms, the routine exercise and enforcement of established rules derived from agreements and practice with origins in World War II and the immediate postwar years, and formally reaffirmed by the Quadripartite Agreement. Max Weber's discussion of the bureaucratic "routines of administration" instructs even in this very different context.[20] The international security regime associated with Berlin can be understood as "a legal and administrative system, whose functioning can be rationally predicted, at least in principle, by virtue of its fixed general norms." Maintenance of the regime includes (at least from the point of view of the Western allies) "adjudicating and administering according to rationally established law and regulation."

Part and parcel of the October 23, 1954, Convention on Relations Between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany was Annex B that established the charter of an Arbitration Tribunal to handle "disputes" among the four parties. Decisions by the Tribunal, following this charter, are based on majority vote — giving the FRG a voice, but leaving final authority to the three allies voting in concert.

As a practical matter, the Tribunal has fallen into disuse with the passage of time. Differences are normally worked out among the governments short of referring matters formally to the Tribunal for resolution. The "Bonn Group" consists at the highest rank of the three Western ambassadors (formerly High Commissioners in the occupation period) and the West German foreign minister. As a routine, most such business is conducted by lesser ranking diplomats in the three embassies and their counterparts within the West German foreign ministry. Parallel efforts, particularly with respect to Berlin matters, are conducted by the Western allied missions in Berlin and by the French, British, and West German embassies and the State Department in Washington. As in Bonn, the Washington connection can conduct business at the ambassadorial–secretary of state level, but as a routine it is conducted at the lesser ranking or "working" level. This "working" level in Berlin, Bonn, and Washington oversees the procedures and routines associated with maintenance of the security regime in Berlin. They are charged with preserving what has become a well-developed "theology" associated with that city.

Another vestige of occupation is the set of military liaison missions maintained by the "former" occupying powers in both the FRG

[20] See Weber's classic "Parliament and Government in a Reconstructed Germany" in Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, eds., *Economy and Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), Vol. II, App. II, pp. 1393-95.

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and the GDR. Established by agreements signed in 1947 and 1948,[21] each of the four allies has liaison missions attached to the command headquarters of the other. Thus, a Soviet military liaison mission, located in Frankfurt since its establishment, is accredited to the U.S. Army Headquarters in Heidelberg. Similar Soviet missions are attached to French and British headquarters in their "former" zones of occupation. American, French, and British missions are maintained in Potsdam, accredited to the Soviet general staff.

The military liaison missions were originally established for the recovery of war dead and to provide a communications link between heads of occupying forces. Important as these missions still are for maintaining communication, viewed by some as prototypical confidence-building institutions, they are indeed an anomaly, existing as they do within two separate, otherwise sovereign states. Western military liaison officers have right of movement throughout the GDR except in certain specified restricted areas; the same right is accorded their Soviet counterparts in the FRG. With respect to maintaining Berlin access, the right of movement enjoyed by Western allied officers is particularly convenient when problems occur on the highway or railroad connecting Berlin with the FRG. Ill passengers aboard the troop train can be brought to a local hospital under escort of a military liaison officer. "Lost" drivers who, contrary to regulations, have strayed from the autobahn may be pursued by liaison officers beyond the more limited jurisdiction of allied military police officers who do not have authority to move beyond the immediate confines of the highway.

Following the Quadripartite Agreement in 1971, subsequent American recognition of the German Democratic Republic as a sovereign state, and the establishment of diplomatic relations, ambassadors were exchanged and an American embassy was opened in East Berlin. Although its embassy is located physically in East Berlin (as are the British and French embassies), the United States continues to deny the East German claim that Berlin is the capital of the GDR. From the American perspective, the embassy is accredited to the GDR and merely happens to be located in a city still under occupation.

Accordingly, East German authorities sometimes refer to Western embassies in East Berlin matters associated with their presence as part of the allied occupation. In turn, the embassies routinely defer these issues to military authorities or to their national missions in West Berlin that have responsibility for occupation matters. To do otherwise would undermine the Western claim to occupation rights; dealing with such

[21] The legal basis for the U.S. and Soviet Military Liaison Missions is the Huebner-Malinin Agreement signed on April 7, 1947. Similar agreements established British-Soviet and French-Soviet missions.

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matters through an embassy accredited to the GDR would use a channel external to the occupation regime and be supportive of East German claims to authority. The American Mission and its Western allied counterparts, by contrast, are a central part of the occupation regime and remain the proper authorities in the Western view for dealing with occupation matters. Their dealings on such issues are with the Soviets, not the East Germans.

In this regard, the Soviet embassy in East Berlin is the principal point of contact for the Western missions. Occupation "business" — overseeing arrangements between German authorities in eastern and western sections of the city for underground (U-Bahn) and surface (S-Bahn) transit systems as well as handling protests, denials, and other communications — is conducted among the Western allied missions in coordination with West Berlin authorities, and between the Western allies and the Soviet embassy in East Berlin.

Meetings occur periodically between the three Western ambassadors in Bonn (who, as noted above, are chiefs of their national missions in Berlin) and the Soviet ambassador in East Berlin. Former Soviet Ambassador Abrasimov has observed that "the regular and long-established meetings between the Soviet Ambassador to the GDR and the American, British, and French Ambassadors to the Federal Republic" that occur in Berlin are "an important source of cooperation between the Soviet Union and the three Western Powers." [22] Their assistants, as senior ranking resident diplomats in Berlin, typically accompany and advise the Western ambassadors in these discussions.

The three Western allied political advisers (POLADS),[23] as second-ranking resident diplomats, also have occasional meetings with their Soviet counterparts, but contact with the Berlin section of the Soviet embassy is maintained routinely by so-called "protocol officers" within each of the allied missions. The final protocol signed on September 3, 1971, states that each of the four governments "will have the right to draw the attention of the other three Governments to the Quadripartite Agreement and this Protocol and to conduct the requisite quadripartite consultations in order to ensure the observance of the commitments undertaken." [24] Contacts are also maintained for administrative purposes between German officials in East and West Berlin, but any substantive

[22] Abrasimov, *Yesterday and Today*, pp. 130-31.

[23] POLAD in this context is the political adviser to the commandant, a general officer who also serves as Deputy Chief of Mission, the senior resident position within the mission. The senior ranking resident diplomat holds the title Assistant Chief of Mission. As stated in the text, the Chief of Mission is the Ambassador in Bonn.

[24] See the "Final Quadripartite Protocol" as reprinted in Catudal, *Diplomacy of the Quadripartite Agreement*, pp. 290-91.

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arrangements made in these channels are always subject to review by the Western allies (and undoubtedly by the Soviet Union as well).

Regime Maintenance and the BASC

Only two quadripartite "institutions" remain in effect that were originally part of the Allied Kommandatura in Berlin — Spandau Prison with its solitary prisoner Rudolf Hess, and more important, if less celebrated, the Berlin Air Safety Center (BASC). The BASC routinely notifies the Soviets of flights in the air corridors and within the Berlin Circle.[25] American, British, French, and Soviet Air Force commissioned and noncommissioned officers work in shifts, with two from each delegation on duty at all times. Working around a table in a small conference room in the former Prussian Supreme Court building that later housed Allied Control Authority offices, each "ally" occupies its own corner. The Western allies pass file cards to their Soviet counterparts, alerting them to flight plans in the corridors and in the Berlin Circle. For their part, the Soviets raise what have become routine objections to certain types of flights, particularly those over East Berlin. Inked hand stamps stating "Flight not permitted" or "Safety not guaranteed" are then affixed to the cards pertaining to such flights. Just as routinely, the stamps are ignored by the Western allies. Notification has been given, standard objections have been raised, and the flights proceed. Neither side yields anything in principle. Indeed, the Western allies do not view the Soviets as an approving authority, since each ally has coequal status in the joint occupation of Berlin.

From time to time, typically or allegedly due to military exercises, the Soviets have either closed one or more corridors for a brief time or offered such compensatory arrangements as allowing the Western allies 5,000 to 12,500 feet in lieu of the customary 2,500 to 10,000 feet. Although such compensation may appear reasonable, in fact it positions the Soviets as authoritative actor, dictating the terms under which the Western allies may use the corridors. The October 1946 Flight Rules do address the possibility of imposing "airspace restriction," but the "appropriate authority" is left unspecified. Because the Western allies view use of the corridors as their right, they have been somewhat reluctant to take "privileges" offered by the Soviets (flying above 10,000 feet when, indeed, they have never conceded their right in principle to fly above that altitude); particularly when taking such "privileges" could establish de facto the authority of the privilege granter.

[25] The original terms of reference, specifying the authority of the BASC, are contained in the same October 1946 Flight Rules noted earlier. See n. 12 *supra*.

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As a study of the day-to-day processes maintaining the security regime in Berlin quickly reveals, the rules are constantly subjected to test. The Western allies understandably hold a defensive position, wishing to maintain their rights without seeking to expand them. Their principal concern is to avoid gradual erosion in practice of their prerogatives. Key to maintaining these rights is their continual and repeated exercise, whether this amounts to notifications in the BASC and subsequently ignoring Soviet objections, or daily transits across Checkpoint Charlie into East Berlin by military vehicle or on foot. In this regard, respecting coequal Soviet right of access to West Berlin reinforces the Western allies' right.

The hand stamp used in the BASC to register Soviet objections is a perfect example of how conflict over Berlin has been routinized. Neither side yields anything in principle as practice is allowed to proceed. And it is upon this practice that maintenance of Western rights so heavily depends.

With respect to regime maintenance — at least holding to the status quo — the continuing problem in the BASC is to keep differences "technical" and thus subject to resolution by the four "allied" controllers. If nonerosion of the existing regime is the Western political goal, then it is useful to avoid politicizing such disputes. Politicization serves only that party seeking to change the regime rules or restate them to expand its authority or reduce the authority of others.

Challenges to the Regime

The two most significant regime challenges that reached major crisis proportions were the attempted denial by the Soviets of Western access to Berlin in 1948,[26] and the erection of the Berlin wall and associated events in 1961[27] that, if unopposed by the Western allies, could have denied them access to the eastern sector of Berlin or to the entire city.

When faced with closure of access by rail and by autobahn, the Western allies decided in July 1948 "to refrain from sharp escalatory measures and to settle for a long-haul strategy involving an expanded airlift, coupled with diplomatic initiative."[28] They considered, and rejected, use of ground forces. Air Force B-29s were dispatched to the U.K. as an indirect threat, but force was never actually used. In any event, the

[26] An excellent, well-researched treatment of the crisis that focuses on the decisionmaking process is Avi Shlaim, *The United States and the Berlin Blockade, 1948-1949* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).

[27] See the treatment in Jean Edward Smith, *The Defense of Berlin* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1963) and Robert M. Slusser, *The Berlin Crisis of 1961* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973).

[28] Shlaim, *The Berlin Blockade,* p. 283.

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effect was formal reassertion during the blockade of the Western allied right of access by air and Soviet de facto acknowledgement, following their decision to lift the blockade in May 1949, of similar rights of Western ground access.

The Western allies' success in the airlift set a precedent that would make such a response seem likely should the Soviets try to deny access in the future. Having been willing and able to assure access by air in 1948, the Western allies legitimized such a response.

When the wall was erected in August 1961, sealing off the Western sectors from East Berlin and all of East Germany, President Kennedy ordered a 1,500-man battle group to proceed to Berlin from West Germany, thus exercising access rights via the Helmstedt-Berlin autobahn. That Soviet or East German authorities made no effort to obstruct the movement suggested that their aims were limited to sealing the city while allowing Western access to proceed as usual.[29] Although a matter of controversy within the Kennedy administration and among the Western allies, General Lucius Clay, the President's personal representative, directed shows of force in response to Soviet and East German provocations — demonstrations that included sending military police patrols along the autobahn and M-48 tanks to Checkpoint Charlie to assure maintenance of access rights. No military action was taken, however, to respond to Soviet harassment of Western allied flights in the air corridors that began in February 1962. As one writer comments: "The Soviets began to fly their own planes in the air corridors, to buzz commercial airliners, to threaten training flights at the same times and altitudes as Western flights, and to drop radar-jamming metal chaff."[30] The Soviets would finally cease such activity in late March after numerous diplomatic protests.

Although following the 1971 Quadripartite Agreement a delicate balance of interests in Berlin led all sides to agree to maintain the status quo, the Western parties remain on the defensive. Rather than pushing for an expansion of their rights, perhaps jeopardizing their existing positions, they are content with the way things are. Institutional development is static as their groups in capitals (Bonn and Washington in particular) and their missions in West Berlin seek to avoid erosion of the existing regime. Challenges to the regime, even temporary denial or delay in granting access, are serious matters because of their potential to become new routines and thus accepted practice.

Regime change in Berlin is incremental. Armed conflict is avoided by allowing certain practices while not yielding strongly held

[29] Slusser, *The Berlin Crisis of 1961*, p. 137.
[30] Smith, *The Defense of Berlin*, p. 330.

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principles. On the other hand, the Western parties are acutely aware that practice over time, if unchecked, can lead to an erosion of existing rights and the security of the city itself.

Berlin, then, has become a model of relatively successful conflict management. The arrangements in Berlin exhibit the dimensions of authority and power — of claimed right and the threat of force — that are at the core of international politics. Nevertheless, the stability and endurance of the international security regime in Berlin depends even more fundamentally on the quality of relations between East and West, not just between the superpowers or among the four great powers and former allies, but also between East and West Germans. The main lines of the once controversial *Ostpolitik* now enjoy substantial support from members of the major West German political parties. Expanding commercial and cultural ties between the two Germanies effectively raise the cost to both parties of their disruption. None of this is a guarantee of peace or the survival of the existing regime, but it does represent some degree of insurance against its demise.

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ANTI-AMERICANISM IN THE THIRD WORLD*

by Alvin Z. Rubinstein and Donald B. Smith

When word came of the takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Teheran in November 1979, there was elation in the *souks* of the Persian Gulf: "The United States has been done in the eye," was a commonly repeated phrase. In Islamabad that same month, merely the rumor of American complicity in the attack by religious zealots on the Great Mosque in Mecca sparked an eruption of violence and destruction against U.S. personnel and property. These incidents are illustrative of a growing antipathy in the Third World toward the United States and of a readiness to believe the worst about America.

Anti-Americanism is easy to identify but difficult to define, ranging from suspicion and resentment to disdain and hostility toward the government, policy, culture, and society of the United States. The sentiment is widespread and persistent in many parts of Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. Important segments of the educated classes of Third World societies perceive U.S. objectives and actions as consistently misguided or malevolent.

In its moderate form the image of America is that of the not too intelligent Clumsy Giant who runs around the world stamping out brush fires regardless of the turf on which they break out. The more sinister image is that of the Octopus, whose tentacles — the military, the CIA, the banks, the multinational corporations — encircle the globe.

Anti-Americanism is a new phenomenon, differing markedly from the anti-British, anti-French, or anti-Dutch sentiments that surfaced in the heyday of British, French, and Dutch imperial rule. And despite a spreading Soviet presence in the Third World, there is nothing comparable to be found in mass or elite attitudes toward the Soviet Union. Anti-Americanism is *sui generis*.

* A longer version of this essay will appear in the volume edited by the authors, *Anti-Americanism in the Third World: Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy* (forthcoming from Praeger).

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Throughout the Third World, Soviet and local communist propaganda together can account for but a modest part of the phenomenon. A more important factor in a number of countries is the influence of Marxism on the thinking of political and intellectual elites over the past fifty years, but this explanation also is incomplete. In some cases anti-Americanism is associated with pro-Soviet attitudes but in other cases not; Islamic fundamentalists in Iran need no inspiration from Moscow to vent their wrath on "the Great Satan."

Areas of Disagreement

Anti-Americanism is a post-World War II and postcolonial phenomenon that took root among elites whose policies and perceptions of regional and international issues differed from those of Washington. Although critical of colonialism and generally sympathetic with the desire of colonial peoples for independence, the United States did not play much of a direct role in the decolonization process. There is no denying the ambivalence of the U.S. position in this unfolding situation. The United States stayed on the sidelines, constrained by the demands of alliance cohesion and compelled to mute its criticisms of the British, French, Dutch, and Portuguese empires, which were already in an advanced stage of dissolution; but it kept to a minimum the diversions of American military and economic assistance for the maintenance of the status quo in the Third World.

United States (and Soviet) ideological opposition to colonialism meant that the national liberation forces had to cope only with second echelon powers and that they could campaign freely for support in international forums. Because the United States was content to play the part of observer and referee while the opposing teams settled the score, decolonization was in a large measure peaceful. (Algeria and Vietnam were notable exceptions.) Yet by the time decolonization was over the United States found itself the target of considerable suspicion and animosity among Third World countries. The reasons vary from country to country and from region to region and, as we shall see, are often difficult to isolate, but four major areas of disagreement surface repeatedly in the criticisms voiced by Third World spokesmen.

We discuss these areas of disagreement primarily from the viewpoint of Third World critics of the United States. There is no systematic effort made to refute their charges, since our purpose is to understand the grievances that give rise to anti-Americanism.

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U.S. Global Policy

The United States is perceived as being obsessed with the threat of communism. Although some would trace the cold war primarily to this obsession, perhaps a more typical Third World opinion would hold the two superpowers equally responsible. There would be wide agreement that the anti-Soviet rhetoric of American politicians has frequently been harsh and provocative, as in President Reagan's denunciations of the Soviet Union as "an evil empire."

Neither superpower has demonstrated much willingness to take risks in order to achieve peace, but each is willing to risk nuclear war in the struggle for advantage over the other. Nuclear arms control negotiations drag on year after year, the Third World believes, because neither superpower is willing to make changes that might cost it military advantage.

Many Third World leaders see superpower behavior on both sides as basically amoral. Both sides have perpetrated or abetted violent outrages on innocent people: in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan; in Guatemala and Vietnam. To the Third World, morality in the global conflict, if it exists at all, is ambiguous. Both contenders profess high principles and both give highest priority to the retention and expansion of their power.

Initial disenchantment with the United States dates from the mid-1950s, when it was political in character. The Eisenhower administration, keen to extend the containment of the Soviet Union, sponsored a series of military pacts that polarized the Middle East and South Asia and pitted U.S. policy against the national interests of key regional actors. The "pactomania" that brought Iraq and Pakistan into the military orbit of the Western powers triggered a countervailing animosity from Egypt and India respectively, each of which saw U.S. policy as a threat and consequently moved to develop closer relations with the Soviet Union. This, perhaps more than any other development caused the erosion of the prevailing goodwill toward the United States, paved the way for Soviet penetration, and gave impetus to Third World attempts to dissociate from the East-West conflict, leading to nonalignment.

Anti-American impulses flowed from political differences over how best to foster security. At the core of these differences was a widely divergent conception of what the danger was and how best to counter it: for the United States, it was the Soviet Union; for Egypt and India — the most prominent of the early critics of the United States — it was regional rivals, if only because neither had ever experienced a threat from the Soviet Union. In time, these political differences were to assume

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manifold dimensions, though competing conceptions of national security remained a central consideration.

Nonalignment was and is the essence of the Third World's response to the global power struggle. The communist Tito, the democrat Nehru, and the authoritarian Nasser all played leading roles in the founding of the movement, and ideological pluralism has characterized its entire history. Nonalignment became, in the field of foreign policy, the logical extension of the Third World country's political independence. Following centuries of Western imperialism, nonalignment was an expression of Third World nationalism, an assertion of the right to chart an independent course free of control by the great powers.

U.S. policy was insensitive to the feelings and calculations that produced nonalignment in the 1950s. Seeing the cold war as a global conflict between good and evil, U.S. policymakers admonished the Third World that "neutralism is immoral." Having marked out the proper course through such regional alliances as SEATO and CENTO, the United States could not easily come to terms with nonalignment, while the Soviets by 1955 publicly supported the principle.

John F. Kennedy, in his 1961 message to the twenty-five members of the nonaligned movement assembled at Belgrade, said that the United States shared their commitment to "a world of peace in which nations have the freedom to choose their own political and economic systems and to live their own way of life."[1] But as the membership of the movement grew rapidly in the following two decades, reaching 101 by 1983, it frequently became a forum for criticism of U.S. policies.

Americans tend to see pro-Soviet bias in expressions of anti-Americanism, partly because Third World spokesmen have roundly condemned alleged misdeeds by the United States but reacted to similar Soviet actions with muted criticism at most. Assuming that this generalization about the lack of even-handedness is valid, how do we explain it? Partly it is the continuation of a pre-1945 pattern in which imperialism was Western imperialism (Yankee imperialism in Latin America), while the Soviet Marxist-Leninist tradition was strongly anti-imperialist. Overwhelmingly, the Third World's direct experience with imperialism was at the hands of the West.

Paradoxically, it is also true that Third World spokesmen feel freer to criticize those whom they know better. Harsh criticism of government is part of the Western tradition in which Third World elites have been socialized. In a curious way the vehemence of Third World rhetoric reflects membership in the same extended family, and the West is expected to "understand." No such historic ties link Soviet and Third World

[1] Quoted in a letter from Ronald Reagan to Indira Gandhi, *India News,* March 7, 1983.

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peoples; the Soviets must be treated more circumspectly, more cautiously, because they too have vast power but are less well known. This lack of even-handedness has often led U.S. officials to dismiss Third World complaints as biased and therefore unjustified.

U.S. Policy Toward the Third World

The most fundamental perception, and complaint, is that U.S. policy relegates all Third World countries to the status of pawns in the global struggle. All bilateral relationships are subordinated to calculations of utility in the cold war or peaceful competition with the Soviets. The Americans profess commitment to peace, economic development, human rights, and democracy in the Third World, but any of these values may be jettisoned without hesitation or compunction if U.S. military or strategic interests are at risk.

Since most Third World countries are not now within the Soviet orbit, the United States is pre-eminently a status quo power. That is, the United States finds the present distribution of power and wealth in the world relatively satisfactory and will resist radical changes initiated by others. A Third World society is important to U.S. policymakers primarily because it might go communist. American policy has therefore been designed (1) to secure the allegiance of as many countries as possible to U.S.-sponsored military alliances, (2) to secure and maintain U.S. military bases in strategic locations, (3) to promote the economic development of U.S.-aligned or nonaligned countries in which American aid can become a significant factor in limiting Soviet influence, (4) to prevent the overthrow of pro-American governments, whatever their internal character, and (5) to overthrow leftist governments supported by or sympathetic to the Soviet Union.

Taken together, according to Third World critics, these are the elements of U.S. imperial policy. The effort to clothe these objectives in the rhetoric of peace, economic development, human rights, and democracy is an exercise in hypocrisy. When the regional military alliances that were forged in the mid-1950s withered away, the United States continued the basic relationship on a bilateral basis in a number of cases. A brutal military regime in Pakistan was supported in the 1971 Bangladesh crisis because it was a traditional anti-Soviet ally facing an internal upheaval. U.S. identification with the Shah of Iran was almost complete despite his lack of concern for democracy or human rights until a few months before he was overthrown by the Islamic revolution. Somoza in Nicaragua, Marcos in the Philippines, Pinochet in Chile, and others were all quite acceptable leaders because they did not disturb U.S. interests.

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In the basic grievance we are delineating, the United States seeks the political domination of the Third World, not in the old-fashioned form of colonialism but in a flexible policy of expanding and contracting interventionism that sets clear limits on the freedom, internal and external, of supposedly sovereign states. On the whole, Third World observers see a great degree of continuity in U.S. foreign policy objectives over the past thirty-five years, regardless of who has occupied the White House. If in 1953 the CIA was engaged in overthrowing the nationalist Mossadeq government and restoring the Shah to power in Iran, in 1973 it was busy destabilizing the Marxist Allende regime in Chile in preparation for a rightist military coup. If in 1954 the reformist Arbenz had to be overthrown to protect the United Fruit Company's interests in Guatemala, in 1961 the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion was launched against Castro's Cuba, and in 1983 the CIA was openly engaged in "covert" operations to overthrow the revolutionary Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. For good measure, in 1983 the U.S. Marines invaded Grenada to remove a Marxist military regime with strong Soviet and Cuban connections.

Third World elites have available to them vastly more information on the CIA than on the KGB. Most of this information comes to them from the United States and other Western countries in a steady stream of liberal and leftist criticism of the CIA. Freedom of the press guarantees the publication and dissemination of this criticism, and debates in the House and Senate on appropriations for CIA covert activities are freely reported. Somewhat paradoxically, the democratic and open politics of the U.S. system operates in this way to stimulate and promote the growth of anti-American sentiment in the Third World. Whatever the allegations of ruthless KGB actions, they are never confirmed by Russian sources.

While most of the U.S. interventions, overt or covert, were of brief duration, the war in Vietnam was different, and perhaps more than any other major event contributed to anti-Americanism in the Third World. The war demonstrated the extraordinary lengths to which the United States was prepared to go to keep a noncommunist government in power in the south, and the enormous losses in human life over the years convinced many that the U.S. obsession with communism had become more destructive than whatever it sought to prevent. That these were mostly Asian lives lost in Vietnam and Cambodia, and mostly civilians, heightened the sense that moral justification for the war was lacking. The fact that successive administrations argued that vital U.S. interests were involved was seen by the Third World as an imperial assertion of a right to intervene anywhere.

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The unwavering U.S. commitment to Israel since 1948 has affected relations with so many countries that it must be touched on separately. Although policymakers have frequently asserted that Israel is a "strategic asset" to the United States, cold-war calculations have never been the primary consideration, unlike most U.S. policies in the Third World. Support for Israel has been based on memories of the Holocaust and the considerable political clout of the American Jewish community. A policy strictly calculated to minimize Soviet influence in the Middle East during the past three decades would have favored the Arabs over the Israelis.

In any case, U.S. support for Israel has long been the most obvious cause of anti-Americanism in the region. The Arabs condemn Zionism as a racist and imperialist ideology which, in its implementation by the state of Israel, has robbed the Palestinians of their homeland, national identity, and human rights. Since the 1967 war the bitter debate has centered on the fate of the Arabs in the West Bank and Gaza. The 1979 peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, though a remarkable diplomatic achievement, left the latter issue unresolved.

Egypt's turnabout in international alignment under Sadat, from a model Soviet client to a model U.S. client, signaled a corresponding decline in expressions of anti-Americanism. The contingent nature of the phenomenon seemed clear: anti-Americanism was freely expressed when it reflected the authoritarian government's international orientation and when specific grievances against the United States gave it point; anti-Americanism receded as these two circumstances changed.

American Economic Activity in the Third World

Third World grievances over the operations of American capitalism vary greatly in intensity from one region to another, ranging from Latin America and the Caribbean, where investments have long been sizable, to South Asia, where they have been relatively small. A large and economically diverse country like India could afford to adjust its trade and investment policies with a declining United Kingdom after independence while keeping the Americans at arm's length. Small countries with a single major export, and thus highly dependent on the world market, found their situation to be very difficult.

In Latin America the economic penetration of weak societies began in the nineteenth century and produced an image of Yankee capitalism that has persisted into the era of the modern multinational corporation. At the turn of the century, the United Fruit Company owned land in Costa Rica, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, Colombia, Santo

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Domingo, Cuba and Jamaica; operated a large fleet of steamships, and held title to the Guatemalan Railroad Company. Nicknamed El Pulpo (the Octopus), the company had no difficulty in extracting favorable treatment from successive Guatemalan governments until Arbenz's enactment of an agrarian reform law in 1952, which set the stage for the CIA-engineered coup that overthrew him.[2]

Seventy percent of U.S. overseas investment is now in the developed world where there are no coups, and political stability can be counted on. Third World critics see U.S.-based multinationals as continuing to exploit their countries' resources and populations, perpetuating a political and economic dependency that benefits only a denationalized elite. These critics dismiss claims that the multinationals are beneficial to the host country in terms of capital and technology transfer, managerial training, employment, and genuine development, and they see any benefits as marginal and incidental to the corporations' basic objectives. They discount the ability of host governments to bargain effectively, even with the weapon of nationalization in the background. The penetration of the economy by a group of powerful multinationals simply means that the government is no longer in control.[3]

The United States, in this view, has consistently sought to combine its political and economic power to ensure hegemony and the subjugation of the Third World. U.S. foreign policy serves the interests of big corporations; the corporations abroad are agents of the U.S. government in its quest for political domination. Such views are commonplace among Latin American intellectuals and are by no means confined to Marxists.

Two American companies, Kennecott and Anaconda, have operated copper mines in Chile since early in this century. In 1969 Anaconda's return on U.S. investments was 39.5 percent and Kennecott's was 24.1 percent. In the 1960s, there was a rapid expansion of U.S. multinationals into Chile, as there was in Brazil, Argentina and Mexico. U.S. investment doubled during the decade, but profits, part reinvested and part repatriated, rose sevenfold. Twenty-four of the top thirty U.S. multinationals (Standard Oil, Ford, IBM, ITT, General Electric, etc.) were operating in Chile by 1970.[4] These facts constitute part of the economic profile of Chile in the year the Marxist Salvador Allende won a plurality in a free election and became president.

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[2] See Richard H. Immerman, *The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982).

[3] On this, and many other points discussed in this paper, see Richard E. Feinberg, *The Intemperate Zone: The Third World Challenge to U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1983).

[4] Dale L. Johnson, ed., *The Chilean Road to Socialism* (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1973), p. 13.

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Whatever the economic effects of the American multinational corporations in Third World countries, their operations are highly visible, and this fact has a strong bearing on the articulation of anti-Americanism. In the 1970s Iran's oil bonanza, combined with the Shah's megalomania, brought swarms of American and other Western businessmen to Teheran. Bell Helicopter and other companies set up huge installations with thousands of employees, and American executives with their dependents were soon ensconced in aristocratic villas complete with servants. By 1976 U.S. companies had over $1 billion invested in Iran, and two years later there were 50,000 Americans living there. As the drama of the following two years unfolded, the large and obtrusive American presence was used to discredit the Shah, and the close U.S. ties with him fanned the flames of anti-Americanism.[5]

Why is there no anti-Soviet counterpart to anti-Americanism in the Third World? Partly because the Soviet Union is marginal to the capitalist international economic order with which the Third World must come to terms, like it or not. American companies, on the other hand, crisscross the globe in the search for economic opportunity. Resentments grow with U.S. profits, and high visibility means vulnerability. The emerging conflict is not between North and South, but between West and South, and the United States represents the West.

Perceptions of American Society

Third World images of American society have always been mixed. In the early 1950s these images were formed largely from popular magazines and Hollywood movies; relatively few people from Third World elites had any firsthand experience with America.

The image had many negative aspects. America was a land of economic opportunity, but its prosperity had led to crass materialism and secularism. It was a depersonalized, superficial society without the moral restraints of deeply rooted religion. In particular, sexual immorality was common. The dominant Anglo-Saxon Protestants shared but little power with others, and did so reluctantly with the Catholic and Jewish minorities. White racism was rampant and blacks had no political voice and often no vote. It was a narrow, bigoted society in which Senator Joseph McCarthy could intimidate the highest in the land with charges of communist sympathies.

American society has changed a great deal in the last thirty-five years, and although there has inevitably been a certain time lag, Third

[5] Barry Rubin, *Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 141.

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World images of America have also changed. The election of a Catholic as president in 1960, civil rights advances, the rise of black and Hispanic politicians, Andrew Young's tenure as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, and other developments have decisively changed the old stereotypes of American society.

The dynamism of American society is viewed as a radical threat by Third World elites intent on the preservation of existing values, institutions, practices, and social relationships. In the Muslim world, the resurgence of fundamentalist groups, inspired by Ayatollah Khomeini's Islamic revolution in Iran and virulent attacks on "Satanic" America, drew attention to this dimension of hostility toward the United States. Anti-Americanism is a visceral reaction to the iconoclasm intrinsic to American cultural exports, a recognition that everything American can have socially disruptive and unanticipated consequences. Whether it be rock music, pop art, blue jeans, McDonald's restaurants, television soap operas portraying sex and violence, political activism, the youth drug culture, social permissiveness, or the preoccupation with personal fulfillment, the effect is perceived as threatening to traditional values and authority relationships.

The consumerism of U.S. mass culture is a more dangerous antagonist for groups seeking to ensure the status quo than is communism or the revolutionary message of the Left. But the materialistic aspect of the American dream is only marginally threatening to tradition-bound societies; it is the peculiarly American notion of change for the sake of change that is systemically so profoundly revolutionary in its import. This underlying restlessness is destructive of traditional institutions, and in that sense the United States stands as an exemplar of the world's leading "revolutionary" system.

The United States is driven by a conscious commitment to use technology to produce wealth and a higher living standard for larger numbers of people than ever before in human history. American society is willing to accept the dislocations and disruptions that are an inevitable part of rapid social, economic, and cultural change and is lunging into the future, impelled by forces that are uncontrolled and nonselective.[6] Governments struggling to control their dissatisfied populations whose aspirations exceed productive capacities fear the diffusion of America's consumer-oriented culture and the pressures from below for change that it unleashes.

American affluence also occasions envy, especially among groups who are politically and socially aware. The contrast between their own plight and the superabundance of their American counterparts breeds

[6] The theme of mankind being overwhelmed by forces that have been unwittingly unleashed is explored in the pioneering study by Alvin Toffler, *Future Shock* (New York: Bantam Books, 1970), p. 366.

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ill will toward the person and the society possessing the wealth. Even in an age of universal consumerism, the U.S. wealth that is palpably evident in the Third World often stands out as wasteful and ostentatious. It seems ubiquitous and inexhaustible, whether in the hands of transient tourists or resident technicians, most of whom are oblivious to the offense that their appearance and behavior may give.

Within the United States changes continue to make American society more accessible to the Third World. Changes in immigration law and the admission of refugees have opened the nation to sizable numbers of immigrants from various parts of the Third World. The pluralization of society has proceeded apace. Cubans and other Latin Americans, Koreans, Indians and Pakistanis, Iranians and others from the Middle East, and refugees from Vietnam and Cambodia have added their numbers to the older U.S. groups of Third World origin and have changed the face of America. International students have settled here in large numbers, and many upper and middle class people in the Third World have relatives or friends living here. Many more are anxious to emigrate to the United States (Who wants to emigrate to the Soviet Union?)

As in the past, economic opportunity is the most powerful attraction of American society. The possibilities of upward mobility draw the new immigrants with fresh appeal; there are difficulties and complaints, but little or no disillusionment with the system. Continuing poverty and the plight of an underclass, conditions that are disproportionately present in the black community, are recognized as unpleasant facts of contemporary America but are outweighed by the positive aspects.

Personal and political freedom in a functioning democracy have a strong appeal. Even the failings of American democracy are instructive, as when Third World readers of *Time* magazine sought to grasp how the peccadilloes associated with Watergate could have brought down a president, in contrast with the unchallenged authoritarian power of many of their own governments.

What impresses many in the Third World is the dynamism of American society. If a kind of rootlessness goes with the dynamism, there is freedom for the individual to incorporate as much of the traditional religion and culture as he wishes. Middle class immigrants find a congenial environment in an open society.

A Typology of Anti-Americanism

The manifestations of anti-Americanism vary greatly from one situation to another. In order of their political impact, from the least to the most serious, these manifestations are as follows:

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Attitudes. Individuals and sections of the elite feel resentment, anger, ill will, and hatred toward the government and/or people of the United States. These attitudes can be deeply felt but remain unexpressed.

Verbal expressions. Speeches, writings, and radio and television programs criticize, ridicule, or denounce the U.S. government and people.

Demonstrations. Large groups of people, more or less organized, assemble publicly to denounce the United States through marches, speeches, and the shouting of slogans.

Violence. Violent mob attacks on U.S. embassies, consulates, and U.S.I.A. libraries and the taking of U.S. government personnel as hostages may be carried out in front of television cameras. More typically, terrorist forms of violence, such as the bombing of embassy buildings or assassination of U.S. officials, are carried out clandestinely with the anti-American message conveyed by the deed.

Any of these manifestations may be associated with the types of anti-Americanism analyzed below. Our typology attempts to make some sense of the bewildering array of beliefs, situations, and events that taken together have been labeled "anti-Americanism." We identify four basic types of the phenomenon; a critical distinction must be made concerning the major actor or actors involved in each: government, elites, and masses.

Issue-oriented Anti-Americanism

Issue-oriented anti-Americanism is an outburst of hostility, or a pattern of such outbursts, against specific policies or actions of the U.S. government with which a Third World government disagrees. Nongovernmental elites generally play a significant but secondary role in supporting their government's policies and in articulating opposition to the United States. Issue-oriented anti-Americanism springs from the policy disagreements of two governments pursuing their respective national interest; it is not generated by elite attitudes nor is it instigated by the Third World government for ulterior purposes.

Much of what is regarded as anti-Americanism in the Third World is of this type. The United States has frequently found itself in policy conflicts with India during the past thirty-seven years — conflict over U.S. military aid to Pakistan, over India's nonalignment policy, over India's annexation of Goa, over U.S. support for Pakistan in the Bangladesh crisis, over the U.S. military base in Diego Garcia, and over India's reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. On some of these issues, the denunciations of American policy in the Indian press and in official state-

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ments were strongly worded. However, while these denunciations were regarded in Washington as expressions of anti-Americanism, from New Delhi's point of view the U.S. policies and actions were *anti-Indian*. It could be argued that the Indian interpretation was more plausible, since the U.S. policies in dispute directly impinged on Indian interests in South Asia. There have been differences of opinion but no serious tensions in Indo-American relations over U.S. policies in Western Europe or Latin America.

Thus, there is a conceptual problem embedded in our category of issue-oriented anti-Americanism, which is always but one side of the coin in a bilateral relationship. One can speak of anti-Americanism as a general phenomenon, as contrasted with "anti-Indianism," simply because the United States since the early years of the cold war has defined its national interest in global terms and its policies have impinged on virtually every Third World country, making for a very weighty aggregate of policy grievances and conflicts.

Anti-Americanism is also fueled by Washington's frequently heavy-handed approach to specific and important issues and by the alacrity with which it uses pressure rather than conciliation to bring about preferred outcomes, in the process manifesting an insensitivity that worsens existing relationships. In the late 1960s, for example, waves of criticism swept through Peru in reaction to U.S. threats to cut off economic assistance because Peru had bought sixteen supersonic Mirage fighters from France and was seizing American fishing boats within the 200-mile zone that was claimed as territorial waters (at a time when the United States considered sovereignty to extend only twelve miles offshore).[7]

U.S. hostility toward Cuba and attempts to isolate Cuba in the hemisphere have often resulted in sympathy for Havana, even among those antipathetical to Castro's policies. Typical of Latin American reaction was the view expressed by the Mexican writer and diplomat, Carlos Fuentes, who has not been to Cuba since 1962 because of political disagreements with Castro: "The day the United States stops attacking Cuba, it will no longer be possible for Cuba to mobilize intellectual opinion in the region. All Latin Americans have felt they must keep silent so as not to help imperialism."[8]

More recently, U.S. efforts to destabilize the Sandinista regime have caused waves of criticism, in large measure from deep-rooted opposition to U.S. interference in the internal affairs of countries in the region. Such specific issues — be they arms purchases, assertions of sov-

[7] *The New York Times*, August 18, 1968.

[8] Quoted in Alan Riding, "Revolution and the Intellectual in Latin America," *The New York Times Magazine*, March 13, 1983, p. 35.

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ereignty on matters such as territorial waters, or the handling of Cuba or Nicaragua — prompt anti-American outbursts that cut across the political, social, or class spectrum.

As noted earlier, Third World officials believe the United States is obsessed with the Soviet Union and world communism and is interested in Third World nations primarily as pawns or proxies in the ongoing global superpower struggle. As these officials see the situation, aid will be forthcoming if they play such roles. Otherwise, they will face neglect. They tend therefore to regard U.S. grants of aid that promote economic and social development as payoffs for political cooperation rather than as expressions of empathy for their problems and aspirations.

This view concerning U.S. motives comes at a time when Third World leaders feel capable of assuming greater responsibility for regional security and cooperative development programs. Though well aware of their vulnerabilities and limited power, they nonetheless insist that the sovereign equality of nation-states requires their greater involvement in decisions affecting their future. Above all, they refuse to accept as givens the traditional monopolization by the great powers of decisions affecting regional security. For example, Latin Americans contend that they could play an important conciliatory role in Central America, moderating the Sandinista revolution and bringing the principal protagonists in El Salvador to the conference table. A noncommunist Nicaraguan nationalist told an American journalist, "The best way to twist the arms of the Sandinistas is by economic and diplomatic pressure from Latin Americans. The more the pressure is managed by Latin Americans and neighbors, the more the Sandinistas will accommodate and save face with neighbors."[9]

Ultimately, the argument goes, countries such as Mexico, Venezuela, Panama, and Colombia — the "Contadora" countries — can more successfully find a solution in El Salvador and Nicaragua than can the United States, especially if all that Washington has in mind is a military solution. Carlos Andres Perez, president of Venezuela from 1974 to 1979, laments the "humiliating lack of respect" displayed by the United States toward Latin Americans, epitomized by the failure of the United States to accord prominence to the Contadora group, which he calls a "symbol of the new Latin American consciousness."[10]

Ideological Anti-Americanism

Ideological anti-Americanism is a sustained, rationally argued antagonism toward the government and society of the United States and

[9] *Wall Street Journal,* June 8, 1983.
[10] *The New York Times,* August 14, 1983.

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is an important part of the belief system of certain sections of the Third World elite. Ideological anti-Americanism is based on (1) a view of history in which the past and present role of the United States in the world is seen as politically and economically imperialist, and (2) a view of the value system of American society as "bourgeois decadence" and "godless materialism." Ideological anti-Americanism continues to generate hostility even without serious policy conflicts between the U.S. and the elite's own government; the intellectuals' views are formed on the basis of what is going on everywhere in the world. In its identification of a central villain in world history, ideological anti-Americanism can be compared with Latin American anticlericalism in the past or anticommunism among extreme rightists today.

Three important streams flow into ideological anti-Americanism in the contemporary Third World: nationalism, Marxism, and Islamic fundamentalism. Nationalism is the most universal and easily merges with the other two. Marxism is the most intellectually coherent, but derives much of its political force from its critique of imperialism, a nationalist theme. Islamic fundamentalism is of course limited to the Muslim world, but since this embraces forty-four countries it must be reckoned a major force. What is striking is the similar way in which Fidel Castro and the Ayatollah Khomeini view the role of America in the world today. Concepts of imperialism and neo-imperialism lie at the heart of ideological anti-Americanism.

Latin America's long tradition of anti-Americanism is historically rooted in hostility to U.S. interference in the region, especially in Central America. As far back in the early nineteenth century as the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine, Latin American elites resented the implicit arrogation of hemispheric hegemony. As a consequence of decades of experience, mistrust and fear of the Yanqui colossus are indelibly fixed in their political consciousness. This is reinforced by the use of force by the United States to depose unfriendly regimes and install friendly ones.

Anti-Americanism is strong among Islamic fundamentalist groups, regardless of their government's official relationship with the United States. In virulently anti-American Iran, the official hostility permeates the society. But even in Egypt, where the government of Hosni Mubarak cultivates close ties with the United States, the Muslim Brotherhood and its ancillary supporters are a source of bitter anti-Americanism. They resist American inroads as destabilizing and antithetical to the perpetuation of traditional values and institutions.

Marxist and Marxist-oriented elites see U.S. capitalism at the center of the system they seek to change. What unifies their diverse

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radical and revolutionary impulses is alienation from the existing international economic system whose prime defender is the United States and their belief that the United States is the main obstacle to systemic change.

Marxism's appeal to the communist and noncommunist Left alike inheres in its potential for providing a critique of capitalism and imperialism, an adaptable model for viewing socio-economic phenomena, a formula (in its Leninist variant) for acquiring power, and a visionary world outlook. Its adherents use Marx's analytical categories and dialectical approach with varying degrees of sophistication to attack the contemporary international economic system, and especially the pre-eminent role played by the United States. Many theorists of development and social systems, such as the *dependencia* school established by Raul Prebisch and others, draw heavily on Marxist and neo-Marxist formulations.

In Latin America, a vaguely Marxist outlook pervades the field of literary activity. Among many distinguished authors, "Marxism, either confused or clear, vague or firm, as a mere pretext for desperate protest or as a serious interpretive effort, as the superficial stridency of youth or as the radical belief of maturity, has contributed a fundamental trait to the ideological physiognomy of Latin America."[11]

If ideas are catalysts of change, intellectuals are the agents by which they are spread and popularized. These intellectuals exercise an influence disproportionate to their power; even in the highly restrictive political environments in the Third World, their voices are heard, especially if regimes can manipulate them for their own ends. According to one longtime American observer of the Latin American scene, it is the intellectuals "who provide respectability to governments in power and legitimacy to revolts and revolutionary movements, they who articulate the ideas and contribute the images through which Latin Americans relate to power, they who satisfy the decidedly Latin need for a romantic and idealistic raison d'être."[12]

Intellectuals of the Left tend to be anti-American partly because they can neither forget nor forgive the success of the American experiment. To the reality of U.S. affluence and power, they can only posit a romantic vision of a bright and indeterminate future. They know that notwithstanding its troubles, inequities, and social tensions, the United States remains a bulwark of stability, evolutionary change, and widely distributed wealth at a time when most Third World countries find themselves in a perilous condition of worsening perplexity.

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[11] Luis E. Aguilar, *Marxism in Latin America* (New York: Knopf, 1968), p. 59.
[12] Riding, "Revolution and the Intellectual," p. 30.

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Instrumental Anti-Americanism

Instrumental anti-Americanism is the instigation and/or manipulation of hostility toward the United States by governments with ulterior motives (1) to elicit mass support by playing on nationalism, (2) to neutralize domestic opposition on the left, (3) to provide a plausible scapegoat for governmental failures, or (4) to justify and strengthen a desired alignment as a client of the Soviet Union.

The typical setting for this type of anti-Americanism is that of an authoritarian regime that controls all the important means of communication. Although the formal institutional means for broad political participation are very limited (sometimes an official party) or nonexistent, the government actively seeks the support of the urban masses (while often ignoring the peasantry).

In such a context anti-Americanism becomes a useful instrument for mobilizing popular support and deflecting frustration away from the leadership toward a foreign, omnipresent, and supposedly omnipotent protagonist. It is convenient, easily generated, and relatively cost-free. As a political instrument for manipulating and mobilizing domestic public opinion, anti-Americanism has been a godsend to Third World regimes. They can exploit it with virtual impunity. As independent actors, they can turn to the Soviet Union or some other source for the wherewithal needed to stay in power. Indeed, a strong dose of anti-Americanism may facilitate the transfer of coveted resources, be they arms, concessionary oil, or long-term loans for development and trade. In the contemporary international system, few Third World countries fear U.S. intervention. For the most part they understand and exploit the systemic tolerance that permits small countries a hitherto unknown flexibility in challenging the great powers.

The use of a scapegoat to deflect criticism from the leadership and mobilize the people against "the enemy" — whoever that may be — is a time-tested technique or rule, whose effectiveness has been enhanced since the advent of mass media. The United States is an inviting target because of mutually reinforcing perceptions of it as an ever-intriguing, intrusive superpower and because it is not apt to respond in kind.

In the absence of institutionalized procedures for permitting criticism of official policy, authoritarian rulers cannot acknowledge having made mistakes without jeopardizing the basis of their rule. Pointing to some outside actor as the source of the trouble can serve to foster cohesion at home. Nasser blamed the United States for Egypt's crushing military defeat in June 1967 and broke diplomatic ties with the United States (as did most Arab governments). In the process, he elicited an emotional

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outpouring of public support and sympathy in the Arab world, which deflected attention away from his responsibility for the debacle. Fidel Castro has in the United States a natural culprit on which to heap all the blame for the ills and unrest of Central America.[13]

A scapegoat satisfies the need for explanations that are simple, satisfying, and believable. How much simpler to blame U.S. assistance to Israel for that nation's defeat of three combined Arab armies, rather than face up to the inadequacies and mistakes of the key Arab leaderships. How much more comforting for critics of the United States to attribute the toppling of Salvador Allende to CIA intrigues, rather than to acknowledge the bitter hostility that his policies had aroused on the Chilean political scene.

Blaming an outside force for internal unrest and failure to achieve greater domestic progress is common practice. In early 1982, the Sudan's vice president, Abdel-Magid Hamid Khalif, accused "foreign conspiracies," an allusion to Libya, of fomenting the riots against price increases.[14] After a series of massacres in the state of Assam in early 1983, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi said that "the agitators may have been getting encouragement from outside," and when asked specifically if the CIA was involved she replied that the situation "is much more complicated, there are many such elements." In this way she left a lingering implication of CIA intrigue — a theme frequently discussed in the Indian press.[15] Railing against "U.S. imperialism" may not enable the leadership of a nation to correct shortcomings in the system, but it is a way of rationalizing failures in order to ensure perpetuation of a ruler's power.

Instrumental anti-Americanism also includes government-managed hostility for the purpose of justifying and strengthening a client state's relationship with the Soviet Union. It is a function of pro-Soviet regimes to be critical of U.S. "imperialism." However, being critical of U.S. policy, even identifying the United States as the enemy, does not always signify that anti-Americanism is endemic in a society. It is important to distinguish between official policy and nonofficial attitudes and behavior.

At a time when the Egyptian government did not have diplomatic relations with the United States and was bitterly critical of U.S. support for Israel, Egyptians liked Americans personally, despite the strains in relations between the two governments and the anti-American biases in the Egyptian press. By contrast, they did not like the Russians even though the USSR had been generous with vital assistance, including the

[13] *The New York Times,* December 13, 1982.
[14] *The New York Times,* January 9, 1982.
[15] *The New York Times,* February 26, 1983.

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dispatch of combat troops in the spring of 1970, during an extremely difficult period in the country's history. The Egyptian example is, admittedly, not a typical one in the Third World, but neither is it unique.

The existence of significant differences between official pronouncements and popular attitudes suggests that an official policy of anti-Americanism may be instrumental and not at all an expression of permanent hostility, and that there exists a potential receptivity to closer ties with the United States. This should act as a reminder not to mistake a particular regime's attitude for the country's underlying national interest; a regime's attitude may undergo sharp reversals as a consequence of a leadership change that can bring the country onto a course closer to that of the United States. Egypt, after the October War, and Somalia, in the fall of 1977, are two examples of countries whose pro-Soviet orientation was abruptly reversed as a result of a change in their leaders' perception of how to achieve key national goals and of the importance of better relations with the United States. Indeed, a basic characteristic of instrumental anti-Americanism is its reversibility on short notice.

Revolutionary Anti-Americanism

Revolutionary anti-Americanism starts with the ideological anti-Americanism of an opposition group seeking to overthrow a regime closely identified with the United States. Attacking the regime thus involves attacking the United States, which is seen as responsible for keeping the regime in power and hence for its misdeeds. After the overthrow of a pro-U.S. government, ideological anti-Americanism becomes an important tenet of the revolutionary regime itself, which sees part of its mission as transmitting the revolution to other countries. In the process, revolutionary anti-Americanism, unlike the three types discussed above, becomes a mass phenomenon. The new regime will find it useful on occasion to manipulate anti-U.S. sentiment, as in the instrumental type, but the revolutionary process has pushed anti-Americanism to the center of both the regime's ideology and mass consciousness.

Both the Iranian revolution and the Nicaraguan revolution clearly exhibit this type of anti-Americanism. The U.S. government's support for authoritarian rulers (the Shah, the Somoza dynasty) paved the way for the anti-American orientation of the popular forces that overthrew these rulers and replaced them with revolutionary regimes.

For most Americans the most puzzling aspect of the Iranian revolution was how the United States came to be blamed for virtually everything objectionable in the Shah's Iran. As Beeman notes, "The vituperative, accusatory rhetoric seemed to be aimed at indicting all Amer-

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ican leaders since World War II for unacceptable interference in Iranian internal affairs, and destruction of the Iranian culture and economy.[16] The Americans working in Iran, 50,000 of them by 1978, thought that they were simply doing a job under difficult circumstances for high wages, but the Islamic militants saw not only economic exploitation but a veritable invasion of foreign influences that were destroying the spiritual orientation of Iranian society. "Thus a highly complex but very basic issue became concretized in the complex symbolic image of the Great Satan: the loss of the nation's spiritual core and the assignment of blame for the occurrence to the United States."[17] For the Ayatollah Khomeini, the Islamic Republic was the great achievement of the revolution, but the Great Satan continued to be its deadliest enemy long after the demise of the Shah. The Great Satan had to be fought continuously, in Iraq, in the Gulf states, in Lebanon, and so the holy war continues.

Summary

Table I
Typology of Anti-Americanism

Type	*Government*	*Elites*	*Masses*
Issue-oriented	**X**	*x*	
Ideological	*x*	**X**	
Instrumental	**X**	*x*	*x*
Revolutionary	**X**	**X**	**X**

NOTE: **X** = major actor
x = secondary factor

By definition, government is the major actor in issue-oriented anti-Americanism; hostility is generated by policy conflicts between two governments, and the role of nongovernmental elites is secondary. In ideological anti-Americanism the reverse is true — the intellectual elite articulates a belief system that influences government. In instrumental anti-Americanism the government manipulates hostility among elites and masses for ulterior purposes. Revolutionary anti-Americanism incorporates the ideological type in a process that mobilizes elites and masses and leads to a regime that enshrines the revolutionary ideology of which anti-Americanism is an important part.

[16] William O. Beeman, "Images of the Great Satan: Representation of the United States in the Iranian Revolution," in Nikki R. Keddie, ed., *Religion and Politics in Iran* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), p. 191.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 192.

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Conclusion

Anti-Americanism was an inevitable consequence of Third World disenchantment with the United States. The idealized conception of an America exemplified by Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln, and Woodrow Wilson was rudely dispelled by the actions of U.S. administrations that became intimately enmeshed in international politics and in the process and on various occasions supported colonialism, apartheid, and dictatorships, sounding the alarm over communism when throughout the Third World the clarion call was for change.

In the early 1960s, C. L. Sulzberger discerned the cause for the spread of anti-Americanism in the contrast between what America professed and what it did. Sulzberger observed, "The image of the United States has become both tarnished and obscured by platitudes. The idealism we assume everyone acknowledges as the foundation of our policy has been diminished by time." And this tarnish becomes increasingly evident as the United States lectures Third World countries from "a pedestal of fake morality," revealing a discrepancy between the benefits U.S. leaders say they wish to bestow on the world and the inequities in American society. This has left an imprint on foreign minds, and as a consequence U.S. wealth and power seem not to be directed toward improving the lot of impoverished societies abroad.[18]

The question often heard in Third World countries is: "Why has the United States lost interest in us?" Perceiving a diminished American interest in helping them tackle the myriad problems facing their societies, governments will be less hesitant to sanction unfriendly acts and to attack the United States as a way of enhancing their domestic popularity.

Few Third World regimes still find much of interest or relevance in the Soviet Union's developmental model. Whatever expectations there may have been about it in the 1950s and 1960s have largely dissipated through observation and frustrating experience. Moscow's appeal now is only as a patron-protector against external threats or as a specialist in curbing internal opponents and controlling the masses; in a word, for system-maintenance.

Contemporary anti-Americanism does not state the Third World's final conclusion, but one side of a profound ambivalence felt toward this country. In a preceding section we examined Third World perceptions of U.S. global policy, of U.S. policy toward the Third World, of American economic activity in the Third World, and of American society itself. What we have suggested is that the Third World perceives

[18] C. L. Sulzberger, "To Change Their Image of Us," *The New York Times Magazine*, March 5, 1961.

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U.S. foreign policy as frequently irresponsible, belligerent, and imperialist and sees American international economic activity as frequently exploitative. Yet America is viewed as a basically good society. The paradoxical perception of a good society that frequently does bad things in the world captures this fundamental ambivalence.

Third World perceptions of a United States that is indifferent to them and their problems create confusion and dismay. Should these societies come to consider the U.S. experience irrelevant in some profound sense, the result would undoubtedly be further erosion in the long-range prospects for the survival of pluralism and democracy in the world.

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review essay

THE MEANING OF MODERATION*

The Making of America's Soviet Policy. Edited by Joseph S. Nye, Jr. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1984. 369 pp. $27.50.

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Joseph Nye and his co-authors have written a book about moderation in foreign policy — why it is necessary, why it has been so rarely achieved in America's Soviet policy, and how it might be achieved in the future. Their diagnosis of the oscillations "between overemphasis and underemphasis on the threatening nature of Soviet objectives" (p. 2) makes worthwhile reading not only because of what they are saying but because of who is saying it. The contributors to this volume, sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations and two Harvard research centers, might be fairly described as the braintrust of America's out-of-power foreign-policymaking elite.[1] Any attempt by such a group to draw lessons from past failures is inherently noteworthy.

In a word, Nye's diagnosis is that America's pluralistic political system is the source of the troublesome oscillations in policy. The cure that Nye prescribes is a "managed balance of power" strategy, designed to manage not only the Russians but also the American public, the U.S. Congress, and other sources of pluralistic disruption. Though Nye's introduction argues that inconsistent and incoherent foreign policies are the consequence of America's "weak state" being dominated by its "strong society" (pp. 3-4), the substantive essays suggest to his reader that pluralism is at most a secondary villain. The more telling mistakes that

* I would like to thank John Mearsheimer for criticizing an earlier draft of this review, and Stephen Van Evera for a discussion of some of the issues raised in it.

[1] They are Richard Betts, Robert Bowie, I.M. Destler, Alexander George, Marshall Goldman, Stanley Hoffmann, Samuel Huntington, Ernest May, William Schneider, Dimitri Simes, Strobe Talbott, and Raymond Vernon.

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undercut moderation are intellectual errors, not clearly rooted in domestic political constraints, committed by the national security managers themselves.

Also problematic is Nye's conception of a "managed balance of power" strategy, which he believes can serve as a centrist platform for a stable policy consensus, buffering policymaking elites from the turbulence of pluralism. This approach, its spirit echoed by most of the book's contributors, advocates a substantial but sustainable defense effort, selective containment of Soviet expansionism that would keep commitments proportionate to interests, and a modest agenda for U.S.-Soviet negotiations, seeking understandings of limited scope in the areas of arms control and regional security (pp. 343-47). Nye and his co-authors do not claim that such moderate policies will in themselves satisfactorily solve any of the fundamental dilemmas of constraining Soviet power and ambition. Rather, these dilemmas must be perpetually managed by national security experts, moderate in temperament, adept at the employment of carrots and sticks, and skilled in the "balancing of competing objectives in a frustrating and changeable world" (p. 334). These managers must be able to use their skills without undue encumbrances. To achieve this freedom, they must manage the domestic policy environment through such techniques as "special compacts to govern executive-legislative interactions" and by cloaking the elite policy consensus in the mantle of "expertise" (pp. 8-9) — tactics already used by the Scowcroft commission on strategic force modernization.[2] In this scheme, moderate policies are desired in part because they are best for dealing with the Soviet Union but also because they are best for sustaining domestic policy consensus. As Nye puts it, "the basic principle for a durable strategy is to cut the foreign policy coat to fit our domestic political cloth" (p. 354).

Two Conceptions of Moderation

It is not clear, however, that Nye's "managed balance of power" makes for good strategy, good politics, or for true moderation. A skeptic might contend that the "moderation" of his approach consists in splitting the difference between two extremes and then relying on ad hoc problem solving by the managerial elite. Lacking a clear analytical rudder apart from political consensus-building, there is a danger that a policy of splitting differences might produce strategies that will fuel rather than moderate international conflict. For example, in Richard Betts's chapter (as in the Scowcroft commission report), moderation and consensus-

[2] "Cloaking" is my characterization, not theirs.

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building serve as justifications for the counterforce weapons programs needed to manage a "dynamic" nuclear balance (p. 126). This outcome seems immoderate as it undermines the mutual assured destruction relationship, a key moderating element in the international system.

The rudder that Nye and his co-authors need is the insight that moderate policies are possible and desirable only when the international system rewards them. Fortunately, this is the case in our era. Aggressors ultimately get stuck in a quagmire. Local forces of resistance are usually tenacious and alliances form to balance the threat that aggressors pose. Defenders learn to be selective in their commitments, lest quagmires envelop them as well. Those who would achieve damage-limiting first-strike capabilities in the nuclear realm find their goal receding. Likewise, nuclear weapons place a heavy burden of risk on would-be aggressors, who face the "last clear chance" to avoid the possibility of uncontrollable escalation. More mundane factors, like the tactical advantage of the defender in conventional war, also promote moderation by discouraging attacks and allowing defenders to win arms races without outspending their opponents. Exceptions notwithstanding, defense-dominance is the general rule; in the long run, prudent actors tend to respond to this fact in a way that moderates the system.[3]

If all of this were reversed, if the best defense were a good offense, if states tended to enlist with aggressors rather than balance against them, then moderation would be an unwise course. Even Nye's national security managers, despite their defensive goals and moderate temperament, might find themselves applying their fine-tuning skills to the planning of preventive aggression. Thus, the prerequisite for a moderate strategy is an international system, like our present one, that is defense dominant. The primary decision rule for this moderate strategy should be to reinforce the moderating elements which make the system defense-dominant.

My disagreement with Nye and his co-authors in this regard is not a large one. Nye argues, for example, that the natural forces of resistance to Soviet expansion allow the U.S. to engage in what John Lewis Gaddis has called "asymmetrical containment" (p. 346).[4] But still, there is a tendency among the contributors to the volume to equate moderation with dialogue and collaboration with the Soviet Union, even when the resulting agreement undermines the defense dominance of the

[3] This description of the international system draws on Kenneth Waltz, *The Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979); Robert Jervis, *The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); and Barry Posen and Stephen Van Evera, "Defense Policy and the Reagan Administration: Departure from Containment," *International Security,* Summer 1983, pp. 3-45.

[4] John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982).

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system, as in Betts's notion of a managed, dynamic counterforce equilibrium. Even if first-strike advantages are created only in people's minds, this itself is destabilizing and immoderate. Moreover, in the regional security area, Alexander George seems to pass over the underlying stability of the system and focus more on the need for collaborative management of transitory pockets of turmoil like Angola. This is fine, so long as it does not lead to the mistaken impression that such marginal disturbances are crucial to the general peace, that the system itself — and not just these pockets — is unstable, and that the active collaboration of the Soviets is required to maintain the stability of the system, since that is bound to lead to disillusionment and possibly panic.

With an unhelpful partner like the Soviet Union, stability can often be achieved more simply by unilateral means (e.g., deploying survivable forces that do not threaten the opponents' forces), whereas negotiations that legitimize a counterforce competition are cooperative but destabilizing. Even worse, negotiations that ban survivable but hard-to-verify ICBMs would prevent unilateral efforts to enhance stability. A stable containment policy can be based on unilateral guidelines that determine (1) which areas are vital for maintaining the balance of power and which are peripheral, (2) which battlegrounds and means of resistance offer favorable cost-exchange ratios, and (3) which means of resistance unnecessarily threaten the security of the opponent.

Collaboration would be truly moderating, however, if its aims were to agree on structural changes in the international system that would eliminate sources of instability. Some of George's suggestions are of this kind — creating buffer states, for example. This might be considered a structural confidence-building measure reducing the feasibility of effective surprise attack, thus reinforcing and guaranteeing the defense-dominance of the system. As Belgian history shows, however, neutralizing an invasion route so that it remains inadequately defended hardly promotes structural stability. George and his collaborators in the study of crisis prevention have tended not to evaluate the structural changes he recommends in these terms. Neutralization is urged not so much to make offense harder as simply to reduce the frictions that are alleged to come from direct confrontation.[5] This is regrettable, because the success of attempts to develop stable, collaborative security regimes often depends on the existence —or creation — of defensive advantages, which provide the margin of security that takes the gamble out of self-restraint. Robert Axelrod stresses the role of tit-for-tat enforcement tactics in the emergence of spontaneous truces on inactive sectors of the front in World War I, but

[5] See, for example, Paul Gordon Lauren, "Crisis Prevention in Nineteenth-Century Diplomacy," in Alexander George, ed., *Managing U.S. — Soviet Rivalry* (Boulder: Westview, 1983), pp. 37-40.

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the defense-dominance of trench warfare was the underlying factor that made this cooperation possible.[6]

A final difference between the two types of moderate strategy is their long-run acceptability to the public. Nye et al. claim to understand the need for "simpler approaches" (p. 8); and they realize that a moderate "peace and strength" strategy (noninterventionist but with a military posture second-to-none) has a potentially large constituency among the poorly educated "isolationist" segment of public opinion. Still, Nye's commitment to active global involvement, dialogue, and expert managing of nuanced trade-offs risks recreating the moral confusion, public distrust, and disillusionment associated with past policies, especially the Nixon-Kissinger détente, by creating the impression that American security depends on a delicate balancing act and active Soviet collaboration. Betts, at least, realizes this problem, admitting that "if a dilemma must be managed rather than resolved, the trick is to have a policy that is all things to all men . . . a tall order to be filled without an un-American amount of dissimulation" (p. 125). But it is precisely when the national security managers start to "obfuscate" (p. 124) that policy acceptance and continuity are most vulnerable.

A simpler strategy would give the "isolationist" 50 percent of American opinion what they want — preponderant military power for defensive and deterrent purposes, but no direct intervention in faraway conflicts —and tell them that this "peace and strength" strategy will unfailingly create the objective conditions for American security in a way that is not closely dependent on Soviet cooperation or on arcane managerial expertise. The strategy would tell them that the world tends to work in a way that checks aggressors in the long run, and that a prudent, moderate brand of vigilance will make sure that it *does* work that way.

Having explicated and sharpened the differences between these two conceptions of moderation in foreign policy — one stressing ad hoc management and the other stressing underlying structures — I will look next at the diagnosis of American immoderation offered by Nye's co-authors. Finally, I will examine Richard Betts's chapter more closely in order to consider whether this book's prescription is driving its diagnosis, rather than the other way around.

Pluralism and Oscillations of Policy

Following Nye's introduction, three essays discuss the pluralistic forces that the authors see as a hinderance to the pursuit of a

[6] Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic Books, 1984).

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stable, coherent policy. William Schneider outlines the role of public opinion after the Vietnam-provoked breakdown of the cold war consensus and the decline of loyal followership among the educated public. The irony in his story is that about half of the American public can be classified as "noninternationalists" — less-educated persons, not moralistic in their attitude in foreign affairs, who favor policies of "peace" (notably, nonintervention) and "strength" (an American military second-to-none). Although this group should be a natural constituency for moderate two-track policies, the sharp ideological division between liberal and conservative internationalists at the elite level has given the noninternationalist mass no stable, moderate leadership to follow. Rather, this group, increasingly alienated from the Establishment and more aware of international issues because of television news, has allied itself with liberal internationalists when intervention in Vietnam was their current concern and with conservative internationalists when their concern shifted to the apparent decline of American power.

Schneider sees this as a source of instability and extremism in American policy:

> What replaced "followership" is an unstable model of competing coalitions in which the noninternationalist mass public swings left or right unpredictably, in response to its current fears or concerns. Instead of a stable, two-track foreign policy, there is a situation of erratic alternation from one track to the other. (P. 14)

An alternative view might be that mass opinion's oscillations are quite predictable, exerting a corrective, moderating effect when the elite faction in power fails to deliver either on "peace" or on "strength." Without indulging in too much idealization of mass opinion, it seems fair to conclude that elite polarization is the main culprit and that an effective, two-track policy of military might and nonintervention should be able to tap a latent pool of mass support without resorting to overselling or obfuscation.

I.M. Destler identifies some similar problems in his chapter on the role of Congress. He too notes the ideological polarization caused by the Vietnam War, and paralleling Schneider's discussion of the anti-Establishment mood of the public, Destler shows how "democratizing congressional reforms" undercut the ability of congressional leaders to manage the intergovernmental consensus-building process (p. 40). Thus, Congress has enjoyed "heightened policy leverage" but has used it in "idiosyncratic," "unpredictable" ways that hinder the President's ability to use carrots and sticks deftly in implementing a two-track policy (pp. 40-41, 49).

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The congressional monkey-wrench-throwing described by Destler seems to stem from two sources. The first is Congress's tendency to deal with issues ad hoc, according to interest-group pressures and coalition possibilities peculiar to the issue at hand, rather than according to the issue's place in an overarching foreign policy design. Grain sales policy and the infamous Jackson-Vanik amendment were problems of this type. The second, which seems much less "idiosyncratic," is Congress's tendency to exert countervailing pressure when executive branch policy seems to be jeopardizing either the "peace" track (viz., the Clark amendment barring covert action in Angola and pro-arms-control measures under Reagan) or the "strength" track (failure to ratify SALT II). Though these counterbalancing efforts may have been blunt instruments, one could argue that their aim was not to disrupt the implementation of a moderate, two-track policy, but to nudge policy back onto those double rails. Though Destler calls Congress "idiosyncratic" and Schneider calls noninterventionist opinion "unstable," one might argue on the contrary that both have acted crudely but systematically to keep policy balanced and moderate — that is, anti-interventionist but supportive of efforts to redress rather than ratify what was seen as an unfavorable shift in the military balance.

Though Nye and his co-authors may somewhat overstate the capriciousness of the pluralistic forces affecting America's Soviet policy, they argue sensibly that the sound basic instincts of these forces in Congress and among the broader public will serve constructive purposes only if given moderate Presidential leadership. Thus, depending on the kind of executive leadership offered, congressional and public concern about a "window of vulnerability" could manifest itself primarily in a negative way (rejecting SALT II), as support for a "managed balance of power" (by supporting counterforce parity and negotiations designed to codify it), or as support for other "moderate" solutions (support for unilateral programs to reduce the vulnerability of the strategic forces of both sides).

The chapter by Robert Bowie examines the prerequisites for constructive, moderate Presidential leadership. At the risk of oversimplifying the subtle points of his analysis, the main lessons confirm those identified by Schneider and Destler: to avoid oscillations and incoherence in policy caused by pluralistic dissensus, presidents must craft policies that stay within the boundaries established by the "peace and strength" themes. In particular, direct military intervention, the perceived erosion of the military balance, and the disillusionment that follows the unraveling of ill-founded attempts at U.S.-Soviet cooperation are likely to undermine confidence in the main thrust of the president's policy (pp. 85–87).

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In a later section of the book, essays by Ernest May, Stanley Hoffmann, and Samuel Huntington trace chronologically the domestic politics of America's Soviet policy. Though Nye's introduction to this section laments "whether nothing can be done about the tendency of American opinion to oscillate between extremes" (p. 207), the following chapters show that the blame for such a tendency lies mostly with the national security managers rather than the public or the pluralist system. Ernest May claims that insiders tended to mute their fear of the Soviet threat before 1950 and exaggerate it for public consumption afterwards, with obviously counterproductive effects for moderation. He states that "electoral processes, the budget process, and the sheer mechanics of catching the public's attention all *seemed* to require" such manipulation (p. 230, emphasis added), but he does not show that public support for sensible foreign policies really depended on dissembling. Likewise, Hoffmann's essay on the Nixon-Kissinger détente shows that domestic support waned as a result of the policy's fundamental "design flaws," not the fickleness of the public (p. 253). In short, America's national security managers devised flawed policies which often cut against the grain of the public's sensible "peace and strength" instincts, and they portrayed a distorted picture of the threats those policies were meant to contain. It is no surprise, consequently, that oscillations and overreactions occurred.

The Managerial Ethos

What remains to be considered is why moderate national security elites tend to see pluralistic forces as potential sources of disruption rather than as potential allies in a two-track policy of "peace and strength." I would speculate that the reason concerns the difference between the two types of moderation outlined above. Following Schneider's analysis, it would seem that a latent consensus of mass opinion exists only for a quasi-isolationist brand of moderation, shunning direct involvement in international troubles but demanding that the military balance be upheld. Such moderation is quite compatible with a unilateralist moderate strategy, relying on and reinforcing the defensive balance inherent in the international system. It is not at all compatible with an internationalist, micro-managerial, fine-tuning conception of moderation. Since national security elites tend to be moderates of this latter variety, they are probably right to perceive a tension between pluralist inputs and their kind of smooth, consistent execution of moderate management of the internationalist system. Distrusting the underlying stability of the international system, they believe that the U.S.-Soviet competition is quite volatile unless it is managed to extremely close tolerances to avoid the

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equal dangers of competing too aggressively or being too lax. Betts, again, expresses this most clearly:

> Many critics yearn for a static equilibrium, some neat combination of force structures and diplomatic arrangements to anchor stability across the board. But the complexity of the relationship and the endurance of the conflicts of interest mean that dynamic equilibrium is the only feasible hope. (P. 126)

Seeing the problem this way, one can understand the acute need for expert managers buffered from pluralistic forces by a bipartisan elite consensus.

Betts's chapter deserves a closer look because it is the most revealing of the assumptions driving the "managed balance of power" approach: its ethos, tactics, and attitude toward domestic political encumbrances. Betts begins with a discussion of "the contradiction of extended deterrence" — namely, that first use of nuclear weapons by the U.S. would be "suicidal" and "unthinkable," and consequently is problematic as a deterrent of a conventional attack on Europe. Betts proposes five ways to get around this contradiction: (1) replace nuclear extended deterrence with an adequate conventional defense, (2) "overcome the mutuality of nuclear deterrence by developing effective first-strike or damage-limitation capabilities," (3) "denying the symmetry of risk . . . , relying on the . . . incredibility of Soviet willingness to risk testing the bluff," (4) "developing options for limited first-use to control escalation," and (5) "ignore the contradiction, wish it away, or deny the need to deter conventional attack" (p. 98). He is uneasy about the sufficiency of the first four, in particular suggesting that Soviet strategic thinkers are unimpressed by Schellingesque notions of the initiator's asymmetrical burden of risk, "the threat that leaves something to chance," and the onus placed on the aggressor by the "last clear chance" to avoid disaster. Rather "Soviets do not differentiate deterrence from 'compellence' as clearly as American theorists do, claim to have been coerced by U.S. nuclear superiority," and believe that "the objective 'correlation of forces' — not risky bluffs — is the logical basis for strategy" (p. 101). In fact, Soviet doctrine on the political utility of military force distinguishes between the appropriate function of "defending the gains of socialism," which plausibly describes how they have actually used their military power, and more adventuristic projects for the use of force, which are not doctrinally approved. Moreover, Hannes Adomeit's study of Soviet crisis behavior suggests that the Politburo's operational code distinguishes between *fait accompli* tactics, used in defending the status quo, and very cautious

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probing tactics, used to minimize the risks of testing for cheap opportunities to revise the status quo.[7]

Thus, the Soviets probably do believe that compellence is more dangerous and less likely to succeed than deterrence, but because Betts is unconvinced of this, he sets fairly high requirements for a satisfactory deterrent posture, believing that "equal counterforce capabilities" are needed to make Soviet strategists suitably pessimistic when they assess the correlation of forces (p. 126). He worries about the West's tendency to devise all sorts of rationalizations to avoid taking measures to reduce "the discrepancy between commitments and capabilities" (pp. 99-100), and sees "the need to pacify numerous audiences within the West while conveying credible and consistent signals to the East" as a Sisyphean task (p. 101).

Managing this task requires national policymakers skilled in the manipulation of public perceptions. On one hand, Betts decries the analytical gamesmanship of bureaucratic and public actors. "Those whose real concern is maintaining extended deterrence without nuclear superiority sublimate their arguments in exaggerations of Soviet nuclear advantages. Those whose real concern is saving money or bolstering détente have to deny such advantages. This fosters gamesmanship in estimating Soviet capabilities," which Betts sees as contributing to the "litany of inconsistencies" that characterizes American strategic policy (p. 103). On the other hand, he says that central policymakers must resort to gamesmanship themselves, "obfuscating the inherent contradictions" in any strategy of extended deterrence, "since forced clarity would do more to wreck alliance cohesion and public support than to improve deterrence" (p. 123).

Just as Betts sees the balance of domestic political support as delicate and needing artful (in the Shakespearean sense) management, he views the military balance and the requirements of deterrence in much the same way. While some analysts, who stress the operational advantages of the defender, believe that NATO's conventional forces constitute a basically sound deterrent, Betts takes "the gap in the conventional balance" as axiomatic (p. 99). Likewise, at the nuclear level, he warns that "technology does not stand still," so "neither side can long remain satisfied with the quality of its deterrent. Keeping the nuclear spectre at bay turns out to mean continuing competition in exploiting technology and seeking advantage from negotiation" (p. 126).

This image of a "dynamic equilibrium" that must be managed to close tolerances helps to explain Betts's attachment to arms control.

[7] Hannes Adomeit, *Soviet Risk-taking and Crisis Behavior* (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1982), p. 319 and passim.

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Even though the Soviets care little for Western concepts of crisis stability (what Betts would call the illusory "static equilibrium") and will do little to foster it through negotiated agreements, they do appreciate the need to manage the evolution of the "dynamic equilibrium" (what some might call the counterforce arms race). Thus, they are suitable partners for creating the kind of negotiated environment that helps to take the worry out of managing fine tolerances.

All of this looks very different if you believe that the conventional balance is in tolerable shape, that the risks of nuclear escalation asymmetrically constrain the would-be aggressor, and that the Soviets *do* make a distinction between offense and defense, between deterrence and compellence. In that case, extended deterrence would not require delicate management of an evolving balance and artful obfuscation to gain public acquiescence to a controlled counterforce arms race. Unilateral measures, focusing on modest improvements in defensive conventional capability and on maintaining the survivability of nuclear forces, would suffice to assure the fundamentals of a stable deterrent balance.

Negotiated arms control would be supplementary, but not essential — something to be sought if it enhanced stability, but shunned if it merely codified and fine-tuned the balance of first-strike postures. Moreover, this strategy, unlike Betts's equal counterforce concept, could be publicly explained in a relatively straightforward and palatable manner. Arguing that equal counterforce does not alter "the impossibility of disarming either side's countervalue reserve forces" (p. 126) will sound increasingly tortuous (even if true) as Pershing II, MX, and D5 missiles are deployed. And if these forces do not provide damage-limiting capability, there is the perennial, and perennially legitimate, question of why they are worth having.[8] In short, it is Betts's view of the delicate balance of terror that drives his conclusions about managing the Western defense debate and about managing the U.S.-Soviet nuclear relationship. This is as it should be, of course. But it is worth pointing out that, although Nye claims this is a book about domestic politics and process rather than substance (p. vii), the authors' views on the substance of U.S.-Soviet relations decisively color their perceptions of the requirements for managing the domestic policymaking environment.

This managerial conception is not the only way to define moderation, however. Taking stock of America's failure to achieve moderation in its Soviet policy should include alternative conceptions of the

[8] See Jervis, *Illogic*, for a critique of limited counterforce doctrines.

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meaning of moderation, based on the reinforcement of moderating structures in the international system, which may present new possibilities for domestic political consensus as well.

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WORLD POLITICS

The New Diplomacy: International Affairs in the Modern Age. By Abba Eban. New York: Random House, 1983. 427 pp. $19.95. How odd that Abba Eban, veteran diplomat and international hobnobber, should have written a book like this! *The New Diplomacy,* considerably better than average contemporary history, is an account of the flow of international politics in the postwar era with chapters devoted to U.S.-Soviet relations, international organization, the Third World, the Middle East, Europe, and war and peace in the nuclear age. Suitable as a textbook for undergraduate or graduate introductory classes in international relations, it contains the full panoply of balanced orthodoxies, in moderately liberal dress, and is well written for the most part. (Eban has somehow restrained his tendency toward the ornate.) What is odd is that a man of considerable intellect and ample experience should have written a book that a well-disciplined academic could have written too. The author does not rise above the material; there are few striking insights, and surprisingly little in the way of personal, illustrative anecdotes about international affairs. Moreover, if one did not know in advance that Abba Eban was an Israeli, it could not be discovered by reading this book, not even the chapter on the Middle East. In sum, there is nothing specially flawed about this book, and many good uses for it can easily be imagined. Only the personal panache expected of this author is lacking.

The Diplomats. By Martin Mayer. New York: Doubleday, 1983. 417 pp. $17.95. A book about diplomats by an experienced free-lance writer that may be said to be in an advanced stage of anecdotage. This volume is foremost a compilation, in discursive form, of hundreds of interviews conducted by the author with diplomats both small and (almost) great over a five-year period. Despite its unscholarly nature, or perhaps because of it, there is enough to be learned and enjoyed in this book to make it modestly attractive. Two special cases are drawn by the author, one of the Foreign Agricultural Service of the United States and one of the Israeli

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Foreign Ministry. No structural analysis is involved here, however; just more anecdote mixed in with a little history for context.

The Green Movement in West Germany. By Elim Papadakis. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984. 230 pp. $22.50. Recent political evolutions in West Germany conferred on the Green Movement a prominent position in the nation's political and intellectual life. This book explores the sociological and psychological background of the movement, its commitment to a harsh anti-technical and anti-industrial stance. The presumed social and political alternative put forward by the Green Movement is indeed an outburst of romantic irrationalism, an endeavor to suppress the logic of industrial civilization, and to develop a transideological platform. The Green Movement staked its effort on nebulous emotions among West German youth, blaming the traditional parties for irresponsibility and lack of compassion. It is actually a major threat to liberals and social-democrats — a pressure group in both domestic and foreign West German politics. Though institutionalized as the Green Party, the movement has maintained its peculiar characteristics as a stronghold of radical pacifism and an uneasy partner to dialogue within the West German constitutional framework. This study highlights the main stages in the evolution of the Green Movement, the reasons for its appeal, the ambiguity of its message, and its inner tensions, particularly those between "fundamentalist, utopian and pragmatic tendencies."

The Third World Coalition in International Politics. Second, updated edition. By Robert A. Mortimer. Boulder, Colo. and London: Westview, 1984. 194 pp. $22.00 ($9.95, paper). The author assumes a fundamental continuity in the two institutions that in the first edition of this study he called the "backbone of the Third World coalition": the Nonaligned Movement and the Group of 77. According to Mortimer, the latter would represent a significant collective actor in the international system, whose political and economic initiatives have far-reaching consequences on both North-South and East-West relations. The Third World coalition, a reality the West has had to face during recent confrontations, is far from a homogeneous entity, a systemic unity devoid of strain and dramatic conflict. There is a permanent tension of solidarity and dispersion, and Mortimer correctly underscores the need to examine the forces underlying the survival of the Third World coalition. But the dilemmas of the Third World cannot be reduced to North-South opposition; and solidarity within the Third World is merely a naive delusion so long as basic political decisions are neglected, postponed, or even rejected. There is obviously a Third World area of common interest, a universe of shared values and

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expectations. Unfortunately, there is a mythological counterpart to these legitimate claims of Third World nations: Third Worldism as a demagogic ideological practice, the whole industry of resentful propaganda imbued with socialist dogma and anti-Western emotion. In a future edition, perhaps the author will find it useful to scrutinize Third Worldism as an ideological alibi and a substratum of desperate need and artificial solidarity, beyond the rhetoric of poverty and "common destiny."

UNITED STATES AND CANADA

Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy. By Alexander M. Haig, Jr. New York: Macmillan, 1984. 365 pp. $17.95. *Caveat* is Alexander Haig's reply to an administration that misunderstood, misused, and ultimately rejected him — according to the author, that is. There are fifteen chapters in *Caveat,* organized more or less in chronological order, dealing with both foreign policy issues and the internal politics of the Reagan administration. Haig describes the formulation of policy toward Central America, the Soviet Union, China, the Middle East, and elsewhere. Those who undertake research on the first two years of the Reagan administration's foreign policy will not be able to ignore Haig's accounts. While the former secretary of state may use the truth in a personal way, much of the information has appeared independently and little of it is subject to serious doubt. This is more than an account of events, however. It is also a window on the mind of a man with strong views about U.S. security policy, both in the abstract and the concrete. One may agree or disagree with Haig's perspective, but at least it is clear and coherent. Perhaps the most disturbing thing about *Caveat,* which has received surprisingly little comment from other reviewers, is the description of the power (and ignorance) of the men who surround the president and insulate him from the world. Haig describes the Meese-Baker-Deaver triumvirate as arrogating power in a manner that would never have occurred to Haldeman and Ehrlichman at their worst. If this is true, then we are indeed living in dangerous times.

The United States and the Persian Gulf: Past Mistakes, Present Needs. By Alvin J. Cottrell and Michael L. Moodie. New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1984. Agenda Paper, No. 13. (Distributor: Transaction Books, New Brunswick, New Jersey). 45 pp. $3.95. A brief overview of

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the U.S. military role in the Gulf, proceeding from the assumption that U.S. interests there have suffered considerable setbacks in recent years, due to both regional turbulence and inappropriate policies pursued by previous administrations. The authors look at Soviet-American naval competition in the Indian Ocean; Western interests in Saudi Arabia; the triangular relationship between the U.S., NATO, and the Gulf; and the RDF, before calling for enhanced maritime and RDF capabilities to defend U.S. interests in the Gulf. Cottrell was Director of Maritime Policy at Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies before his recent death, and Moodie was associated with CSIS before his appointment as Special Assistant for Public Affairs at the U.S. Mission to NATO.

The American Retreat: The Reagan Foreign and Defense Policy. By Joseph Churba. Chicago: Regnery Gateway, 1984. 251 pp. $18.95. The third volume of Churba's trilogy on American foreign policy, the other two being *Politics of Defeat* (1977) and *Retreat From Freedom* (1980). With chapter headings such as "The Soviet Lunge for the World," and "The Encirclement of the Persian Gulf," it is clear that the author's purpose is not mainly to educate but to persuade. The USSR, Churba argues, because of its failing economy and unrepresentative political system, is driven to seek world hegemony. Only complete dominance will insulate the USSR from the military and economic threats of the West. To achieve this dominance, the Kremlin, through subversion and coercion, has helped overthrow the government of Nicaragua, as well as the governments of Iran, Afghanistan, and Ethiopia, and, as a result, has the Persian Gulf all but surrounded. To combat this threat, the United States must build up its military forces and, together with its allies, neutralize Soviet aggression. In addition, an information campaign aimed at Soviet dissidents and minorities must be mounted to facilitate the internal collapse of the Soviet imperium. The assumption that the Soviet Union's flawed economic and political foundations can only be preserved by world domination is arguable to say the least. Furthermore, Churba totally ignores indigenous Third World nationalisms, attributing the overthrow of the Shah and Somoza entirely to Soviet and Soviet proxy meddling. Whatever its analytic frailties — the most notable being its insistence on coercing the political dynamics of the entire planet into a U.S.-Soviet prism — its most basic alarm, that the Russians are on the make in Southwest Asia, may indeed be correct. In any case, the book is valuable for its representation of a school of thought with growing influence on the traditionally isolationist Republican right.

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The Half War: Planning U.S. Rapid Deployment Forces to Meet a Limited Contingency, 1960-1983. By Robert P. Haffa, Jr. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984. Westview Replica Edition. 277 pp. $25.00 (paper). In a somewhat novel approach to a popular subject in recent years — U.S. rapid deployment forces and planning for American intervention in the Persian Gulf — this book attempts to answer the question, why did it take until the 1980s for the U.S. government to get serious about creating effective limited contingency forces. Haffa examines the handling of preparations for "limited contingencies" and "half wars" between 1960 and 1980. Discussion of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force and the new U.S. Central Command is minimal, presumably because the book seems to be based on a Ph.D. dissertation for MIT. Haffa, an associate professor of political science at the U.S. Air Force Academy, first examines the role of force planning for limited contingency within the evolution of U.S. strategic concept over these two decades, then analyzes the shortcomings of the two principal resultant organizations, STRIKE Command and Readiness Command. He next focuses on strategic mobility, pointing out that the U.S. never had the capability of supporting rapid deployment for a limited contingency simultaneously with a major force movement to Europe. Based on this three-pronged historical examination, Haffa concludes that construction of a coherent limited-contingency force requires it to be (1) made contingency-specific; (2) designated a unified command with multi-service components; (3) sized against the major threat; (4) adequately supported with strategic lift, pre-positioning, and access to regional facilities; and (5) based on a revised strategic concept. The U.S. must be prepared to deal with multiple crises simultaneously but only in those areas deemed vital to its interests.

DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY HISTORY

The Change in the European Balance of Power, 1938-1939: The Path to Ruin. By Williamson Murray. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984. 513 pp. $50.00 ($19.50, paper). The thesis of this book is that in the autumn of 1938, with the European great powers on the brink of war during the Czechoslovakian Crisis, Hitler was in a perilous strategic bind, when he had the good fortune to be rescued by Britain's Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain. While German rearmament had made important strides after the Nazi seizure of power in 1933, it certainly had not

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progressed to the point that Germany could defeat the coalition of Britain, France, and Czechoslovakia. German rearmament had been hampered by the diplomatic restrictions of Versailles and the limitations of Germany's economy. Focusing on the *relative* pace of British and German rearmament in the 1930s, Murray convincingly buries the myth that Chamberlain's appeasement of Hitler at Munich gained time for Britain to "catch up" with Germany. Actually, the reverse was the case because the Munich sell out greatly improved Germany's strategic position. Germany used the time available to it during the year after Munich to achieve a window of superiority over the armed forces of Britain and France—especially in air power. In addition, the diplomacy of Hitler and Stalin permitted Germany to avoid the strategic problem of fighting a war on two fronts and to have access to raw materials from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Murray's study is an important addition to the diplomatic and strategic history of the 1930s and the Second World War. He does a particularly fine job in relating the economic base of Britain and Germany to their military capabilities and in discussing the doctrinal and material development of the Royal Air Force and the *Luftwaffe* in this period.

The Foreign Office and the Kremlin: British Documents on Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1941-45. Edited by Graham Ross. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984. 314 pp. $49.50. There is no British equivalent to the excellent *Foreign Relations of the United States* series of documents covering the period of the Second World War. The Woodward and Butler series *Documents on British Foreign Policy* stops in September 1939 with the outbreak of war. This volume is an admirable attempt to provide scholars with easy access to important Foreign Office and Cabinet papers dealing with the uneasy wartime relations between Britain and the Soviet Union. Here are the minutes of Churchill's famous meeting with Stalin at the Kremlin in October 1944, when the great British statesman produced what he called a " 'naughty document' showing a list of Balkan countries and the proportion of interest in them of the Great Powers." Of course, this famous percentage agreement proposed by Churchill to settle the postwar position of the Balkan states by effectively creating separate British and Soviet spheres of influence has been the subject of numerous studies. While the forty-six documents contained in this volume will bring no surprises to scholars steeped in the papers of Britain's Public Record Office, they form a valuable collection for those interested in tracing the outlines of wartime diplomacy from a British perspective. It is to be hoped that other collections of wartime documents from British archives will be published, emulating the fine work done by the historians at the State Department.

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The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire. Edited by Marian Kent. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1984. 250 pp. $29.95. This volume of seven essays by prominent diplomatic historians examines the rivalries among the European great powers to expand their political influence, commercial interests, and territorial holdings in the rapidly decaying Ottoman Empire during the opening years of this century. The Ottoman Empire—known as the "sick man" of the European state system—was a prime target for partition by the expansionist great powers throughout the nineteenth century. Perhaps only their mutual jealousies and antagonisms over the division of the spoils—rather than the military strength of the Ottoman Empire—prevented partition. During the First World War, the great powers fighting against the Ottoman Empire—Britain, France, and Russia—negotiated among themselves to bring about the long-awaited partition. These competently executed essays describe the tangled diplomatic maneuverings of the European powers to expand their influence in the region while attempting to limit the expansionist urges of rivals. In addition, the first essay provides an overview of internal political changes within the Ottoman Empire during its final years.

Europe Transformed, 1878-1919. By Norman Stone. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984. 447 pp. $20.00 ($7.95, paper). Norman Stone, author of the highly acclaimed *The Eastern Front* and *Hitler,* has written a lively interpretative history of the continental European great powers during the forty-year period between 1878 to 1919. In a superb synthesis, Stone skillfully weaves the dynamic economic and social forces then transforming European society with the domestic and international politics of that era. One of Stone's principal arguments is that political institutions on the continent could not keep pace with this rapid transformation. While some of Stone's interpretations are bound to stir controversy, his scholarship is impressive, his arguments compelling. This book would make a fine text for history courses dealing with modern European politics.

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS AND TECHNOLOGY

Crisis in Economic Relations Between North and South. Edited by Norman Schofield. London: Gower Publishing Co., Ltd., 1984. 439 pp. $41.00. Research that began at a seminar in International Political Econ-

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omy at the University of Texas at Austin gives this volume a scholarly and detailed foundation in guiding the reader to an understanding of the economic circumstances that have precipitated North-South conflicts, especially in certain commodity sectors. A chapter co-authored by the editor and Karen Hirschman on "The Political Economy of Copper and Aluminum" provides a clear and sophisticated analysis of producer motives for trading and pricing in these commodities, allowing us a glimpse of the arguments made by Kennecott and CIPEC (Intergovernmental Conference of Copper Exporting Countries) in defense of their market strategy. Other chapters evaluate STABEX, the controversial earnings stabilization system of the First Lomé Convention; export earnings case studies of Ghana, Mauritius, and the Ivory Coast; and thoughtful conclusions by David McKay on "economic theory and political reality." Those seeking a clear description of North-South commodity and trade differences unfettered by rhetorical exaggeration would benefit from this book.

Power, Passions, and Purpose: Prospects for North-South Relations. Edited by Jagdish Bhagwati and John G. Ruggie. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984. 334 pp. $30.00 ($12.50, paper). Papers presented at the 1983 New Delhi Conference on Global negotiations (sponsored by the Indian Council for Research in International Economic Relations and the International Economics Research Center of Columbia University) are bound in this perceptive and realistic commentary on the present stalemate in North-South relations. While Southern negotiators have consistently sought a broad agenda for reform of the international economy and "Northern-dominated" institutions (the World Bank and the GATT), the Northern perspective has centered on a halting willingness to negotiate issues only on a piecemeal basis. The conclusion of this volume suggests agreement with the latter approach in advocating an International Monetary Conference over the previous attempts at full-scale systemic change. Advice to Third World nations is to "remain vigilant" yet develop a flexibility in their negotiating energies. Advice to the U.S. is to take the initiative (already stated as the Reagan administration's plan by Treasury Secretary Regan) in leading such a conference which would help coordinate efforts to address the increasingly serious debt-crisis. Overall, this collection serves as an excellent current and historical reference on the roots of the North-South impasse.

The Economic Theory of Social Institutions. By Andrew Schotter. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. 177 pp. No price given. This work is an effort by an economist at New York University to explain the emergence of economic and social institutions. Andrew Schotter argues

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that such institutions emerge as the result of spontaneous actions by individuals responding to societal problems that cannot be resolved through market mechanisms. Where coordination problems or prisoner's dilemma situations exist, Schotter argues, prices alone will not generate sufficient information to coordinate the behavior of economic agents. Thus social and economic institutions emerge to supplement the information available in the marketplace. The evolution of money, the organization of days into weeks, the establishment of conventions of war, and the emergence of the state can all be plausibly explained, Schotter contends, as responses of decentralized actors to recurrent social problems. Critical of what he sees as the narrow and unrealistic focus of most economists on the rare phenomenon of competitive markets, Schotter also suggests that there may be "innate biogenetic predispositions" that explain why particular institutions emerge. That "symmetric institutions" have evolved may, Schotter observes, for example, be the consequence of the fact that human "bodies are symmetric" and that "man builds social institutions that in some sense mimic his biological reality." Rationality, spontaneity, decentralization, and biology are emphasized; the role of power in the creation of social institutions is absent, by assumption, from the analysis.

Presidential Economics: The Making of Economic Policy from Roosevelt to Reagan and Beyond. By Herbert Stein. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984. 414 pp. $16.95. Stein, a former chairman of President Nixon's Council of Economic Advisers, surveys economics and economic policymaking in the United States from the Great Depression through the early 1980s. Roughly two-thirds of the book deals with the period since 1960; the concluding chapter is a long and cogent discussion of a desirable national economic policy for the future and of the obstacles to it. The book is less anecdotal than the title or Stein's government experience might suggest. Changes in economic policy and the particular types of policy adopted are considered to be as much the product of changing economic conditions, shifting national preoccupations, and changes in economic thought as of the presidents themselves. Much can be learned from the book, as a consequence, not only about people and policymaking in the White House but also about the evolution of the U.S. economy and economists in the last four decades.

Economics and World Power: An Assessment of American Diplomacy Since 1789. Edited by William H. Becker and Samuel F. Wells, Jr. New York: Columbia University Press, 1984. 474 pp. $35.00 ($10.00, paper). Eight essays written largely by historians address the role played by eco-

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nomic factors in the formation and conduct of American foreign policy since 1789. They do so, according to its editors, in order "to provide a synthesis that assesses more fully and more precisely than previous literature the interaction between foreign policy and economic needs and interests, and the perception of such needs and interests." The contributors emphasize that the role of economic factors varies over time and issue. Most, however, generally agree, as one contributor states, that economic considerations "overall . . . comprised only a portion of a larger complex of political, strategic, ideological, moral, and domestic factors which went into the making of American foreign policy." The essays were designed to be, and are, accessible to advanced undergraduates as well as to more advanced students of U.S. foreign policy.

MILITARY, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND ARMS CONTROL

The Nuclear Debate: Issues and Politics. Edited by Phil Williams. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984. 81 pp. $10.00 (paper). Four short, sharp essays on the West European nuclear debate, by Phil Williams, Lawrence Freedman, Christopher Coker, and Gina Cowen. Williams sketches the debate in its broad, political dimensions. Part of this essay provides some historical background, within an analytical framework that brings the reader forward to the present with some ability to grasp the current debate. Perhaps most valuable about Williams's essay is a sort of argumentative taxonomy, where the various rationales for and against the deployment of U.S. Pershing II missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles are laid side by side in clear language. Freedman, perhaps the best known to U.S. audiences, covers arms control. Much of his essay is historical recapitulation, together with a restatement of current issues. This essay is certainly competent, but perhaps the least inspired of the four. Coker's essay is on the politics of the peace movement in Great Britain; Cowen's does the same work on the continental peace movements. These essays weave domestic and trans-Atlantic politics with skill, and the details provided about the European peace movements are recommended especially for the American reader, for whom good summaries of the European peace movements have been hard to find.

The M16 Controversies: Military Organizations and Weapons Acquisitions. By Thomas L. McNaugher. New York: Praeger, 1984. 211

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pp. $25.95. Within this book is everything and more than the average scholar would wish to know about U.S. army rifles and their acquisition. Despite the avalanche of detail that makes reading this book something less than sheer joy, there is here an important contribution to scholarship. McNaugher has looked at the acquisition process of the famous "rifle that couldn't" in Vietnam as an extended case study in the sociology of military bureaucracy. For the most part, the book succeeds. The analysis is careful and sophisticated, and guided, as the author attests, by Steinbruner's cybernetic theory of decision making, one of the better treatments of organizational decision-making processes to come along in many years. Aside from its thick construction, the book has only one real drawback. Though it features a concluding chapter whose title and subtitles suggest a herculean emergence from myriad details into the clarity of general conclusion, such final clarity is missing. The reader is left to imagine an adequate conclusion, based on fragments dropped here and there among the chapters. It would be too much to ask that more be made out of a single case study than is merited intellectually, but here less is made out of an interesting case than was possible. On balance this is a worthy study, though perhaps not for the merely casual student of such subjects.

Preventing War in the Nuclear Age. By Dietrich Fischer. Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman & Allanheld, 1984. 228 pp. $16.95 ($9.95, paper). Richard Falk praises this book as "perhaps the most important book ever written about nuclear war." Actually, it is but a reiteration of numerous varieties of intellectual fluff, repackaged and bedecked with new jargon and filled with strawmen and false dualisms. The author informs the reader with an air of profundity that weakness is sometimes an invitation to aggression, that security need not be a zero-sum proposition, and that (this in italics on page 175) "it is not wise to rely on a nation to keep agreements that go against her interests." Having staked a claim to seriousness by rejecting unilateral disarmament, Fischer argues that we need "transarmament": a rejection of offensive arms that cause war and tension in favor of solely defensive arms that produce stability. This reminds one of Freeman Dyson's *Weapons and Hope* (see review in ORBIS, Summer 1984), except that Dyson has some idea of the complexities of distinguishing offensive from defensive weapons. Fischer evidently does not. One might imagine for a moment that Fischer favors the Reagan Administration's strategic defense initiative. But no, it might frighten the Russians. Fischer favors a nuclear freeze and a comprehensive test ban; and opposes counterforce targetting, launch-on warning, and so forth. Moreover, Fischer rejects deterrence as a permanent solution to the nuclear dilemma. He favors instead "dissuasion," but this reviewer, at least, had a pretty

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hard time figuring out the difference. Alas, this is not the most important book ever written on nuclear war. But, experts take heart; you are not supposed to read this book. Fischer tells us early on: "The problem is that those who make war and those who want to prevent it are usually not the same. This book is not addressed to those who initiate war, but to its potential victims. . . . This book is not written for specialists," says Fischer, but for those who already understand that "the use of violence is counterproductive in the long run because it helps make enemies rather than friends."

SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE

The Soviet Union and Revolutionary Iran. By Aryeh Y. Yodfat. London: Croom Helm; New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984. 168 pp. $25.00. Associated with the Lavon Research Institute of the Israel General Federation of Labor, Yodfat provides a carefully documented survey of Soviet relations with Iran over the course of the twentieth century. As in his companion volume on *The Soviet Union and the Arabian Peninsula,* the emphasis is on a recitation of events, agreements, and public statements. Yodfat does not really delve into broader policy concerns or the underlying motivations of either side.

Crisis in Soviet Agriculture. By Stefan Hedlund. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984. 228 pp. $27.50. This examination of the structural roots of Soviet agricultural failures places primary responsibility on the institutional framework of the state and collective farms. The future of any significant reform will depend on convincing top leaders that basic changes will work, and overcoming opposition of local officials whose control functions will likely be replaced by market mechanisms.

Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe. Edited by Sarah Meiklejohn Terry. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984. 375 pp. No price given. A Council on Foreign Relations book that includes a dozen chapters focusing on both bilateral relations between Moscow and its East European counterparts and functional problems of economics, energy and military relations. John C. Campbell, Andrzej Korbonski, Jiri Valenta, John Hardt, and Pierre Hassner are among the contributors. The editor notes that Soviet succession struggles, such as that underway since Brezhnev's death in November

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1982, have "traditionally had a destabilizing effect on Eastern Europe" as Moscow is unable to impose a consistent policy in the region while preoccupied with domestic intrigues. Moreover, parallel succession crises are likely to beset several East European countries during the present period of Soviet leadership instability: Zhivkov in Bulgaria, Kadar in Hungary, Husak in Czechoslovakia, and Honecker in East Germany are all seventy years of age or older.

Political Elite Recruitment in the Soviet Union. By Bohdan Harasymiw. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984. 277 pp. $27.95. Measures the chances for key categories of the population to advance into elite roles in Soviet society. A long chapter, originally published in *Osteuropa,* on the *nomenklatura,* lists positions inside the Party and outside that may be filled only by Party initiative or confirmation. Harasymiw believes that a crisis has developed in the Soviet system of political recruitment.

The Dilemma of Reform in the Soviet Union. By Timothy J. Colton. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1984. 113 pp. $6.95 (paper). The outgrowth of the Council's 1982-83 study group on the Soviet Union, this slim volume argues that the most likely direction of domestic policy over the next decade is moderate reform rather than radical or minimal reform, conservatism, reaction, or (hypothetically) revolution. Completed in April 1984, the book incorporates developments in the early months of the Chernenko "era." Favoring "a balanced policy toward a changing Soviet Union," Colton concludes that "little faith should be invested in the false notion that we can soon tame Soviet foreign behavior by changing Soviet society."

Soviet-East European Relations: Consolidation and Conflict 1968-1980. By Robert L. Hutchings. Madison, Wis.: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1984. 314 pp. $27.50. This timely, well-documented, ably analyzed study examines the USSR's economic, military, and ideological efforts to foster a totally integrated relationship with the communist regimes of Eastern Europe. The problems and progress of the period from 1968 to 1980 show the Kremlin's quest for cohesion and stability still beset by "the internal contradictions and fundamental instability of an empire held together by force." Soviet internationalism had made little headway against the nationalisms endemic in the region.

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THE MIDDLE EAST

Islam: A Primer. By John Sabini. Washington: Middle East Editorial Associates, 1983. 127 pp. $7.50 (paper). Not bad for a first exposure to Islam, but beyond that, this little book is of very modest use. Islamic history, traditions, law, theology and sectarian divisions are all covered briefly. Overall, the book portrays a rather rosy picture of Islam, being written quite clearly by a believer. Perhaps there is nothing wrong with this after centuries of Western portrayals of Muslims as a bunch of fanatical, blood-drinking savages. The scholar, or even the average undergraduate, will consult books of greater sophistication and balance. One that comes easily to mind is Philip Hitti's *Islam: A Way of Life* (1970).

The Peace Process 1969-1973: Efforts and Contacts. By Mordechai Gazit. Jerusalem: the Magnes Press of Hebrew University, 1983. 154 pp. No price given. It is "common knowledge" that between the death of Nasser in September 1970 and the October War of 1973, Israel did not do enough in the pursuit of peace to avoid the disastrous and painful war that befell it. Like other examples of common knowledge, this one, says Mordechai Gazit, is wrong. Gazit details the diplomacy of the period, showing that despite a variety of constraints and problems, the Israeli government was not remiss in pursuing peace. Gazit ought to know at least a little about this: he was the number two man in the Israeli Foreign Ministry during most of this period and, as the brother of Major General Shlomo Gazit of military intelligence, was obviously privy to much inside information. His narrative is a classic example of writing history from the inside out — starting with the established facts and then sifting through the public record for scholarly corroboration. The narrative is also sensitive to the nuances of the complexity of the diplomatic process, and the retelling forces the reader to deal with that complexity. Perhaps Gazit does not deal sufficiently with the perceptions ascendent at the time, nor with the very important role that a lax American policy played during this period. Nevertheless, this is a fine essay and well worth reading. Unfortunately, it is also a work that may be missed outside of Israel both because getting books from Israel requires extra effort and because, alas, no biographical note specifying Gazit's qualifications is included anywhere in the volume.

Political Parties in the West Bank Under the Jordanian Regime, 1949-1967. By Amnon Cohen. (Translated from the Hebrew by David Bernstein.) Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982. 278 pp. $19.50. It is as-

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tonishing that much of the best scholarship we have today on Jordan and the Palestinians is written by Israelis. Here is yet another example, adding to the work of Porath, Migdal, Heller, Harkabi, Mishal, Susser, Plascov, and others. In this volume, Cohen details the histories, organization, and fate of the Jordanian Communist Party, al-Qawmiyun al-Arab, the Muslim Brothers, and the Liberation Party. As his narrative proceeds, specific histories and personal portraits are enriched by an interweaving of the broader political context in Jordan and beyond. Cohen's book was aided by a rare archival windfall. When Israeli forces captured Jerusalem in 1967, a horde of documents fell into Israeli hands and were rapidly made available to Israeli scholars. Cohen dove into this material with enthusiasm, resulting in a careful, well-detailed analysis. The essence of this book appeared in English as part of a collection entitled *Palestine Arab Politics,* published by the Truman Institute of the Hebrew University (1975). But that little book is hard to find nowadays and lacks the comprehensiveness of this full account.

United Arab Emirates. Compiled by Frank A. Clements. Oxford, Eng., and Santa Barbara, Calif.: Clio Press, 1983. World Bibliographical Series, no. 43. 162 pp. $26.00. Another volume in ABC-Clio's handy World Bibliographical Series. This one consists of 565 entries, each with a brief annotation, and a comprehensive index. Many of the entries have only marginal relevance to the UAE, but the volume is noticeably short as it stands. More important, the compiler has been extremely diligent in tracking down those citations having direct bearing on the UAE and has included nearly all of them. Clements also compiled the volumes on Saudi Arabia and Oman for this series.

The Middle East Political Dictionary. By Lawrence Ziring. Santa Barbara, Calif., and Oxford, Eng.: ABC-CLIO Information Services, 1984. 454 pp. $37.50. The first encyclopedic dictionary of the Middle East in about a decade, this volume is reasonably accurate and comprehensive, with some 300 entries on the region between Morocco and Pakistan. While the subdivision into six chapters (political geography and geopolitics, Islam, ethnicity and political culture, political parties and movements, Israelis and Palestinians, diplomacy, and conflict) is logically sound, it makes the book cumbersome to use, and the reader is forced to rely almost completely on the index and "guide to countries." Each entry includes a paragraph on "Significance," many of which are bound to raise eyebrows. Also included are maps of the Middle East and the Arab-Israeli conflict, as well as tables on ethnic groups, Palestinian population,

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country profiles, and a short bibliography. A worthwhile work for anyone's reference shelf, if the price does not dissuade.

Who's Who in Saudi Arabia 1983-84. (Third edition.) Jidda: Tihama (distributor: Gale Research, Detroit), 1984. 375 pp. $65.00. Provides information on about 1,200 individuals, including some seventy members of the Al Sa'ud ruling family and separate biographies of King Fahd, Crown Prince 'Abdullah, and Second Deputy Prime Minister Sultan. The usefulness of the book is enhanced by an index arranged according to profession, and there is also a short survey of the country with a number of statistical tables. Not surprisingly, the amount of detail given varies from one individual to another, and many entries obviously were based uncritically on information provided by the persons cited.

A Concise History of the Middle East. (Second edition.) By Arthur Goldschmidt, Jr. Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1984. 416 pp. $30.00 ($11.95, paper). It is a challenge indeed to cover four thousand years of the history of one of the most complicated and tempestuous regions of the world in 339 pages. Experts on one period or another are bound to have quibbles, and even serious disagreement, with any work that rushes through the centuries substituting, as it must, generalities for data and analysis. The Lebanese Crisis and the Iraqi Revolution of 1958 are covered in three paragraphs, for example. But while easy to criticize such broadly stroked volumes, it is hard to write them. This is indeed a book well designed for classroom use; that is, for use by a skillful teacher. The first nine chapters deal with the Middle East before the entry of modern European power and ideologies. Chapters ten through sixteen cover events through the end of World War II and the birth of the State of Israel. Chapters seventeen through twenty-one bring us up-to-date; the final (and perhaps the weakest) chapter of this revised edition is devoted to the Islamic resurgence and events in Lebanon. The book also features a good chronology, a useful index — absolutely indispensable for such a book, a glossary, and an extensive bibliographical essay alerting interested students to other works of substance and detail.

The Arabian Peninsula: Zone of Ferment. Edited by Robert W. Stookey. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1984. 151 pp. $22.95. A diverse collection of essays, all but one first presented at a panel of the 1981 Middle East Studies Association conference. Perhaps the most interesting contribution, by Monte Palmer, Ibrahim Alghofaily and Saud Alnimir, looks at behavioral patterns in Saudi Arabia and their impact on the country's attempts to break away from *rentier* status. The authors conclude

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that Saudi development efforts face serious constraints due to the citizenry's disdain for manual labor, its unwillingness to relocate geographically to meet the country's occupational needs, and the premium that Saudi society places on contentment over achievement and risk-taking in career values. Calvin H. Allen, Jr., and Robert W. Stookey contribute interesting and well-written surveys of the U.S. relationship with Oman and the political development of two states in Yemen, respectively. Nazih N. M. Ayubi's article on Arab aid, in the context of OPEC-Third World relations, is comprehensive and thought-provoking, while Robert E. Looney's examination of the impact of the petroleum industry on Saudi economic development covers the ground thoroughly, if perfunctorily. The one weak link is Alexander Bligh's labored attempt to relate rumors and unsubstantiated accounts of "instability" and attempted coups in Saudi Arabia to prevailing ideological and political patterns in the Middle East.

Kuwait and the Gulf: Small States and the International System. By Hassan Ali Al-Ebraheem. Washington: Georgetown University, Center for Contemporary Arab Studies; London: Croom Helm, 1984. 117 pp. $10.95. Looking at the role of small states in international relations, with particular reference to Kuwait and its neighbors, the author concludes that small states are here to stay. He contends that the uproar about their increase is nothing but a manifestation of the West's concern over losing its monopoly in the U.N. and other international organizations. Al-Ebraheem, a political scientist at Kuwait University, notes that Kuwait abandoned 250 years of local neutrality when it joined the Gulf Cooperation Council, but argues that this action reflects the recognition of Kuwait and the other members that they cannot survive on an individual basis. But he also asks whether they can survive even within the GCC. For the GCC to work, Al-Ebraheem contends that its foreign policy must be based on neutrality; its goal of social and economic integration must be viewed as the first step in the integration of all the Arab countries; and it should strive to reduce the gap between rich and poor Arabs (through adoption of a plan similar to the Marshall Plan).

Oil Supply Disruptions in the 1980s: An Economic Analysis. By Karim Pakravan. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1984. Hoover International Studies. 85 pp. No price given. An analyst for the First National Bank of Chicago, the author contends that international cooperation, ideally between OPEC, other oil exporters, and oil importers (including both North and South) is essential to reducing the economic costs of a potential disruption of Gulf oil supplies. He elaborates a number of "coun-

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tervailing policies" aimed at reducing disruption costs. For the U.S., he advocates both "anticipatory policies,"such as an import tariff, stockpiling, and domestic oil and gas deregulations, and "emergency measures," including the unlimited release of oil reserves at market prices, and regulations requiring a switch to alternative fuels. But Pakravan cautions that the long-term solution to Gulf oil security problems can be found only in the region itself, where he counsels economic integration, beginning with the hydrocarbon industries.

Arab Petropolitics. By Abdulaziz Al-Sowayegh. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984. 207 pp. $25.00. Saudi Arabi's Assistant Deputy Minister for Foreign Information looks at the purpose, utility, and goals of the "oil weapon." After a recapitulation of the development of the oil industry in the Middle East, the creation of OPEC and its members' "triumph" in gaining control of their oil resources, the author examines the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the beginnings of a coalescence of oil and politics. The heart of the book consists of a detailed analysis of the emergence of oil as a weapon against U.S. support of Israel and an assessment of its future viability and success. Al-Sowayegh concludes that "The real challenge facing the Arabs in the 1980s is to use their oil as an opportunity to promote economic prosperity, and to reaffirm their political sovereignty and international influence to effect legitimate Arab demands for a just and lasting solution of the Palestine problem."

The Islamic Impact. Edited by Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, Byron Haines and Ellison Findly. Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1984. 249 pp. No price given. A collection of ten essays, seven delivered as lectures in a series sponsored by, among others, the National Council of the Churches of Christ, USA. The essays explore the centrality of religion to Islamic art, science, politics, and six other subjects. Although the book is uneven and the unifying theme, the impact of Islam on Muslim culture, seems stretched at times, three essays are noteworthy. Charles Issawi's essay on Islam and contemporary economics is revealing in its description of why traditional Islamic society and practices made capital formation, and therefore the natural development of capitalism, impossible. John Esposito's thorough and readable account of the evolution of Islamic law provides a wealth of information on Sharia law and modern attempts to apply and reform it. Akbar Muhammad's account of Islam in America is interesting and concise, if of marginal significance. In contrast, Willen Bijlefeld's "On Being Muslim" is too technical for anyone without a serious interest in Koranic philosophy. Eqbal Ahmad's essay on Islam and politics rants and cants against Western institutions and biases, but itself evidences

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cultural bias and prejudice. On balance, a book of modest interest for specialists. General readers will look elsewhere for edification.

The Struggle for South Yemen. By Joseph Kostiner. London: Croom Helm; New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984. 195 pp. $23.95. This account of the National Liberation Front's rise to the top in the struggle to replace the British in Aden Colony and Protectorate relies on a "nuts-and-bolts" approach. Kostiner, now at the Shiloah Center, Tel Aviv, has been thorough in his combing of pertinent published material, including relevant Arabic sources (especially important since he obviously was unable to talk to the participants), and has produced a detailed chronicle of a critical period in South Yemen's history. Crammed full of significant dates, names, and movements, this study is useful but the reader is warned: Kostiner is heavy on facts and very light on analysis.

The Iran-Iraq War: An Historical, Economic and Political Analysis. Edited by M. S. El Azhary. London: Croom Helm; New York: St. Martin's Press, for the University of Exeter Centre for Arab Gulf Studies and the University of Basra Centre for Arab Gulf Studies, 1984. 144 pp. $22.50. First presented in a symposium at the University of Exeter in July 1982, this collection of ten papers on various aspects of the war better represents the Iraqi point of view. Best are David E. Long discussing the war's impact on international oil trends, John Townsend analyzing the economic effects on the belligerents, and John Duke Anthony examining the regional and worldwide implications of the war. Other contributors look at the historical background to the Shatt al-'Arab and Khuzistan disputes, Iraq's twin strategy of pursuing both development and war efforts, and the attitudes of the Arab states and the superpowers. Finally, Glen Balfour-Paul outlines the numerous missed opportunities for bringing the long war to an end. He expresses the hope that Iran and Iraq, having turned to war for a settlement of their disputes, will in the future pursue peaceful means to advance their respective claims to regional hegemony.

Fire in Beirut: Israel's War in Lebanon with the PLO. By Dan Bavly and Elaihu Salpeter. New York: Stein and Day, 1984. 261 pp. $18.95. An attempt to explore thoroughly the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, that somewhat exceeds the competence of its journalist authors. Bavly and Salpeter explore the war and its roots from the Israeli, Palestinian, and Arab standpoints and include chapters on the role and reactions of the superpowers. Such a broad approach whets the reader's appetite but the authors do not deliver, at least not quite enough. The book, however, offers a very readable account of the political maneuverings inside the

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Knesset and Likud, and paints a vivid portrait of a powerful and domineering Ariel Sharon dragging a docile Knesset into his war. Bavly, who during the war served in the office of the Israeli military spokesman, and Salpeter, a correspondent with *Ha'aretz,* demonstrate their special knowledge detailing the media's coverage of censorship of the electronic media in an open society at war. Much of the remaining narrative, derived from secondary sources, is sparsely documented and occasionally in error. For a more sophisticated treatment, seek out Zeev Schiff and Ehud Yaari's account, *Israel's Lebanon War,* published in September by Simon and Schuster.

Israeli Security Planning in the 1980s: Its Politics and Economics. Edited by Zvi Lanir. New York: Praeger, 1984. 271 pp. $29.95. Twelve essays by Israeli scholars on aspects of Israeli defense decision making are organized into four sections. The first, "Constraints and Variables in Israeli Defense Policy," featuring essays by Yuval Ne'eman, Yoram Peri, and the editor, is the more general. Here the general reader may find discussions within his ken. The second section on the regional arms race features essays by Zeev Bonen, Aryeh Shalev, and Aharon Yariv, a former Director of Military Intelligence in Israel and one of the brightest analysts inside (and outside) the Middle East. In the third section Ezra Sadan, Eliezer Sheffer, and Naftali Blumenthal delve into the economic implications of security policies. A final section studies decision making at the national security level in essays by Pinchas Zusman, Yehezkel Dror, and Zvi Lanir and Zur Shapira. Most of this book is for the specialist, and in this area has no peer, assembling some of the best scholarship that Israel has to offer on the topic. While the essays do not all aspire to produce generalizations from the Israeli experience, the level of analysis is sophisticated enough to suggest schemas applicable elsewhere. The volume is a product of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University.

The War for Lebanon, 1970-1983. By Itamar Rabinovich. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984. 243 pp. $19.95. A very readable and sophisticated political-military analysis of the Lebanese crisis from the 1975-76 period through the end of 1982. Rabinovich, head of the Dayan Center and the Shiloah Institute for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University, begins by reminding the reader of the unusual character of Lebanon as a state. He then details the events of 1975-76, and subsequently carries the narrative to the eve of the Israeli invasion in June 1982. Especially pleasing about this account is its skill at mixing the byzantine complexities of Lebanon's various factions and families with regional and international facets of the conflict as well. Naturally, Rabinovich is able

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to throw special light on the Israeli attitude and policies in all this, and he does so in a dispassionately analytical, even antiseptic, way. Chapter five covers the war itself from June to September 1982. There follows an "interim assessment" of the consequences of the Israeli invasion, and a postscript for the English language version of the book covering some of the events of 1983. Study aids abound — a chronology, a glossary, maps, documentary appendices and an impressive array of notes — illustrating the author's facility with English, Hebrew, Arabic, and French language sources. Those readers who want a detailed account only of the 1982 war will probably be better served by a forthcoming account written by Zeev Schiff. But for those with ambitions of understanding events in Lebanon over the past decade, this is the book to read.

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

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

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

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